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Modern industrial development, which implies the introduction of 
new technologies and complex investments, has brought about the 
appearance of intellectual and professional activities specializing in these 
tasks - consulting and engineering (C&E) activities. 
These activities organize and apply knowledge for purposes of 
investment and production. In the case of investment, they are concerned 
with the planning and implementation of investment projects: formula-
tion of the project, choice of the most appropriate product design and 
process technology, project evaluation, detailed design and engineering, 
procurement of plant, preparation of contract documents, supervision of 
construction, testing, and starting-up of new installations. In the area of 
production, they render valuable services for the operation and mainte-
nance of the plant, the solution of management problems, and the training 
of personnel. When backed by research and development, they provide 
the necessary support for adapting imported technologies to the local 
environment and for creating and applying new technologies. 
If a country lacks the capacity to carry out C&E activities by itself, 
projects will be designed and executed by outsiders, with a concomitant 
loss of local decision power and the danger of inappropriate technical 
solutions that do not correspond to local conditions and needs. In 
addition, opportunities to favour purchases of domestic equipment, 
inputs, and technical services and to create effective links between 
research institutions and the productive sector will be lost. 
Optimal investment projects and self-reliance in technological mat-
ters depend crucially on having consulting and engineering capabilities of 
one's own and employing them properly. Developing countries should 
have an interest in establishing their own consulting and engineering 
design organizations (CEDOs), developing them so they can efficiently 
carry out their activities, and utilizing them in the most appropriate 
mariner. This is increasingly being understood by some countries that have 
formulated policies for such purposes. In other developing countries, 
however, such a need is not yet properly appreciated. 
Interest in the subject has increased in recent years, and a growing 
body of literature has become available since the early 1970s.1 A number of 
relatively advanced developing countries, notably India, Brazil, Korea, and 
Argentina, have adopted legislation and policies to promote their C&E 
capabilities, with various degrees of success. The subject has also engaged 
1See references at the end of chapter 1. 
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the interest of several development agencies, which have supported 
research and outlined programs for promoting the development of C&E 
capabilities. A short review of these activities provides a backdrop for 
IDRC's efforts on the subject: 
• UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) has 
been looking at the question for several years, has conducted a number of 
surveys, and has contributed to the creation of consulting and engineering 
capabilities in several developing countries, within industrial research 
centres or as separate institutions. In June 1978 it convened a meeting in 
Ljubljana to discuss the problems faced by CEDOs in developing countries 
and to appraise the possibilities of cooperation among them. The meeting 
found that industrial consultancy is a key element of industrialization 
programs because it contributes directly to evolving appropriate technical 
and economic solutions in harmony with national socioeconomic objec-
tives, securing improved terms in technology acquisition, and achieving 
technical and managerial self-reliance through a more effective use of 
national resources: consultancy is the "software" equivalent of capital 
goods, which is the essential "hardware" input for industrialization. 
• The United Nations Development Programme has been keenly aware 
of the importance of consulting and engineering for the formulation of 
appropriate development projects and has tried to enhance the participa-
tion of CEDOs from developing countries in the projects it promotes. In 
1975 it sponsored a meeting on consulting services in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, and more recently it has supported work on the subject of 
cooperation in consulting and engineering services among developing 
countries. 
• The Inter-American Development Bank has created several preinvest-
ment funds in Latin American countries since the mid-1960s, with the 
purpose of improving project preparation in the public sector; such funds 
became explicit supporters of national consulting and engineering and 
have recently inaugurated a program of collaboration among themselves 
in which this support will be further enhanced. 
• The World Bank has carried out careful studies regarding the use of 
Bank-funded projects for building up local technical and project 
capabilities, and the results have allowed it to draft improved procedures 
that have recently been incorporated as operative suggestions in the 
Bank's manual of operations. 
• The OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment) has conducted studies on CEDOs of industrial countries and their 
activities in developing countries and has supported six case studies (in 
Cameroon, Colombia, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Peru, and Thailand), which were 
reviewed at a seminar in Paris in October 1978. An important finding was 
that CEDOs of developed countries are not much aware of the conditions 
and needs of the developing countries for which they design investment 
projects and tend to transplant solutions from developed countries to an 
environment where they may not be fully adequate. Such solutions tend to. 
favour the purchase of technology, equipment, and production inputs 
from the country in which the CEDO resides; the possible supply by 
entities of the recipient country is not fully taken into account. 
The International Development Research Centre has sponsored work 
on consulting and engineering since 1974, when it commissioned M. 
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Kamenetzky to carry out a study of the evolution of process engineering in 
Mexico and Argentina. Also, it sponsored the Science and Technology 
Policy Instruments Project, and a number of the participating teams 
identified the issue of consulting and engineering design services as one 
that warranted research. Several national studies were carried out and a 
technical meeting took place in Caracas, Venezuela, in October 1975, 
where papers were submitted by the teams from Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Korea, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Observers from UNDP, 
the World Bank, the OECD, and the IDB-ECLA research group were also 
present and referred to the work carried out in their respective organiza-
tions. One of the conclusions of the meeting was that the subject was of 
great importance and that it was ripe for research. 
Consequently, in October1976, IDRC convened a meeting in Corfu, at 
which a number of people defined the outlines of a possible research 
project on this theme. A paper prepared by Dr Anil Malhotra on consulting 
and engineering design organizations served as a background paper. 
Since the Corfu meeting, a number of discussions have been held on ways 
and means of providing greater definition and focus to a CEDO research 
project. There was an agreement that the subject is complex and that an 
exchange of views should help to clarify the critical policy issues that are 
amenable to research and analysis. 
As a contribution to this objective, IDRC asked me to draft guidelines 
for case studies of CEDOs to be carried out in several developing countries 
and to prepare a review of the subject, which, together with the case 
studies, could help to define an international collaborativE( research 
project. It was recognized that these case studies would be a necessary 
preliminary to the formulation of a more detailed research proposal on this 
theme. 
The case studies were made in 1978-79 in four countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Philippines, and Korea). Together with other material, they were 
reviewed at a meeting convened by IDRC in St. jovite, Canada, in October 
1979. This meeting was attended by participants from several developing 
countries who had been directly concerned with the subject as practition-
ers, policymakers, or researchers. After several days' work, a research 
proposal was drafted for submission to IDRC, touching on the principal 
issues identified by the participants. 
At the same time, those meeting in St. jovite felt that the studies 
prepared under the auspices of I DRC and reviewed at the meeting were of 
great potential interest to a wider audience, and therefore it was suggested 
that a publication should be envisaged with this material. This suggestion 
was accepted by IDRC and has resulted in the present volume. 
THE BOOK 
Chapter 1 is an essay on the general question of consulting and 
engineering in developing countries. The essay draws heavily on conver-
sations with practitioners, users, and researchers; on discussions at 
international meetings on the subject; and on the growing literature. 
Some of my previous experiences have also been incorporated. 
Chapter 2 reproduces the guidelines that were prepared for the case 
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studies. These guidelines followed from a conceptual framework that has 
been incorporated in chapter 1. 
The case studies are shown in chapters 3 - 6, in edited versions of the 
original reports. Results of the case studies are reviewed and compared in 
chapter 7. 
Finally, chapter 8 looks into the areas that should be considered in the 
planning of future research on the subject, which emerge from the 




CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING DESIGN 
ORGANIZATIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
ALBERTO ARAoz 
Consulting and engineering design are activities of an intellectual 
nature, which organize and apply knowledge for purposes of investment 
and production. They are characterized by certain methods of work, or 
methodologies, and often by a multidisciplinary approach. The services 
produced are not just of a technical nature; the economic, environmental, 
organizational, and training aspects are important for a good formulation 
and execution of investment projects, as well as for the efficient operation 
of the resulting installations. There is an accent on professionalism and 
multidisciplinarity, which distinguishes the best consulting and 
engineering design organizations. 
There are some semantic and definitional problems deriving from the 
use of different terms for these activities (e.g., consulting, consultancy, 
industrial consultancy (UNIDO), technical consultancy (India), consulting 
engineering, etc.) and for those who are engaged in them (often, 
contractors provide C&E services and on doing so they are acting as 
consulting engineers, and conversely when consulting engineers con-
struct they act as contractors). Sometimes a certain term is incorporated 
into legislative texts and adopts a definite meaning in a particular country. 
I shall use the set of definitions that were agreed on at the STPI 
meeting on consulting and engineering services (Caracas 1975), which are 
of an operational character. C&E services are rendered at different stages 
of a project (Table 1). 
Consulting services comprise the preinvestment services as well as 
advisory services in the two other categories - project execution and 
operation maintenance-the rest being engineering services. Therefore, 
consulting services include preinvestment services (prefeasibility and 
feasibility), as well as services rendered to a client related to the 
coordination, control, and supervision of project execution, and to the 
operation and maintenance of productive installations; and engineering 
services (or engineering design services) include those related to project 
engineering (basic engineering, detailed engineering), to product design 
and engineering, and to other design activities. 
Consulting services at the preinvestment stage may involve various 
disciplines - engineering, architecture, economics, finance, law, ecolo-
gy, and occasionally even medical, psychological, and educational sci-
ences - the personnel aiming to conceive and appraise a project so that a 
sound decision may be made. The contributions of professionals from the 
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Table 1. C&E services at different stages of a project. 
Services 
Preinvestment services 
Project execution services 
Services for operation and 
maintenance 
Stage of a project 
Prefeasibility studies (surveys, 
identification, evaluation); project 
feasibility study 
Project engineering (engineering 
survey, detailed engineering, product 
engineering, organization and 
management, information systems); 
project implementation (procurement, 
construction -supervision); 
commissioning and start-up (includes 
personnel training) -
Production and maintenance 
disciplines must be integrated so that the result is based on estimates of 
various parameters, which may later change in value. Thus, there is a 
degree of uncertainty; input costs may vary, unexpected contingencies 
such as a geological fault may appear, a new and better technology may be 
produced, and so on. 
Engineering services come into the picture when the main charac-
teristics of the project have been decided upon and a technology has been 
chosen. They are mainly performed by engineers, collaborating techni-
cians, and draftspersons. Uncertainty of the outcome is much lower than 
at the preinvestment stage, so that consulting services are "probabilistic," 
and engineering services are "deterministic." 
C&E services may be classified in different ways according to the type 
of service, the branch of economic activity to which it is rendered, and the 
type of client. This classification allows a fine division that can be 
expressed in tabular form; examples are surveys made by UNIDO and 
OECD. 
In developing countries, C&E services are required mostly by users in 
the public sector (ministries, planning commissions, regional develop-
ment authorities, public enterprises, development banks, and institutions 
in charge of promoting industrial development). Private industry is usually 
a less important client. Small- and medium-scale enterprises are potential 
clients for a wide variety of C&E services, mostly in the areas of 
management, technical assistance, and information. 
The cost of preinvestment consulting services is only a very small 
fraction -1-3% in most cases-of the total investment, but such services 
are crucial from the technical as well as the economic and social points of 
view. In a developing CC?Untry, the intervention of a local consulting 
organization may mean that the project is conceived with much more 
relevance to local needs and conditions than it would be if a consultant 
from an industrialized country were employed. Local engineering may 
contribute further in maximizing domestic inputs. 
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I shall use the term consulting and engineering design organization, 
CEDO, to denote the organization producing C&E services. Several types 
may be distinguished: private C&E firms, which restrict themselves to 
rendering C&E services; public C&E firms, which are similar to private 
CEDOs except that they are state owned; public organizations that supply 
C&E services in addition to other services - for instance, industrial 
research institutes, industrial design organizations, technical information 
centres; captive or in-house organizations in public or private enterprises, 
which may be called engineering departments, project departments, etc., 
and may be temporary or permanent; in-house organizations in contrac-
tors and in equipment suppliers, which frequently provide C&E services to 
their clients by formulating projects that will incorporate their goods and 
services. 
C&E activities in developing countries are in general not fully 
developed. Domestic CEDOs tend to be weak, and demand is geared to a 
varying but important extent toward foreign CEDOs or their local sub-
sidiaries and joint ventures. At an early stage of development, C&E 
capabilities tend to be concentrated in construction and civil engineering, 
as well as in preinvestment services in general. CEDOs devoted to 
industrial projects appear later on; as industrialization proceeds, the 
scope of their activities becomes wider, and in some cases basic 
engineering capabilities are achieved. 
If a country does not have the capacity to produce C&E services, 
projects will be conceived, designed, and executed by foreign-based 
CEDOs, with the danger of inadequate technological solutions, the need 
to import capital goods and production inputs that might have been 
supplied locally, and the continuing dependence on foreign know-how 
and foreign skills. 
CEDOs in developing countries have a wider and deeper role than 
those in industrialized countries. This is partly due to the more primitive 
conditions under which they operate, the relative ignorance and 
unfavourable attitudes of their clients, and other obstacles to their activity. 
The principal difference, however, lies in the important socioeconomic 
role they may fulfill by setting up projects that are appropriate to local 
conditions and by putting in motion a process that may produce significant 
impacts on development, beyond the contribution of the project itself. 
When C&E activities are carried out by competent domestic CEDOs 
with knowledge of local conditions, the potential benefits for the investor 
as well as for the whole economy are more adequate technological 
solutions, clearly delineated investment packages, and efficient absorp-
tion of foreign technology and foreign consultancy inputs. There may also 
be a reduction in the cost of projects and their foreign exchange 
component, because local consultancy services are often cheaper and 
there is a higher proportion of local inputs than with foreign-based 
services. 
Perhaps more significant in the long run are the favourable impacts 
outside the limits of the project itself. Locally designed projects tend to use 
more local inputs, thus increasing the demand within the country for 
capital goods, components, technology, services, and professionals. 
Bargaining power vis-a-vis foreign investors and technology suppliers may 
be increased. Knowledge may be spread more effectively among firms. 
New skills, attitudes, and capabilities are bound to be introduced 
11 
throughout the industrial spectrum as widespread learning takes place. 
CEDOs may link up local research and development (R&D) institutions 
with the productive sector, taking charge of the engineering aspects of 
new technical solutions and providing technical assistance once industrial 
production has started. 
The experience of several developing countries shows that such 
positive impacts on development have materialized as the management of 
knowledge by nationals has strengthened. 
Some authors - of whom Perrin has been the most persuasive - feel 
that consulting and engineering play a unique and crucial role in industrial 
development, being at the crossroads of a flow of information and 
decisions between productive units, capital goods manufacture, and 
research and development. C&E activities link these three parts of the 
economic system and also provide links with the financial system. Through 
the projects carried out by domestic CEDOs, it is possible to maximize 
impacts from the productive units to the other two activities, thus 
promoting the development of an integrated industrial system. Industrial 
development without employing domestic C&E capabilities would rely 
indefinitely on imported technical solutions and imported capital goods 
(Perrin 1971). 
C&E activities may, therefore, achieve a high social utility in terms of 
their impact on development. Two important national objectives would 
then be the increase in domestic C&E capabilities and their proper 
utilization so that a high social efficiency will result from the resources 
allocated to investment. · 
The public sector may play an important role in this regard. In many 
developing countries, the state has taken up growing responsibilities in 
dynamic activities such as petroleum, energy, transport, iron and steel, 
shipbuilding, heavy chemicals, pulp and paper, cement, etc., and public 
enterprises have become the main - if not the only - concentrations of 
economic power under national control able to face foreign-owned firms. 
They constitute important decision centres with the power to affect 
profoundly different sectors of national activity. Investment projects in 
these branches, however, have often been bought from foreign suppliers 
through turnkey purchases, and the participation of domestic C&E and 
industry has been limited. A change in traditional patterns of behaviour 
would have important effects on industrial development. Hence there 
should be an effort to open and examine investment packages, which 
often combine financing, technology, capital goods, construction, and 
technical services, to ensure maximum local participation in the supply of 
goods and services for the investment project. 
A turnkey plant may be said to constitute an unknown package. The 
investors should be able to carry out their investments in a disaggregated 
manner, to have control of the technology, put the package together in 
accordance with the real national needs, and utilize fully intellectual and 
physical domestic inputs. To go from a turnkey operation to domestic 
control of technology and inputs, it is necessary to undergo a learning 
process that can rarely be accomplished in one step; thus, it is necessary to 
proceed through a series of stages that imply a growing mastery of 
technology - the development of domestic C&E capabilities and the 
adequate utilization of such capabilities (Sabato 1973). 
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There are costs in developing C&E capabilities and in accepting for a 
period some relative inefficiency, as happens with infant industries. One 
of the principal obstacles has been the risk to be assumed in entrusting 
national organizations with complex and exacting tasks. This, however, 
has generally been exaggerated in the past on account of poor knowledge 
and underestimation of national capabilities as compared with foreign 
capabilities that have been taken to be unexcelled.2 To this is added the 
frequent attitude of decision-makers in developing countries who look for 
an immediate effect of their decisions and purchases. They just want to 
obtain what they urgently need, to "get the job done." By adopting such a 
short-sighted approach, they may lose important opportunities to improve 
the efficiency of their own organizations in future and to produce 
significant long-run effects on development. 
There is, therefore, a good deal to be done in educating investors, 
banks, and governments regarding the key role of consulting and 
engineering for self-reliant development and the need to support and 
promote this activity through national policies. Ways and means have to be 
found in every country to transmit this message to decision-makers, 
industry, and often the consultants themselves. 
DEMAND FOR C&f SERVICES 
Consulting and engineering services are not products that feed final 
consumption in a society; they are inputs to other activities - investment 
principally- and as such their demand largely depends on the volume of 
those activities, which are themselves related to the extent of actual or 
planned changes in the country. 
A distinction may be made between requirements and demand; the 
first term is the volume that should be demanded and the second is the 
actual volume demanded. It may be suggested that the demand for C&E 
services in a developing country tends to be lower than requirements, 
because project preparation and design are often made with less depth 
than would be desirable. If such tendencies were verified, there would be 
reasons for adopting policies for increasing the demand for C&E services 
to an adequate level, through persuasion, a decrease in the price of C&E 
services, or other means. 
SOURCES 
The principal sources of demand for C&E services in a developing 
country are the large investment projects in the public sector, which are 
carried out by ministries, public enterprises, development corporations, 
and other agencies. Such projects are usually included in national 
development plans. Other sources of demand are financial institutions 
like development banks and small enterprise development funds, which 
request consulting tasks for studies, programing, and project formulation; 
2 Foreign consultants have frequently made costly mistakes or recommended 
inadequate solutions that would have been easily perceived by a local consultant 
familiar with local conditions. On the other hand, a local firm may contract foreign 
expertise as and when needed. A more balanced assessment of the worth of local 
consultancy and a change in risk-avoiding attitudes is needed. 
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industrial firms carrying out investment projects (new plants or exten-
sions), introducing new products, or adopting new production 
technologies; and small and medium-sized enterprises needing help for 
the acquisition of machinery, the improvement of management practices, 
and the solution of a wide range of technical problems. Demand 
originating outside the developing country may come from other 
developing countries, international financial institutions, and occasionally 
agencies of developed countries that extend bilateral aid usually preceded 
by extensive preparatory work. 
The sources of demand may be classified according to the branch (civil 
works, mining, food industry, etc.), the type of technical service (building, 
power and light, water and gas, ventilation and air conditioning, drainage 
and sanitation, topography, etc.), and the stages of consulting and 
engineering services for projects (prefeasibility, feasibility, techno-
economic work, process design, detailed engineering, procurement, 
product design, project start-up, project management, etc.). A series of 
two-way tables using these categories would give a detailed idea of the 
structure of demand. 
This demand may be attended partly by in-house capacity and partly 
by outside CEDOs. The complexity of demand, to a large extent depending 
on the country's level of development, will call for more or less complexity 
in the structure of supply. Of prime importance in the case of semi-
industrialized countries are multipurpose CEDOs that may attend the 
needs of the public sector, financial institutions, and large industrial 
enterprises. In countries of incipient industrialization, or in those with a 
very large traditional sector, CEDOs attending the demand of small and 
medium-sized enterprises would be of prime importance.3 
Most of the demand for C&E services related to investment projects in 
the developing countries originates in the public sector. Any policy in 
favour of building up C&E capabilities and utilizing them adequately would 
therefore have to rely to a large extent on improving the behaviour of state 
investors, who should be influenced to adopt enlightened procedures in 
their investment operations. 
ESTIMATIONS 
It is not easy to estimate the demand for C&E services. It is probably 
better to employ as an indicator the volume of business (sales of C&E 
services) rather than physical indicators such as the number of drawings, 
personnel, etc. The volume of C&E services may be roughly estimated as a 
percentage of the expected cost of investment. There are few data on this 
aspect, but rules of thumb are that the cost of preinvestment studies 
(consulting) are around 3% of the total project cost in large industry 
projects and 1-1.5% in large infrastructural investments. The cost of 
detailed engineering would be between 5% and 9% according to the 
complexity of the project (Araoz and Politzer 1975). This calculation is 
much too rough for reasonably accurate plans for the development and 
utilization of C&E capabilities, and a first research need comes out clearly: 
3 A network of consultan_cy institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises 
has been established in India, in close liaison with financial institutions for the 
same sector (Bhatt 1975). 
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to find out from past experience the value of such percentages for different 
types and locations of investment projects. This information would make it 
possible for a country to estimate the requirements for C&E for its main 
sectors and hence to plan the expansion and use of its C&E capacity. 
In the case of preinvestment services, it is probably more difficult to 
arrive at satisfactory estimates than i.n the case of engineering and project 
implementation services. Sometimes investment decisions by the state are 
taken on political grounds, using a few a-priori elements, and the 
feasibility study may then become a formal requisite to justify decisions 
already taken. In other cases, investment decisions respond to one main 
factor, the availability of finance, and the study once again justifies a 
decision already taken. Preinvestment studies, then, largely become 
window-dressing. Similarly, the private sector sometimes justifies deci-
sions in this way, although banking institutions and planning agencies are 
insisting more and more on the need to carry out careful feasibility 
assessments as a way to guarantee that good investment decisions will 
result. 
Estimates of demand for C&E services should consider areas in which 
C&E services are bound to be required in the future and in which there is as 
yet little or no national C&E capacity. Long-term projections should be 
useful for identifying such areas. The formation of C&E capacity in them 
should be undertaken early if complete dependence on foreign CEDOs is 
to be avoided. Estimates may be made by an official organ, such as a 
planning authority, or by institutions, like the National Association of 
Consultants, that can study supply aspects in great detail. 
There have been a number of experiences in demand estimation that 
have underlined the difficulties of the exercise. Demand projections were 
carried out in Canada, but the experience was not altogether successful, 
the conclusion being that only short-range predictions could be made 
because C&E activity is too much affected by the ups and downs of the 
economy to permit any reliable estimations in the medium or long term.4 
This conclusion applies to a market economy, without explicit national 
planning; in a mixed economy with central planning, as is the case in many 
developing countries, it probably makes sense to devote efforts toward 
estimating the demand for C&E services several years ahead as a basis for 
programing the development of C&E capabilities. 
In Algeria, for example, such estimates were a basis for the training of 
human resources. A fixed ratio of the principal industrial projects was used 
as the consulting and engineering input. This gave a good idea about the 
volume of studies and of detailed engineering needed, and from this 
figure, the number of working hours was estimated for professionals, such 
as engineers, technicians, and designers. Thus, it was possible to make 
rough estimates of the number of people needed by area of specializa-
tion.s 
4 This observation was made at the seminar convened by OECD in 1978. 
s A first conclusion from the exercise was that there were not enough training 
possibilities in Algeria. Priorities had to be set out, regarding both the engineering 
field and the phase of the consulting and engineering process, and it was clear that 




The demand for C&E services is already large in some of the 
developing countries and may be expected to grow significantly as major 
investment programs are undertaken. UNIDO estimates that industrial 
investment in all developing countries is close to U.S. $100 billion;6 if C&E 
services represent 5-6%, total annual demand would be in the order of 
U.S. $5 billion.7 Opportunities for CEDOs in developing countries would 
seem to be large, particularly because many projects are to be undertaken 
by the public sector. In India, for instance, it was estimated for the Fifth 
Five Year Plan some 25 000 professionals would be needed to handle all the 
engineering and plan design services, but only 6000 were available at the 
beginning of the period (Malhotra 1976). 
The upward trend is apparently caused by the improvement in the 
economies of some developing countries, the preparation of more 
ambitious plans, a more intensive process of programing and implemen-
tation, a greater awareness of the role of consulting and engineering, and 
reorientation based on previous mistakes resulting from insufficiently 
detailed studies. Another influence is the increase in the share of C&E 
within total project costs, in part because C&E costs become more visible 
as the purchase of turnkey projects diminishes and also because there is a 
tendency to spend more on a wider range of engineering services in an 
attempt to save on the investment and operating costs of projects. 
FOREIGN C&E SERVICES 
In many developing countries there is a tendency to channel the 
demand for C&E services toward foreign CEDOs from industrial countries. 
If -national C&E capacity is to receive proper utilization and thereby 
produce the social benefits expected from its activities, it is important to 
identify the reasons for such a preference and to lay down policy that will 
permit a redress of the situation as far as is convenient. Among the reasons 
are: 
e The relative weakness of domestic CEDOs compared with foreign 
CEDOs, which principally comes from an inherent inequality infinancial 
means and credentials. Domestic CEDOs are often caught in a vicious 
circle, which is very difficult to break. 
e Attitudes in public and private enterprises that lead to the disparaging 
of domestic skills, the use of foreign consulting firms, and the turnkey 
solution. Such attitudes may take a long time to change because confi-
dence in local consulting activity must be developed. In addition, 
decision-makers~ particularly in the state - may have an attitude toward 
6 UNIDO presented this estimate in its document for. the UN Conference on 
Technical Cooperation, Buenos Aires, 1978. 
7 Estimates of the demand for C&E services in Latin America reached U.S. $15 
billion for. 197'6-85. Decisions based on these services would affect U.S. $200 
billion of investment and would strongly influence consumption, production, and 
many other aspects of life in the region (Araoz and Politzer 1975). 
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risk that makes them behave on the safety-first prin,ciple; this may become 
an important obstacle to the demand for local C&E services (Araoz 1977).8 
• Lack of domestic financing for C&E services; the client then looks for a 
foreign CEDO able to finance its services on easy terms. 
• Lack of local medium- and long-term financing for investments, 
obliging both public and private investors to turn to foreign sources that 
finance the complete packages of consulting, engineering, technology, 
and equipment. This problem is dominant in countries that depend 
extensively on foreign aid and foreign investment, and the untying of aid 
has now become an issue in international forums. 
• The behaviour of international financial agencies that, despite pro-
nouncements to the contrary, favour the use of established CEDOs from 
the industrial countries. 
• The behaviour of national financial agencies, which tend to copy the 
"prudent" behaviour of the international banks and, just as the latter, are 
often in favour of "getting the job done" and not complicating things with 
relatively untried local CEDOs or local inputs. 
There are strong arguments for building up a national capacity in 
consulting and engineering and achieving import substitution in this field, 
although too strong a nationalistic attitude may act as a barrier to the flow 
of technology, it may impose tasks on the local CED Os that they are not yet 
ready to discharge, or it may be negated in practice if weak local CEDOs 
take on foreign CEDOs as partners and leave to them the substantive work 
and the decisions that go with it. The problem is to use foreign C&E 
services in such a way as to maximize their positive features and minimize 
their negative effects. 
FLUCTUATIONS 
An important characteristic of the demand for C&E services in 
developing countries is its fluctuating nature. Economic cycles, stop-and-
go policies, political changes, lack of long-term public investment pro-
grams, etc. are factors that lead to acute ups and downs in demand. There 
is a need for continuity if CEDOs are to work properly and develop 
steadily. The drying up of demand has not infrequently meant the 
disbandment of human groups that had been built up with much effort and 
the need to turn to foreign CEDOs when demand picks up again. On 
theoretical grounds, some idle capacity is socially beneficial in the long 
term in activities where, on the one hand, demand is not constant and, on 
the other, the length of services demanded is not uniform.9 Mechanisms 
must be found to support occasional idle capacity and to avoid disbanding 
groups when there is no work. 
To-even out state demand for C&E, first, government can introduce 
general regulations and carefully draft tenders and specifications. If 
regulations stipulate that local C&E services be used wherever possible, 
demand is bound to increase and become relatively more stable. Many 
influences act on state project owners. They have to decide whether they 
B According to an Indian study, no government policy has been effective in 
forcing clients to use Indian engineering services or indigenously manufactured 
equipment (Malhotra 1976). 
9 This result is well known in queuing (congestion) theory. 
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want to pay more to the consultant or to the equipment suppliers. In large 
package deals there is much C&E work that does not show; if packages are 
pulled apart, C&E costs increase but the total project cost may diminish. 
Also, they have to assess their desire to deal with one main engineering 
supplier, which may minimize complications and risks, and balance it with 
market conditions. Although it is generally accepted that C&E services 
should be bought by quality and not by price, sometimes price is 
considered to be more important than quality. Second, government can 
stabilize demand by analyzing development plans and by coordinating the 
different agencies that carry out investments. The latter may be difficu It 
because agencies are often jealous about their autonomy. Third, the 
government can create demand for CEDOs by ranking projects according 
to priority and supporting low-priority projects when demand for C&E 
services is low. This has been successfully done in Brazil through FINEP 
(Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos), a government agency that funds 
studies and projects. Fourth, CEDOs themselves may try to adapt to these 
fluctuations. They can continue to work in spite of recessions by 
diversifying their activities, working outside the public sector, or exporting 
their services. In many developing countries, consulting organizations 
have a small core of highly qualified managers and few stable technical 
personnel; they rely on a large network of specialists for specific projects. 
When the work load diminishes, it is the outside collaborators who suffer; 
the firms continue to survive. · 
FOREIGN DEMAND 
Some CEDOs in developing countries have been able to sell their 
services to other developing countries. This trend is bound to increase in 
some fields because these CEDOs have advantages over CEDOs from 
developed countries: they provide services at lower costs; they have an 
approach that is closer to the philosophy and way of life of the client; their 
awareness of local problems and local conditions is likely to be greater 
because of similarities between developing-country economies; and they 
may draw on technological solutions that have been tested and proved 
under conditions similar to those of the receiving country. 
The export of C&E services is beneficial on several grounds. Foreign 
exchange is earned; national techFJology may be exported; and a CEDO 
may keep up its level of activity when local demand has momentarily 
dropped. Some developing countries have drafted policies for promoting 
such exports through tax measures, credits, and other means. 
SUPPLY OF CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING SERVICES 
TYPES OF CEO Os AND THE STRUCTURE OF SUPPLY 
There is a clear tendency in developing countries - as has been the 
case in developed countries - toward the separation of C&E functions 
from other activities, as a consequence of the division of labour in 
increasingly complex societies. 
ACEDO may be independent, producing services for various clients, 
or it may belong to a larger organization (such as a government agency, 
productive firm, contractor, or equipment manufacturer). These "captive" 
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CEDOs, often known as project departments, supply services principally 
to their parent organizations, but sometimes they do serve outside clients. 
CEDOs may be owned by the state or private groups, local or foreign. 
They vary considerably in size and in the range of services they offer. There 
is competition between the different producers of C&E services in a 
country, but there are also relations of complementarity, which a policy for 
C&E promotion should consider. 
In some developing countries, important sectors such as electric 
power, transport, steel, oil, and petrochemicals are in the hands of the 
state and carry out a succession of investment projects. They have a steady 
need for C&E services and tend to have their own C&E capacity; 
independent local CEDOs are used to supplement this capacity when 
peaks of activity take place, whereas foreign CEDOs are employed as 
suppliers of basic engineering and very specialized services. 
Unless an enterprise or government agency has a sufficiently steady 
flow of new investment projects, it does not pay to house C&E staffs and 
becomes economic instead to contract outside CEDOs for most of these 
activities. This practice may be socially beneficial, as it allows CEDOs to 
become larger and acquire a great deal of experience, enabling them to 
render cheaper and better services to a variety of users, and to disseminate 
knowledge that otherwise would have profited just one customer. 
Countries of incipient industrialization with a small modern sector 
have a small C&E capacity, mainly in production firms (particularly those of 
foreign capital), government project offices, and various public-sector 
institutions, including engineering design centres, industrial research 
institutes, productivity centres, consultancy units for small and medium-
scale enterprises, and occasionally educational and training institutions. It 
is very important to employ whatever technical capacity is available for 
tasks of project formulation, design, and technical assistance. Industrial 
research institutions, in particular, are sometimes the only feasible 
alternative to import of C&E services. 
Private independent CEDOs in developing countries range from very 
small firms with a high mortality to large, stable, firms. In many developing 
countries, there are numerous small CEDOs that carry out preinvestment 
services and a certain amount of engineering. They face a large number of 
problems, among them the instability of demand, the lack of confidence in 
the effectiveness of their services, and the fact that their clients often are 
not exactly aware of what they want and may not be capable of controlling 
the different stages of execution of a project. Frequently these small 
CEDOs look for foreign collaboration to increase their chances of landing 
an assignment. Their role is sometimes that of a commercial and 
administrative agent or a technical collaborator in peripheral matters. In 
other cases they carry out a great deal of the work. They are often 
organized as a small permanent group of able professionals who are joined 
temporarily by experts for a specific project. In the best firms of this type, 
those in the permanent staff have acquired a mastery of the technology of 
consulting,10 have a good knowledge of local conditions, and keep a 
10Technology of consulting includes know-how about methods and their use, 
the utilization of outside expertise, the ways of presenting results and recommen-
dations for different types of clients, etc. 
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dynamic system of contacts with users in the private and public sectors and 
with local and foreign sources of technology and equipment. 
In some developing countries one also finds relatively large private 
CEDOs that are able to handle complex projects on their own. Frequently 
they also operate as contractors and carry out turnkey projects for their 
clients. Often they are subsidiaries or joint ventures of CEDOs from 
industrial countries. 
India, Brazil, and other developing countries with a relatively impor-
tant industrial sector show a well-developed C&E capacity in independent 
and captive CEDOs. In the case of India, Malhotra (1976) has pointed out: 
• CEDOs may be classified in two groups according to their ability to 
provide project consultancy services. Most of the small organizations are 
in a position to offer only preinvestment or project planning services. It is 
only the larger organizations that are able to provide comprehensive 
project consultancy services. 
• The small consultancy organizations have been forced to face keen 
competition from equipment suppliers who provide free consultancy 
services to the potential investors. 
• A review of the activities of consultancy organizations indicates that so 
far no specific pattern has emerged. Although there are a few organiza-
tions (MECONS, Dastur & Co., Engineers India Limited, National Industrial 
Development Corp., etc.) that were originally established with the 
intention of specializing in particular industry areas, they have entered 
other fields as well. This may be due to difficulties in securing continuous 
business in their specific fields. But this diversification must necessarily 
reflect the quality of specialization established in highly complex fields. 
• There are a fair number of reasonably well-equipped organizations in 
respect of economic, project, and management consultancy services in 
India. But not sufficient headway has been made in developing process 
and technological consultancy services. As a result, India still continues to 
depend heavily on external sources for the required process know-how 
and product-designing technology. 
• The level of participation of consulting engineering firms in a sector 
varies according to the industrial sector served. This varying participation, 
to a very large extent justified by the different rhythms of technical 
progress observed by each sector, is also determined, to a lesser extent, by 
factors such as the possibility of access to the sources of know-how, the 
structure of the sectoral market, the links with groups in other sectors of 
the economy, and the links with capital goods producers and research 
institutes in the country. 
A more typical srtuation is found in most Latin American countries, 
with a proliferation of individual consultants and small CEDOs with ad hoc, 
fragmentary, and individualistic characteristics, coexisting with some state 
organizations that produce C&E services and with a few large private 
CEDOs that often are foreign owned or joint ventures. Except for a few 
countries, most of the important investment projects are prepared and 
implemented by foreign CEDOs from the industrialized countries, with 
marginal participation by local people. The relatively recent emergence of 
local CEDOs, which did not exist before the early 1960s in most cases, the 
indifference of governments, the vicious circle, the strong fluctuation of 
demand, and the lack of financial means have been the main reasons for 
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this situation. Studies undertaken by the Andean Pact Secretariat show that 
by 1972 there were about 180 independent firms in the Andean subregion, 
which gave permanent employment to almost 1400 professionals. Most 
firms were small and were principally dedicated to physical infrastructure 
projects (transport, power, sanitary engineering, irrigation, telecommuni-
cations, urbanization, structures in general). In Chile, around 1974, about 
15% of the total national expenditure for engineering was derived from 
private firms, 25% from foreign firms, and 60% from state organizations. In 
Venezuela, about 3000 professionals were employed in consulting 
engineering, but only a small proportion was organized in relatively 
important firms. Argentina has many small C&E firms, and a few large ones, 
which have had to cope with low fees, tardy payments, and a very 
fluctuating demand. The situation is similar in most of the other countries 
of the region, perhaps with the exception of Brazil, which for years has had 
a policy in support of domestic C&E. 
Some other features of the Latin American situation should be noted. 
Local C&E capacity for services to industrial investment is much lower than 
for infrastructural investments. Local CEDOs often associate with CEDOs 
from industrial countries for a given job, but often there is no real 
collaboration between them, the local firm undertaking subsidiary 
responsibilities and sometimes acting as a mere agent. Some large CEDOs 
are subsidiaries of firms from developed countries or are joint ventures 
where the local associate is in fact a junior partner. The important C&E 
assignments tend to be entrusted to foreign CEDOs or to local CEDOs of 
foreign capital, whereas the locally owned CEDOs are employed in smaller 
projects or as subcontractors for the simpler tasks of large projects (Araoz 
and Politzer 1975). 
SOME ISSUES 
IMPORTS FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The use of foreign CEDOs is sometimes unavoidable and is often 
regarded as convenient on grounds of speed, efficiency, and reliability; 
but there may be serious drawbacks, particularly in the long term. To 
minimize them, and to heighten the positive effects of employing C&E 
services from developed countries, certain types of procedures and rules 
should be applied. The purpose should be to employ foreign C&E as a 
complement to rather than as a substitute for local C&E, seeking 
mechanisms of cooperation between both to favour the maximum 
utilization of local sources and to make full use of foreign consulting as a 
vehicle for technology transfer and the training of national consulting 
personnel. Some people feel that the best solution is to employ a local 
CEDO as the prime contractor and let it determine what foreign collabora-
tion it needs and how the work should be divided, with the proviso that it 
should establish a "relationship between equals" rather than just offering 
its letterhead and its offices to the foreign CEDO. This approach, however, 
finds obstacles in financial institutions and investors on account of their 
risk-avoiding, efficiency-seeking attitudes and their poor capacity to 
contract and use C&E services. Local CEDOs, on the other hand, may not 
feel up to the task in so far as they have become accustomed to a subsidiary 
role in regard to foreign CEDOs. 
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PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN DOMESTIC CEDOS 
The issues here are similar to those that have been extensively 
debated in relation to foreign capital participation in manufacturing and 
other economic activities. There are, however, certain peculiar aspects 
that have to do with the nature of C&E activities and the role they may fulfill 
in development. First, the extent to which a local CEDO is dependent on a 
foreign one is better indicated by the origin of its technology and key 
personnel than by the percent equity share of the foreign CEDO. Second, 
whereas foreign capital CEDOs present a number of advantages because 
of their ready access to the know-how and expertise of the parent 
organization, there may be disadvantages on account of a tendency to 
accept uncritically solutions imposed by the parent and to rely on foreign 
inputs without making a decided effort to use fully what may be procured 
domestically. 
INSTALLED CAPACIT.Y 
As with demand, estimations of supply of C&E services are far from 
easy. Plain inventories of installed capacity on the basis of attainable sales 
volumes or of human resources available may be misleading. Some 
participants at a meeting of OECD in 1978 stressed the importance of the 
type of know-how that depends on the institutional organization; it was 
pointed out that skills, on the other hand, can be traded among 
institutions. C&E capacity, it was suggested, may be taken to be the total 
volume of human resources, economic resources, and technical proce-
dures that are available at a certain moment to carry out C&E services; but 
these resources must be within certain types of organizations. Two 
computers and 200 engineers are only meaningful if they are in an efficient 
organization and have methods that can be used to prepare a project and 
follow up its execution. Therefore C&E capacity is only significant ifthere is 
appropriate capability to manage the organization and the projects it 
carries out. Hence, estimates of installed cap,acity are strongly related to 
the presence of management capabilities. 
SPECIFICITY 
How can specialized CED Os be put to work in different areas? Do they 
have to recruit new people (or teams)? Can existing personnel be retrained 
in a short time? How can the new know-how be procured efficiently and 
quickly? Answers to these questions not only would throw light on the 
chances for survival of a CEDO when demand dries up in its specific field 
but would be helpful in debates about the establishment of a national C&E 
capacity when CEDOs have to be set up in several fields, because specific 
C&E resources may not easily be put to work in a field different from that in 
which they have specialized.11 
STATE-OWNED CEDOs AND PRIVATE CEDOs 
Private CEDOs in some developing countries have shown great 
concern about the expansion of state C&E activities, which they feel are 
encroaching more and more on their market. Although they are not 
11 Recent experience in Argentina has shown that CEDOs engaged in highway 
projects have found it difficult to switch to hydroelectric projects, even though the 
fields seem to be closely related. 
22 
against public-sector departments for the preparation of general studies 
and projects, they object to the growth of institutions that "without 
actually being consulting groups" absorb many resources destined for 
consulting. They feel that the proper role of state consulting lies in the 
promotion of expertise in new fields, which once developed should be set 
up as private CEDOs. They have doubts about the efficiency of state 
consulting and point out that top personnel are not easily attracted to 
government employment because of low salaries, that the best technical 
people move to administrative posts, that the pace of work in state 
organizations is much slower du.e to the characteristics of bureaucracy, 
and that political influences are much more persuasive. They add that 
private consulting is cheaper, though this fact may be hidden from view 
because a government organization often does not include in its costs the 
full amount of overhead items; sometimes only direct costs are charged. A 
cry of unfair competition comes from private CEDOs, who point out that 
they are strongly motivated to be efficient because their earnings, and 
indeed their survival, depend crucially on their efficiency, whereas 
public-sector CEDOs in general lack such a motivation.12 
On the other side of the debate, arguments are that the profit-seeking 
nature of private C&E makes it vulnerable to ties with construction and 
equipment firms and with foreign CED Os and that legal and administrative 
regulations and ethical declarations of principle are largely unsuccessful in 
curbing such tendencies. Another argument is that the small size of many 
sectoral markets for C&E services favours monopolistic behaviour by the 
few CEDOs (sometimes only one) serving a market. Moreover, certain 
areas of C&E are held to be legitimate interests of the state: such would be 
the case with industrial sectors like steel, petrochemicals, and mining 
where the state has a central interest or even a monopoly; with new 
activities where there is as yet no installed capacity in C&E; and with small 
and medium-scale industries that cannot meet the fees asked by private 
CEDOs. 
The issue of state versus private C&E probably cannot be solved on 
rational grounds alone because it depends on contextual factors and on 
the political style of a country, which may or may not favour private 
enterprise. Within each country, there should be an attempt to identify the 
areas in which state-owned or private CEDOs are better qualified and to 
find out how state and private C&E may collaborate and complement each 
other. Some people think that the proper areas for the state are those of 
policy, planning, programing, and preliminary project conception - the 
strategical decisions - leaving to the private CEDOs the detailed and 
specialized studies, the preparation of preinvestment studies, and other 
tasks needed for tactical decisions, as well as engineering design and 
project implementation activities. Other people believe it is advisable for 
large public enterprises to develop strong in-house C&E capabilities, 
coupled with R&D activities, especially when this approach is the only way 
to acquire the engineering capabilities that are needed for technological 
autonomy. 
12 These and other arguments are frequently invoked by national and 
international consultants' associations in defending the interests of private CEDOs. 
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C&E STATISTICS AND THE FORMAL EMERGENCE OF A C&E SECTOR 
One of the reasons why national policy in many developing countries 
does not deal explicitly with C&E activities is that the latter do not have a 
visible existence in the national system of statistics and do not constitute a 
formal sector or branch. Even though the magnitude of these activities is 
not large, their importance as organizers and executors of investments, 
and as suppliers of many different services to production, would justify 
their constituting a visible aggregate of economic activity to which policy 
may be applied. 
It is possible, and indeed desirable, to measure the production, 
consumption, import, and export of C&E services, classified according to 
various criteria, and to relate such data to other economic, educational, 
and scientific indicators. Such information would help to diagnose the 
situation at different times and to lay out policies and plans related to C&E. 
Although this should eventually be done within the general 
framework of economic statistics, the characteristics of C&E activities and 
services are such that it would seem appropriate to start measuring them 
within the framework of science and technology statistics. Most C&E 
activities would fall within the category "related scientific and technologi-
cal activities" of the well-known OECD and UNESCO systems. A subsys-
tem of C&E activities and services could be developed following an effort 
for drafting and testing operational definitions and classifications, perhaps 
under the auspices of an international organization. 
EMPLOYING DOMESTIC C&E 
The use of domestic C&E services may produce a number of positive 
impacts on development beyond those that take place when a foreign 
CEDO is employed. Most of the effects are medium or long term and are 
difficult to measure because they are the result of applying certain ways of 
formulating and executing an investment project rather than other ways 
that were previously used. They are often social consequences, and they 
may be obscured by other influences. Some of the variables affected are 
qualitative, such as technical level, learning, and vulnerability, so that 
quantification of the effects is not simple and in some cases may be 
impossible. But it is worthwhile to analyze the different effects and to 
arrive, at least, at a general appreciation of their magnitude in a particular 
situation. This will perhaps be sufficient to provide clear guidance for 
policy decisions if, as would appear from the limited evidence so far, 
positive effects are high for certain ways of carrying out the investment. 
How DECISIONS IN THE PROJECT SEQUENCE ARE LINKED 
Certain decisions in the project sequence condition later decisions 
and markedly affect their relevance to development objectives. During 
project preparation -the preinvestment stage-the characteristics of the 
project are defined. Decisions at this stage have strong implications 
regarding the specifications and the origin of the goods and services that 
are to be procured in subsequent stages. A number of alternatives are 
studied as the work proceeds from project identification (when there may 
be a number of programing studies about the development of the main 
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economic sectors and of specific industrial branches), through prefeasi-
bility (when a preliminary choice is made of the main proje~t parameters, 
following from studies of markets, technology, location, etc.), and finally 
to the feasibility report in which more detailed market and location 
studies, preliminary engineering design, and tentative negotiations with 
prospective suppliers allow the organization to develop alternative 
technological solutions, submit them for appraisal, and make recommen-
dations to the project owner, who actually chooses from the alternatives. 
But the organization doing the preinvestment work will have already taken 
a large number of preliminary decisions, which are incorporated in the 
alternatives submitted to the project owner, so that these alternatives may 
be more or less appropriate to local conditions, or oriented toward the use 
of local.inputs, according to the approach and biases of that organization. 
Experience seems to show that when a local CEDO is in charge of 
preinvestment work, a better technological choice may result and more 
local inputs are likely to be incorporated. 
Another important decision has to do with the way in which the 
investment project is financed. Experience also shows that the local 
content is highest when the investors use their own funds and lowest when 
supplier credit is employed. 
Once an alternative has been chosen and financing arrangements, 
government approval, and other necessary preliminaries are ready, the 
project enters the execution stage, and a number of decisions have to be 
taken regarding the supply of inputs. The technological solution will have 
been selected already, and this generally means that a supplier of the basic 
engineering design will also have been chosen, either the technology 
owner or a firm that has been licenced by it. In many cases, the technology 
and the basic engineering design are procured outside developing 
countries; there is room, however, for detaching certain peripheral 
technologies from the core and getting them engineered locally. Also, it is 
sometimes necessary to conduct R&D work to adapt the process or the 
product to local conditions, and it should sometimes be possible to have 
this R&D performed locally. The extent to which the work on peripheral 
basic design and adaptive R&D may be carried out locally varies not only 
with the level of technical development of the recipient country but also 
with the attitudes and the efforts of the project owners and their consultant 
organizations. 
The next task is detailed engineering, in which the basic design is 
converted into a set of detailed drawings and instructions for the purchase 
and installation of equipment and for the construction activities. At this 
stage, a number of seemingly minor decisions take place, which when 
added together may make up important differences regarding the charac-
teristics and sources of the inputs to be employed. The participation of a 
domestic engineering group is important to ensure that local inputs are 
incorporated into investment and production as far possible. 
It is through a large number of decisions of this nature that a local 
engineering group can fulfill a socially important role in specifying inputs 
that can be produced by local suppliers. At the investment stage, this will 
affect the origins of different capital goods, technical services, construc-
tion materials, and construction services. At the operation stage, previous 
design engineering decisions will influence the nature and source of raw 
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materials, basic inputs, components, parts, spares, technical services, and 
administrative services.13 
One can easily see how important it is to have domestic control of the 
preinvestment and the design engineering activities if full use is to be 
made of potential domestic supply at the investment and the production 
stages of the new installations. Consulting and engineering organizations 
in charge of those activities should be well aware of the possibilities of 
local supply and should have the right attitudes regarding modifications in 
process and product design, specifications, standards, and delivery dates. 
They should appraise the risks and the extra cost - if any- in each local 
purchase and advise the project owner regarding the decision that is best 
in the long run. In this way they may have a decisive role in increasing 
significantly the social efficiency of the investment process. 
PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
THE INVESTOR 
By using local C&E services and by opening up the technological 
package, the investo.r may benefit in the short run from a reduction in the 
costs of purchases, as efforts are applied to certain activities that may have 
been disregarded before, such as more appropriate specifications, better 
quality control, and the search for new sources of supply. In a longer time 
span, the investor may be able to choose a better-adapted technology, 
lower the cost of many items, supervise closely the construction of 
equipment and fixed installations, and decrease vulnerability in future 
operations as a consequence of a higher proportion of local inputs. This 
may cause substantial savings in investment costs, as well as in operating 
costs later on. But, more importantly, the investor and the local CEDO it 
employs undergo a learning process that is bound to increase the 
efficiency of production and maintenance operations, permit better 
investments to be made in the future, and help incorporate a stream of 
product and process improvements, some of which may originate locally. 
The cumulative effect of this learning process, and of a similar.learning 
process in the investor's local suppliers, may be very important. 
There are, naturally, some drawbacks. The investors have to bear the 
costs of building up their internal technical capabilities and may also have 
to face extra costs on account of higher prices, poorer quality, and dearer 
financing of local supplies. There are also the risks of technical failure and 
late deliveries, which often deter users from opening up packages, relying 
on local engineering, and buying from local suppliers; however, it is likely 
13 For example, in .a Latin American country some years ago, a number of 
simple industrial buildings had to be built. Some. of them were designed by local 
engineers, and these used 75% of domestically produced steel; others, designed 
by foreign engineers, imported 75% of the steel required. The large difference did 
not result from different characteristics of the buildings, which were alike, but from 
the approach of the designers. Foreign engineers were not familiar with local steel 
and would only employ it when they were sure it would not endangerthe structure. 
Local engineers knew well the local steel and employed it unless they were sure it 
would not be appropriate. The "safety-first" attitude of the foreigners, added to 
their imperfect knowledge of the local product, unnecessarily multiplied by three 
the steel imports. 
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that such risks have been exaggerated in the past and have resulted in the 
continuation of poor practices for too long. 
Changes in project formulation and implementation to produce the 
benefits should be carried out with caution. There should be a careful 
realistic appraisal of how far it is possible to proceed with forward-looking 
practices on a given occasion, on the understanding that another step 
ahead can be taken at a later date. By following a stepwise process of 
change, the investors can build up solidly their technical competence and 
that of their CED Os and can develop a network of reliable suppliers. Some 
risks, however, are unavoidable, particularly when suppliers are given a 
chance to produce something they have not produced before. But risks are 
a part of economic life, and those who do not risk do not gain. 
LOCAL SUPPLIERS 
Improved investment practices, particularly if they involve purchasing 
programs for some time in the future, are bound to benefit local suppliers 
through an increase and stabilization of demand that encourages applica-
tion of resources and efforts for technological improvement, productivity 
increases, personnel training, and expansion of plant. Additional induce-
ments for technical progress are the introduction of specifications that 
demand a higher level of accomplishment. 
One of the results may be that suppliers improve their technological 
levels and learn to do new things, thus enlarging their markets. Such a 
consequence is well known in developed countries, where many technical 
innovations resulting from work for the government in aerospace, 
defence, and other areas have found their way into civilian applications. 
The suppliers are allowed and even encouraged to apply the know-how 
they have gained to new products in other markets. In develo.Ping 
countries, the industrial branches are less sophisticated, and the know-
how does not usually come from original R&D but rather from technology 
imports, personnel training, engineering efforts, and a sequence of minor 
changes and innovations. But the phenomenon is essentially similar; it can 
be clearly observed in mechanical industries supplying parts to manufac-
turers of automobiles, ships, and other complex products, which have 
shown remarkable technical progress in some developing countries. It is 
possible through adequate purchasing policies to accelerate and orient 
the learning process; a good example is the role that French public 
enterprises played through their procurement policies in developing the 
capital goods industry in France in the early postwar period. 
Suppliers may find some problems in going along with purchasing 
policies that are aimed at them by just one or a few customers. They may 
have to accept stiff conditions and face continuously the possibility of a 
sudden drop or cancellation of orders on account of a change in policy, a 
not infrequent occurrence in some developing countries. 
OTHER PARTICIPANTS 
When purchases are made from local suppliers, they may produce 
effects on other parts of the economic system through market and 
nonmarket mechanisms. 
A rise in the output of suppliers produces demand increases 
elsewhere through the "multiplier mechanism," and if there is not enough 
idle capacity in personnel and equipment to allow a corresponding 
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increase in output, new investment may be needed (the "accelerator"). In 
addition, there may be significant "linkage effects," through which 
important changes in the industrial structure of the country result. 
The magnitude of the multiplier, accelerator, and linkage effects 
would reflect the orientation and magnitude of the investor's demand, at 
the investment and operation stages, and could be significant when large 
investments are carried out, such as happened last century with railways 
and is taking place today in certain developing countries that have 
ambitious plans for expanding their petrochemical industry. 
There are other effects, or externalities, that are not transmitted 
through the market and are, thus, less quantifiable but that may prove to 
be even more important for industrial development in the long run. They 
should·be explicitly considered and their magnitude appraised, if only by 
means of qualitative judgments, when investment programs are being 
formulated. Among them are the favourable psychologic impacts of 
successfully employing local consulting engineers, disaggregating com-
plex investments, relying on local technological developments, and 
utilizing local capital goods and other inputs in investment and produc-
tion. This "demonstration effect" is potentially so important that a strategy 
for building up C&E capabilities and utilizing them for maximum impacts 
on development should carefully select its initial activities so that the 
chances of success are maximized and it should devote efforts to 
propaganda on the achievements. 
But, more importantly, a number of technologic effects occur as 
human resources are trained, researchers' attitudes are improved, techni-
cal knowledge is diffused, and capabilities for problem-solving and for the 
improvement and generation of technology are reinforced throughout the 
industrial system - a learning process sparked by forward-looking 
investment activities and the backbone for technological self-reliance. 
CEDOs fulfill a crucial role in this process by applying new know-how 
when approached by different clients. In this sense, independent CEDOs 
help in the "socialization" of knowledge otherwise locked within enter-
prises. 
IMPACTS ON DEVELOPMENT 
Governments can direct impacts so that they promote the develop-
ment of a certain branch of industry (say, electric motors of 10 horsepower) 
or type of producer (small firms in a particular region) by explicitly using as 
a policy instrument the considerable purchasing power of the public 
sector resulting from its investment activities. 
Other impacts will be transmitted throughout the industrial spectrum 
by market and nonmarket mechanisms; perhaps the most interesting 
outcome is a widespread learning process that results in an increase in 
productive efficiency, a reduction in costs, and a technological progress 
that may allow new produdive activities.· it is suggested that investment 
projects should be designed and conducted so that they have strong 
positive effects on learning.14 
14 The importance of the learning process was pointed out to me by R. Carranza 
in a private communication. 
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Impacts on R&D activities, and on the utilization of R&D results, are 
also very important. In fact, the results of R&D in specialized institutions 
have little chance of being employed optimally if C&E expertise is not 
applied to evaluating them, finding possible uses, identifying clients and 
users, developing product and process designs that can be applied 
commercially, and in general carrying out the activities needed to 
transform a technical advance into a commercially successful innovation. 
Some R&D institutions have their own C&E departments -
"technoeconomic services," "sales," "consultancy," etc. -whose job is 
to link R&D activities with prospective users. In other cases, the task is 
done by an independent CEDO. In some large public enterprises in 
developing countries (oil, iron and steel, power) in-house R&D and 
engineering departments work hand in hand to develop and apply new 
technology and may enable new investment projects with basic engineer-
ing of their own. At this stage a very high degree of mastery of technology 
will have been obtained.15 
The final impacts on development are expressed in a change of 
structures and a modification in the values of macro variables such as 
employment, productivity, imports, qualified personnel, etc. Other influ-
ences are at work so that the contribution of local C&E in investment 
projects may not be easy to ascertain. The stage of development of the 
country is an important factor. In a relatively advanced developing 
country, the impacts are probably much more important than in a country 
of incipient industrialization. In fact, they may even help to overcome the 
blocking of industrial development at the end of the easy import-
substitution stage, through substantial purchases of industrial products 
from the enterprises that are receptive to innovation and able to profit 
from it. The impacts result from a conscious effort to manage investment 
projects in such a way that demand is generated for those enterprises, 
purchase specifications are carefully drafted, adequate prices are agreed, 
flexible contracts are signed, and financial and technical support is 
provided. The positive effects not only come from the increase in demand 
and its repercussions throughout the economy, but also derive from the 
technical progress that suppliers are induced to make to respond to 
increasing technological requirements, from the widespread learning 
process that such technical progress causes in other parts of the industrial 
system, and from the restructuring of relations between public enter-
prises, foreign and national private enterprises, R&D, financing organiza-
tions, and the government (Sabata and Martin 1967). 
The benefits may be partially offset by the costs implied in inefficien-
cies and failures of local producers, retaliation by countries that face a drop 
in their exports, monopoly situations, etc. Policymakers have frequently 
magnified these drawbacks and often have not been fully aware of the 
potential benefits. 
PROCEDURES AND DECISION MODELS 
To achieve maximum impacts, projects should be disaggregated, local 
supply possibilities studied, and purchases carefully programed, prefera-
15 The CEDO analyzed in the Brazilian case study in this volume is a good 
example of how this mastery is achieved. See also Malhotra (1979). 
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bly in concert with the supplier branches. A procedure employed in 
Argentina classifies items into a "positive" list (the items are already being 
produced with the required quality at acceptable prices), a "negative" list 
(it is not possible to produce them locally), and a "probable" list 
(production may take place if several problems are overcome, such as 
small local market, quality, safety). Efforts toward supplier development 
are concentrated on the "probable" list. This approach may be used also 
for technological inputs; action would be taken not for productive firms 
but for consulting and engineering organizations, research institutes, and 
other organizations of the science and technology system (Sabata 1973). 
Similar procedures may be used in the stage of operation of produc-
tive units, but the difficulties are increased because the project owners, 
functioning enterprises, deal with many supplier units. There must be a 
development of adequate administrative procedures to construct an 
effective purchasing policy including technical, financial, and training 
assistance to the suppliers.16 
Regarding decision models for local procurement, there have been in 
France some interesting attempts at constructing formulas for the pricing 
of local inputs under different conditions, and it would be useful to 
analyze such solutions in detail. In Argentina, G. Gargiulo has analyzed the 
acceptability of higher prices for local components of atomic power plants. 
Local production of components has microeconomic, macroeconomic, 
social, and technological effects that should be identified. If the compo-
nent is already being produced locally, with sufficient quality, the 
purchasing decision is based on a comparison of the local and the import 
costs, with due regard to existing incentives and protective tariffs for local 
production. If the component is made locally but not with enough quality, 
or if it is not yet made but could be manufactured, the indirect benefits 
brought about by local production should be taken into account. To 
produce the component, the suppliers need to increase their technical 
capabilities, in equipment, technology, and training. This step produces 
extra benefits to the firm, which otherwise experiences a slower rate of 
technical development. There are, however, extra costs occasioned by the 
rapid increase in technical capability. The valuation of costs and benefits 
requires the definition of quantifiable indicators and the solution of the 
price system that should be applied. This line of analysis has not been 
developed (Comisi6n Nacional de Energia At6mica 1974). 
Far too little is known about the practical aspects of heightening and 
transmitting the impacts of investment activity. Many positive experiences 
have taken place in developing countries, and no doubt the practices 
currently employed in some industrial countries may also be valuable as 
examples. There is a clear research need to identify and analyze successful 
cases and evaluate the procedures and decision rules employed, from 
which guidelines may be prepared for the benefit of developing countries. 
16 An example is the "ancillary industries program" carried out by public 
enterprises in India. 
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EFFICIENCY OF INVESTMENT ACTIVITY 
Investors are expected to maximize the efficiency of their investment 
activity, i.e., the relation of benefits to costs. How far is this achieved in the 
developing countries? Partial evidence shows that frequently investors 
respond to limited, short-run objectives and are up against limitations and 
constraints such as the unwillingness to assume risks, the lack of qualified 
technical advice, imperfect information about alternatives, restrictions 
imposed by outside finance so that they employ foreign CEDOs and the 
project is carried out in a turnkey manner. 
It is likely that if a long-term outlook were adopted, internal limitations 
eased, and a certain amount of effort applied - in other words, if 
improved procedures were employed for project formulation, design, and 
execution, involving a domestic CEDO at all stages in a responsible role-
more efficiency would be possible. 
Extra efforts applied by the investors and their CEDOs to the 
investment activity produce an increase in the private efficiency of the 
activity, that is, in the relation of the benefit reaped by the investors to the 
extra costs they must bear. The efforts have a more than proportional 
return until an optimum is reached, when more efforts do not pay. The 
investors may get to a new optimum in a reasonably short time, by acting 
on aspects that can be modified rather quickly. Over a longer period, they 
may build up their internal capability, undergo a learning process, improve 
their purchasing procedures, set up a network of reliable suppliers, etc., 
and, particularly if during this period there is an adequate development of 
one or more domestic CEDOs on which the investor may rely, further 
improvement may take place as a succession of investments is carried 
out. 
In employing turnkey operations, investors apply a moderate effort 
and obtain an efficiency that they regard as maximal (Fig. 1), feeling that 
extra efforts are not warranted and may even be counterproductive. But 
changes in attitudes, a more long-term view, the increasing use of local 
CEDOs, and improved purchasing procedures may allow them to reach a 
higher maximum of efficiency in a relatively short time and an even higher 
maximum in the long run. The differences in short- and long-term 
maximums are attained through successive investments, as learning 
proceeds and various effects are worked out. The long-term maximum 
would be the optimum from the private point of view in the case of 
investors' making their decisions according to long-run considerations. 
But an additional increase in efficiency may result if efforts are joined with 
other investors - this is a distinct possibility in the case of public 
enterprises - so that CEDOs can accelerate their learning process, 
specifications can be unified (particularly in the design of peripheral 
installations), product varieties reduced, and larger consolidated pur-
chases carried out at lower prices (Fig. 2). However, in practice, it does not 
appear easy to coordinate investors' activities and unify their criteria and 
purchasing mechanisms. 
Private efficiency takes into account only the costs that investors must 
bear and the benefits they reap. Meanwhile, what is happening to social 
efficiency - the benefits versus the costs to the suppliers and other 
participants? Reaching a social optimum may require greater efforts than 
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mechanisms-of various types must be introduced so that the costs will be 
borne by the community rather than by the investors. 
The model of analysis I am suggesting is conceptual and qualitative, 
and it would not be easy to express quantitatively. However, a first 
observation that has strong policy implications is that the point of 
maximum private efficiency may be reached by the investors without any 
incentive other than their self-interest. It pays them to increase efforts up 
to that point. Now, if the increase in social efficiency from the original 
position (turnkey operation) to that corresponding to optimum private 
efficiency is very high, a great deal would have been accomplished already, 
without a special incentive policy because the investors ·should have 
learned how to improve their practices.17 
The maximum private efficiency that can be attained partly depends 
on internal factors - for instance, the technical and managerial level, the 
correct appraisal of real risks - and partly on factors of the environment, 
among them, coherence of policy, stability, etc. Higher levels of private 
efficiency in investment activities will be reached when policy and 
institutions are stable and when public-sector investors follow a common 
rationale. 
A further increase in social efficiency may follow from the application 
of measures to encourage investors to apply more efforts than strictly 
warranted on private efficiency grounds. Such measures depend on the 
particular circumstances: they may take the form of a subsidy to the 
investors to compensate them for the extra effort with its accompanying 
costs and risks; or they may be directed to suppliers to lower their costs 
through special credit lines, training schemes, technical services at low 
cost, tariff protection, etc. 
There is at times a tendency to rush things, without adequate 
preparation, in an attempt to achieve too soon a high level of incorporation 
of domestic technology, services, and inputs. It is necessary to understand 
the limitations that exist: learning to produce results that can be incorpo-
rated in successive investment projects takes time, and progress is 
achieved by stages. An important question is how far to go in each stage. In 
other words, what percentage of local participation may be sought in 
successive investment projects? 
17 For instance, the investors may have had to modify their previous attitudes; 
plan their strategy for carrying out future investments; study the possibility of using 
local technology, engineering, capital goods, and inputs; improve their technical 
and management structures to make them able to carry out the expanded tasks 
involved in opening up a package and dealing with local CEDOs; perhaps develop 
their own project formulation and engineering departments ("captive" CEDO) and 
R&D groups; develop and adopt adequate methods of analysis and decision rules 
to deal with the various activities involved in an investment project, particularly in 
regard to purchasing decisions; externally, assist their domestic suppliers finan-
cially and technically so that their efficiency and technical level may increase; 
schedule purchases far in advance and make this known so that suppliers will have 
expectations regarding the type of purchases and their timing, a fact that will 
reduce uncertainty and induce investments in physical facilities, training, 
technological improvements, new technology, etc. 
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CEDOs 
CEDOs can be very different, and it is not easy to make general 
statements about them. For instance, they differ in the way they originate, 
and this fact may significantly affect their later development and charac-
teristics.18 What makes them comparable is that they have to carry out 
certain activities concerned with the organization and application of 
knowledge, and they have to acquire the resources and abilities to perform 
those activities in an efficient way. 
CEDOs, like other institutions, develop until they reach maturity 
when they are reasonably well equipped with human, physical, and 
intellectual assets; are large enough to perform efficiently; have stable 
relationships with their environment - clients, suppliers, government, 
banks, local and foreign CEDOs - and are able to fulfill efficiently their 
social role. 
The problems of a mature CEDO are somewhat different from those of 
a CEDO in its developing stage, because one of the main imperatives of the 
latter is to achieve maturity. To do this, it may need special measures of 
support from the public authorities. This is why both stages are considered 
separately here. Policy issues in sectors where mature CEDOs exist are 
different from those where CEDOs are developing. International cooper-
ation between CEDOs also acquires different characteristics according to 
the maturity of the weaker party. 
MATURE CEDOS 
I suggest that the performance of a CEDO should be appraised by its 
social efficiency (SE) - the impact of the CEDO on national development 
in regard to the resources it employs.19 The concept is related to that of 
social efficiency of the expenditure on an investment project and is not 
easy to quantify (Fig. 3). However, qualitative comparisons may be made of 
the SE of a CEDO at different times, and also between two different CED Os 
of similar overall characteristics. 
What influences social effitiency? SE seems to depend on the 
adequate performance of CEDO activities; grouped into three main 
categories, these are determination of the "products" to be produced; 
production; and distribution. Maximum social efficiency in these activities 
would be, respectively, a maximum social utility of the products, a 
maximum productive efficiency, and a maximum distribution efficiency. 
The better a CEDO performs in these respects then; the better its SE. 
18 This was discussed extensively at the meeting sponsored by IDRC in 1976, 
where a typology of "emergence patterns" was considered, ranging from profes-
sionals getting together and looking for clients, through a building firm that 
branches into C&E services, to the carefully planned creation of a large C&E 
department by a large production enterprise. 
19 The indicators of "success" that are sometimes applied to a CEDO may not 
adequately reflect SE; for instance, the fact that a CEDO is profitable, or shows a 
good rate of growth, is a good measure of its commercial success but only a partial 
indicator of its social efficiency. To give extreme examples, the Red Cross probably 
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These activities themselves are influenced by internal factors that 
derive from the characteristics of the CEDO. Such characteristics have 
probably evolved in response to needs posed by the activities carried out 
by the CEDO and have also been influenced by the environment in which it 
performs. 
DETERMINATION OF "PRODUCTS" TO BE PRODUCED 
The rule for determination of products would be that, within its field 
of work, the demands of its clientele, and its production possibilities, the 
CEDO should aim at selecting its "products," and "designing" them, in 
such a way that their social utility is highest. ACEDO produces consulting 
and engineering services that have a certain value for the client, but the 
utility for society may be different, because the prices that are relevant 
socially may be different from those that are relevant privately, and other 
costs and benefits may accrue to society on account of the impacts 
associated with the rendering of C&E services. The CEDO not only should 
do a good technical job but should carry it out in such a way as to produce 
long-run favourable impacts on the investor and also on other social 
participants, so that maximum social benefits are derived from the task. In 
the design of products, therefore, the CEDO must consider both the strict 
needs of the project and long-run impacts on the client and on other 
participants. 
The problem, of course, is that the extra costs and risks of designing 
for maximum social impacts are to be borne by the clients, whereas the 
benefits brought about by those impacts may be capitalized by them only 
in part. Thus, it may be necessary to instill motivation and to provide 
incentives that will induce a socially desirable course of action. 
A number of issues may be brought up regarding the social utility of 
the CEDO products. The first one is how to appreciate (let alone measure) 
this variable. What weight should be given to long-term impacts compared 
with short-term ones? It is likely that this matter can only be discussed 
properly within the framework of a development plan. Other issues have a 
more operative content. Can certain practices be applied for maximizing 
expected social utility? What internal characteristics (for instance, national 
or foreign ownership of the CEDO) help or. hinder a high social utility? 
What policy instruments are best to promote maximum social utility? 
Research is needed to answer such questions. 
PRODUCTION 
One important objective for every CEDO is to attain maximum 
production efficiency; the production program should be executed in 
minimum time and cost, with adequate quality and reliability. This 
objective is a necessary although not sufficient condition for maximum SE. 
There is much diffused knowledge about CEDO production, but little 
has been written about it in the case of developing countries. Here is an 
important field for research, which goes well beyond normal managemer:1t 
problems on account of the peculiarities of a CEDO. One of these 
peculiarities is the nature of the principal inputs used by a CEDO: 
high-level human resources; and knowledge, technical know-how, and 
information of many kinds. The management of these resources is not 
simple, and current management literature is of limited value. Questions 
are numerous: What sort of professionals should a CEDO employ? How 
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should they be trained and kept up to date? How can they be integrated 
into an efficient team? What are the best methods of work? How is 
information to be procured, stored, employed? What links should be 
formed with local and foreign suppliers of technology and information? 
When is an association with a foreign CEDO useful? 
The experience of CEDOs of industrial countries is more pertinent to 
questions of productive efficiency than to questions about the determina-
tion of products, and about their distribution, where peculiar conditions in 
developing countries and the nature and role of their CEDOs would seem 
to call for fresh approaches. Whereas in the industrial countries the 
well-structured socioeconomic context largely reduces the problem of a 
CEDO to that of attending the expressed needs of the client and attaining a 
high productive efficiency, in a developing country the situation is much 
more complex and the optimum social efficiency cannot be reached by 
acting only on production. The two other groups of activities require much 
attention, and often the CEDO will have to surmount adverse characteris-
tics of the milieu. 
DISTRIBUTION 
It is not enough for a CEDO's products to possess a high social utility. 
The products must reach users at the appropriate moment in a form that 
will respond to their needs. In this way the CEDO makes sure that the 
results of its production activity receive proper utilization and hence that 
the promise of social utility is realized. This is the problem facing those 
involved in distribution. 
In a highly industrialized country the problem is not acute. Clients are 
able to state very precisely their needs for C&E services, and they have 
technical structures to absorb what consultants give them; the market 
mechanism takes care of most if not all the impacts on development of C&E 
services, the importance of external benefits being probably of small 
magnitude. 
In a developing country there is a danger that the clients will not ask 
for the type of C&E services they need, that they will not absorb well the 
C&E services for want of a technical capability of their own, and that the 
potential external benefits of a CEDO's work will not materialize because 
the participants are not aware of opportunities or are not capable of seizing 
them. To avoid such outcomes, every CEDO needs a good "delivery 
system." This requires strong links with clients and receivers of impacts. 
The CEDO has to devote efforts to overcoming barriers such as unfavoura-
ble client attitudes, lack of a common language, lack of economic 
incentives for clients to contract local inputs, etc. The CEDO may even 
have to educate the clients and help them consolidate a technical group of 
their own. 
The CEDO should ideally go beyond its strict duty of providing C&E 
services and engage itself in a largertask of identifying and educating other 
groups that may profit from the opportunities opened up by its activities. 
For instance, the CEDO may look for research centres and capital goods 
producers that could supply needed inputs, encourage them to bid, pass 
on to them relevant information, and so on. In this way the CEDO may 
perform its social task. This activity is costly and time-consuming and 
would have to be supported explicitly by the investor and possibly by 
public policy. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
The national and international environments affect significantly a 
CEDO's internal characteristics as well as its activities. Major influences in 
the national environment may be divided into two groups, according to 
the degree of control that may be exerted over them. The first includes 
legislation, policies, and actions of government, its agencies, and enter-
prises. Within this group, there are explicit policies that are expressly 
designed to affect CEDOs and their activities and implicit policies that are 
directed to other institutions and activities but produce side effects on 
CEDOs. Among the problems hindering CEDO activity are the instability of 
demand, the lack of financial strength, and the competition from foreign 
CEDOs; if conditions are to be improved, implicit policies may have to be 
changed and explicit policies formulated and implemented. For instance, 
the implicit policies contained in the growth and pattern of public 
investment should be examined, because slight changes in timing may 
mean survival for some CEDOs; the establishment of a fund to permit a 
countercyclical policy such that contracts can be awarded to CEDOs for 
long-term studies when project work slackens may be all that is needed to 
stabilize demand. 
The second group comprises contextual factors that cannot be quickly 
changed by modifying legislation, policy, procedures, or decision rules. 
Perhaps the most serious obstacle to CEDO development resides in the 
cautious, risk-averting attitudes of decision-makers, which make them opt 
for foreign suppliers. Other contextual factors relate to the administrative 
practices in government procurement, which are often heavy and cumber-
some; the technical capabilities of clients, which are often low; the 
frequent lack of understanding in government and political circles of the 
importance of having strong domestic and engineering capacity and using 
it; the quality of university graduates that a CEDO recruits, etc. 
CEDOs need not accept these limitations; they may try to modify 
conditions in their favour, influencing their national environment in 
different ways: seeking changes in legislation and practices, suggesting 
new measures, building up a favourable image, helping clients to create an 
internal technical capability of their own, etc. Some of these actions may 
be done by individual CEDOs, others by CEDO associations at a national or 
even international level. 
In the international environment, two aspects are noteworthy. The 
first one has to do with the outside organizations that may affect the 
performance of domestic CEDOs, by influencing their characteristics and 
their behaviour: foreign CEDOs, as competitors; financial agencies; and 
suppliers of different inputs. 
Foreign CEDOs may be strong competitors in the national markets, 
and the local CEDOs, by virtue of the usual selection procedures applied 
by clients, may find themselves unable to break a vicious circle in which 
lack of previous experience precludes them from getting contracts that 
may give them experience. This subject properly belongs to the develop-
mental and not the mature stage of a CEDO; but it is likely that a certain 
measure of protection may have to be extended for some time to CEDOs 
that have recently achieved maturity, because foreign CEDOs may have 
strong advantages from the financial backing and export subsidies of their 
countries and from their proximity to and familiarity with owners of 
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technology and producers of capital goods. Foreign CEDOs often 
associate with local CEDOs for certain assignments. In such cases, there is 
the danger that the local CEDO will remain the junior partner, without 
participating in the main decisions; this should be avoided. In fact, 
associations with foreign CEDOs should be employed for gaining experi-
ence, training staff, and obtaining information. 
Regional and international financial agencies often fund large devel-
opment projects, and therefore their policies and practices have an 
influence on domestic CEDOs. The record shows that these agencies have 
principally wanted to "get the job done," although recently some of them 
have shown interest in using their loan operations to foster the develop-
ment of national C&E capabilities. The behaviour of international banks is 
often imitated by domestic banks, and this gives more urgency to the 
redressing measures that can be taken. 
A number of foreign organizations may be the source of important 
inputs - for instance, R&D centres, information systems, capital goods 
manufacturers, manufacturing firms, etc. The CEDO should maintain a 
network of relationships to have "on tap" information, experts, and other 
critical inputs. 
The other aspect of the international environment has to do with the 
export of C&E services to other developing countries. Such exports have 
been taking place for some time, and it is likely that they will expand in the 
future for reasons already reviewed (lower costs, more appropriate 
technical solutions, a better understanding of conditions in the recipient 
countries, etc.). One of the principal issues is whether such operations of 
technology commerce can be kept free from the drawbacks that similar 
operations between developed and developing countries have had in the 
past and, furthermore, whether they may be endowed with characteristics 
that would give them positive social impacts in the receiving country, 
creating domestic demands for goods and services, contributing to the 
domestic development of skills and technical capabilities, and producing 
other desirable effects. This technical cooperation among developing 
countries (TCDC) may require positive guidelines expressed in interna-
tional agreements, and incentives for operations that comply with them. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CEDO 
A mature CEDO should have a mastery of the technology of consulting 
and engineering and a reasonable degree of competence in the technolo-
gy of the area or areas it attends. For this it needs qualified, experienced 
personnel; good management procedures; organizational know-how; 
and other characteristics favourable to its efficiency.20 
The characteristics of a CEDO will be influenced by its environment, 
the origin of its capital, its degree of autonomy, its past history, and the 
20 Malhotra (1976) points out that successful CEDOs in India show characteris-
tics such as good management; tendency to recruit the best people and pay them 
well; acceptance of risks; good marketing; support from government or political 
sectors to obtain key contracts during their first few years of life; flexibility and 
willingness to go into new fields; agreements with foreign CEDOs; disaggregation 
of C&E services until only basic engineering is purchased outside; ability to offer 
the local investor a complete package from conception to start-up as well as 
technical services at the operating stage. 
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sector it attends; they will also be shaped by the policies and practices 
adopted by managers and senior staff members, volitional factors that find 
expression in the choice of the role, structure, strategies, etc. 
CEDOs in developing countries often attempt to modify external 
factors in their favour. This action is an important departure from the 
practices of CEDOs in developed countries where the environment is 
favourable, or at worst neutral, rather than hostile. 
Some underlying research questions are: How are stable and useful 
links forged with the various social participants? What role can the CEDO 
have in the formulation of sectoral development plans? What is the 
minimum size of an efficient CEDO in different fields, from heavy 
chemistry to small mechanical industry? How should it be organized to 
withstand the ups and downs of demand so common for C&E work in 
developing countries (for instance, a relatively small stable staff and an 
ample list of collaborators that can be drawn into projects as and when 
necessary)? 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CEDO 
CEDOs show different characteristics in their development over time, 
according to their origin, ownership, degree of autonomy, and sector of 
activity; but certain aspects and issues are relevant for many different types 
of CEDO. 
The development of a CEDO to maturity is bound to be gradual, with, 
ideally, an increase in social efficiency as a function of time. The final goal 
is the mature CEDO functioning at a reasonable level of social efficiency, 
its action being guided by long-term objectives. 
During the developing stage the CEDO principally guides its actions 
according to concrete, short-term objectives, the main purpose being to 
get to the mature stage. Ad hoc government policies may be required for 
the promotion and support of this process. The time needed to complete 
the process and reach maturity will be variable and will very much depend 
on the support received by the CEDO and on the characteristics of its 
environment (Fig. 4).21 
An independent CEDO in a developing country faces many obstacles, 
due to the nature of its activities and to the environment in which it acts. 
Equity capital is scarce for C&E activities, and financing is scarce and 
expensive. Tardy payments when a job is done for the state put a strain on 
finances; competition and fluctuations in demand result in a high death 
rate. A small CEDO may be caught in a vicious circle; it cannot getthe large 
assignments it needs to grow because it cannot show qualifications, never 
having undertaken large assignments before. Even when experience has 
been acquired, for instance through work as a subcontractor to a large 
local or foreign CEDO, other obstacles persist in the shape of legal and 
administrative requirements such as the need for offering financial 
guarantees. 
It is no wonder then that many important CEDOs in developing 
countries are subsidiaries or joint ventures of foreign CEDOs. However 
good this may be from the point of view of survival and of productive 
21 Some CEDOs will never reach maturity, will remain at a low level of social 
efficiency, or will even disappear. 
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efficiency, it is often not good from the point of view of social efficiency. A 
country cannot depend permanently on foreign sources for the greater 
part of the work involved in organizing and carrying out investment 
projects, and sooner or later it will have to develop its own C&E 
capabilities. 
State support is required for this. In some countries the tendency is 
toward public-sector CEDOs, in others toward independent private 
CEDOs. The principal role of the state regarding the development of a 
CEDO is to ensure it an expanding and stable demand; extend to it a 
measure of protection; make available sufficient credit; and help it acquire 
technology, experience, and a good human team. 
There is not a unique model for CEDO development. The way the 
organization develops depends on circumstances. Paths and strategies are 
dictated by the concrete objectives to be achieved, but the process is 
gradual and relies on the acquisition of expertise and credibility in 
successive stages.22 
22 The experience of successful CEDOs in developing countries should be 
examined. A first step has already been taken with the four case studies included in 
this volume. There is also a wealth of experience about CEDO development in 
industrial countries that should be examined critically for its relevance for 
developing countries. For instance, the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) studies have indicated that in the USA, CEDOs 
showed no established historic pattern of growth, many of them having started as 
boilermakers, mechanical or electrical designers, civil engineering contractors, or 
even construction material suppliers. Continuity of demand was extremely 
important. The early CEDOs gained diversification by accommodating a range of 
tasks along the specialties that made them leaders in particular fields (Brown 1978). 
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A developing CEDO should pay attention to a number of aspects, 
some of which have to do with its internal functions and others with its 
relations with clients and other participants: 
• Paths of development- the areas in which the CEDO is to work; they 
come up as a result of an interplay between immediate market oppor-
tunities and long-term objectives. There is a danger of growing along an 
"easy" line, as market opportunities appear and clients "overburden" the 
CEDO, making for imbalances, too much specialization, and possibly 
shallow technical development. Thus the CEDO may find itself expanding 
greatly its economic analysis capabilities or its structural design activity, 
while subcontracting other areas of work. Or the CEDO may diversify too 
much through accepting all customers, stunting its technological 
capabilities. The CEDO should lay out its long-term objectives and develop 
fully one or two technological areas that show good promise; once 
mastery has been acquired in one area, the CEDO may move into a new 
one. 
• Acquisition of know-how and expertise - the key to CEDO develop-
ment; it may be said to comprise three interrelated ·aspects: human 
resources development, technology acquisition, and the development of 
management capabilities. 
• Cultivation of clients in a widening circle - life insurance; it may 
mean a CEDO must help clients to acquire sufficient capabilities to deal 
efficiently with tasks such as the preparation of terms of reference, drafting 
of tenders, evaluation of bids, control of progress, etc. The clients or users 
must have their own technoeconomic capabilities and procedures that will 
guide their dealings with CEDOs and other suppliers. 
• Design of contracts favourable to CEDO development; lump-sum 
contracts are usually preferred by clients, but CEDOs favour cost-plus-
fees, as they often find it difficult to make accurate cost estimates because 
of unstable conditions in a developing·country. A small CEDO may not be 
able to absorb the losses of a single contract, so this is a critical point. 
• Pricing policy; many prospective C&E clients in a developing country, 
principally the medium- and small-scale enterprises, are not in a position 
to pay fully for the services they need. Sometimes such services are 
provided at a loss by special state institutions. At the other end of the scale, 
large state investors may give opportunities to developing CEDOs to bid 
for a large C&E task, for which a developing CEDO may have to charge 
more than usual because of high indirect costs such as employment of new 
management resources. This could perhaps be interpreted economically 
as a firm working on the rising part of its cost curve. The state client would 
be footing part of the costs of CEDO development; if it did not accept this, 
it is possible thatthe CEDO would be deprived of an opportunity to expand 
and to acquire more know-how. 
• Development of network of contacts; the developing CEDO will need 
to devote efforts to develop a network of contacts internationally so that it 
may have good and prompt access to information, technology, equipment 
makers, and other suppliers of inputs for its work. It should also build up 
its relations with local research. institutions and manufacturers, which 
should be close enough to permit it to discharge a socially important role 
as a link between domestic producers and users of technology and capital 
goods. 
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THE ACQUISITION OF KNOW-HOW AND EXPERTISE 
The building up of a good human team, the acquisition of technologi-
cal knowledge, and the development of management capabilities are 
interrelated. The development of human resources cannot be separated 
from the acquisition of know-how; and in particular the development of 
management requires it to absorb key technical knowledge. 
The development of human resources should be in step with demand, 
or possibly somewhat ahead of it, if those resources are to be prepared for 
the tasks to be carried out. Ideally the CEDO should formulate a personnel 
development program. The recruitment and training of stable personnel 
are two factors that interplay. Whattype of recruits should be had and what 
training they should be given will very much depend on circumstances and 
opportunities; there seems to be no agreed procedure, and practices 
differ from firm to firm. Recruits may be fresh graduates, persons with 3 or 
4 years' experience in technical work, or experienced professionals. In 
regard to training, two important elements are academic training at home 
or overseas and on-the-job training while assignments are carried out, 
particularly when this is done in association with a more experienced 
CEDO. It is important to use the training opportunities when there is 
collaboration with a foreign CEDO, but this may not be easy if the latter 
believes that it will raise costs or lengthen the job or if it is wary of helping 
the development of a potential competitor. These are aspects where 
explicit policy may greatly help, by inducing the local CEDO to maximize 
the use of training opportunities and the foreign CEDO to conduct the 
training. 
The efficient operation of a CEDO requires the use of modern 
management techniques and needs the acquisition of expertise in han-
dling complex tasks that are carried out by persons from different 
backgrounds. In organizing its program of work, the CEDO has to pay 
particular attention to the allocation of its resources to the best effect. It 
should operate in a businesslike manner, if it is to become cost-conscious 
and efficient; this should apply too in public-sector CEDOs. In this sense a 
cost-plus type of contract is not too effective. Attention should be paid to 
the setting of standards for executing consultancy projects, the control of 
costs, schedules, the quality of work, etc. All this may be embodied in 
standard procedures. 
The acquisition of technology and expertise by the CEDO implies a 
lengthy learning process about which little hard data exist so far. In the first 
place, the technology of consulting and engineering should be mastered, 
including techniques such as demand analysis, project evaluation, 
mathematical model-making, electronic data processing, scheduling, 
design routines, drafting techniques, preparation of reports, etc. 
Second, the technology of the sector to which services are rendered 
should also be mastered. This brings up some interesting issues: 
• The technology should not only be in the minds of the CEDO's staff 
but should somehow be incorporated in the organization itself, through 
specialized routines, computer programs, technical files, lists of technol-
ogy, equipment suppliers, etc. This "firm-embodied" know-how may 
reinforce the aggregate knowledge of the staff, improve their efficiency, 
and allow a departing staff member to be replaced by a new recruit with 
little disruption. 
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• Technology acquisition may reach different levels of depth and 
complexity. The mastery of basic engineering design would be an 
appropriate goal in the long run; other more accessible goals may be 
formulated for different times as a guide to the CEDO's technical 
development. 
• Noteworthy among the forms of technology acquisition and learning 
are the recruitment of experienced personnel; the repetition work that 
may be carried out for successive clients; the establishment of feedbacks 
from clients once assignments are completed (possibly through follow-up 
visits and meetings); the close interaction with R&D institutions, technol-
ogy owners, and equipment makers; the further training of staff members 
through special programs; the formation of a special group to master a 
certain technology (such as a "process group" that can carry out 
development and pilot plant work); and very importantly the association, 
permanent or temporary, with an experienced foreign CEDO. It may be 
desirable for the CEDO to establish links, or even associate itself, with a 
foreign CEDO, either indefinitely orfor the duration of a project. In the 
best of cases this may mean a quick way to acquire know-how, but there is 
a danger that a developing CEDO will remain a junior partner. Experience 
shows that the focal CEDO usually has problems in gaining access to 
crucial data, obtaining manuals and operating instructions, and in general 
procuring written documents that collect and summarize years of experi-
ence. The CEDO should negotiate access to such information,23 which is 
vitally needed if there is to be an effective transfer of corporate knowledge. 
Government policy should support this, for instance, by requiring that the 
local CEDO should lead the project with the foreign firm helping to carry it 
out: the project director can then have direct access to the top personnel 
at the foreign CEDO's headquarters instead of having to go through the 
foreign personnel who happen to work on the spot. Training may also 
become one of the items of cost in a contract between a government and a 
foreign CEDO. There are several interesting experiences in the developing 
countries that are worth analysis for the types of agreements and the 
operating procedures that are best for technology transfer from a foreign 
to a local CEDO (see Perrin 1971). 
BUILDING UPA NATIONAL CONSULTING AND 
ENGINEERING CAPACITY 
Developing countries need to build up a national C&E capacity and put 
it to good use if they are to have control of decisions that are important for 
their development, employ their intellectual resources well, carry out 
optimal investment projects, and achieve a harmonious growth of their 
industrial sector. This is not likely to happen spontaneously; it requires 
promotion policies that aim to produce a set of CEDOs able to provide C&E 
services with efficiency and ref iability. As benefits to the country as a whole 
are bound to be significantly larger than those accruing to the users of C&E 
services, it is logical that the costs of developing C&E should be shared by 
the country through appropriate government action. 
23 For instance, through a full-disclosure clause in an agreement for collabora-
tion on a specific project. 
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OBSTACLES 
Certain obstacles in developing a domestic C&E capacity and using it 
efficiently are a result of the characteristics of investors, CEDOs, and other 
participants; other obstacles are a result of the local or the international 
environment. A study of them suggests some policies to eliminate them. 
Small countries can only hope to install adequate C&E capability in a 
few fields, if at all. Policymakers are often not aware of the key role of C&E 
in carrying out better investments and contributing to self-reliant devel-
opment; and frequently there is not the necessary political will to change 
things for the better in these matters. Public investment programs often 
lack continuity, and decision-makers tend to be too cautious, not fully 
trusting local CEDOs and suppliers and wishing to avoid any complications 
that may imply delays and costs in the short run. Besides, they are 
hampered by the usual systems of selection and contracting of suppliers, 
established by law or traditional administrative practices, which are not 
adequate for promoting technical development; thus, it is not easy for 
them to support tasks that go beyond immediate requirements. In 
addition, investors often have a limited technical capability to deal with 
CEDOs, negotiate technology purchases, and identify technical require-
ments of production problems. 
External forces such as supplier financing and tied loans greatly 
reduce the investor's scope of decision; there is more latitude when 
financing comes from international agencies, although insistence on 
"getting the job done" puts the focus on short-term efficiency aspects 
rather than long-term ones. Domestic investment banks tend to behave 
like international banks and are not willing to take what they consider to be 
high risks. Self-financing allows the highest latitude for choice of CEDO, 
technology, and equipment; but few investors have it. 
Domestic CEDOs face strong competition from industrial countries' 
CEDOs, which may show much more impressive credentials, promise 
better guarantees, and provide more favourable financial terms. Faced 
with the choice, real or imagined, between delays, uncertainty, and few 
guarantees, on the one hand, and speed and efficiency, on the other, 
investors frequently select a foreign CEDO. Short-term considerations 
prevail, and long-term ones, which might help in the reduction of 
technological dependence, are not considered. 
Internal characteristics of clients, CEDOs, and other participants may 
change in time as development proceeds and learning takes place. 
Unfavourable government policies may be changed once identified. But 
many contextual factors are difficult to modify; although some of them 
may be overcome through persuasion and strong incentives, others have 
to be accepted as part of the environment. As to the obstacles that 
originate in foreign participants, the country may adopt defensive policies 
and also join other developing countries in a united front to bring about 
changes in the international environment. 
STRATEGY 
An efficient approach to the building up of domestic C&E capacity 
should not just rely on policies "from the top." It should seek to promote 
actions from the participants themselves so as to put in. motion a 
cumulative and expanding process that will overcome obstacles, change 
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attitudes, and bring about CEDO development and utilization as a 
consequence of the interest and efforts of those involved, complementing 
this with adequate policy measures at the right moments. Persuasion, the 
diffusion of experiences from home and abroad, and the training of 
responsible officials in investing enterprises are general measures that can 
be taken early. As the process gets going, a number of general or sectoral 
policies may be adopted to support it, and at the same time existing 
policies may be revised when they have a negative influence on the 
development and use of C&E capacity. 
Within this general strategy, many specific actions may be taken. 
Which ones, and in what order, will depend on the context, the 
opportunities, and the interest and eagerness of the participants. It is 
possible, for instance, that major advances can only take place when there 
is a balance of payments, and investors-particularly public enterprises-
have to turn, faute de mieux, to local CEDOs and local suppliers. If things 
turn out well, the terrain that has been gained may be kept. It is likely that 
the process cannot be planned in detail and that it is rather a case of 
"disjointed incrementalism" as outlined by Lindblom and Hirschman, the 
pursuit of an objective when there is only a general idea of where it lies and 
little knowledge of the obstacles, like crossing a minefield with the help of 
a mine detector. 
The way in which a national C&E capacity is organized will be different 
for different countries and for different fields where C&E services are 
needed. Certain strategic choices must be made so as to define objectives 
that will guide policymaking and action. These choices must address: 
• The problem of priorities regarding the type of service and the 
industrial branch in which C&E capacity should be established first. It has 
been suggested that priority should be given to preinvestment studies first 
because these are required for principal decisions that shape the way 
investment projects are engineered and implemented. After preinvest-
ment, a second priority would be detailed engineering, an activity that 
allows the links with the capital goods industry. Priority should probably 
be given to the branches in which there are possibilities for repetitive 
investments that will maintain a demand and allow experience to be gained 
in successive tasks. Repetition possibilities for engineering are present in 
peripheral technologies used by many different investment projects; to 
make use of them it is necessary to disaggregate investment packages and 
parcel out contracts. 
• Degree of autonomy and specialization. Which combination should 
be favoured - private or state-owned CEDOs, independent or captive, 
specialized or multipurpose? Much will depend on the prevailing opinion 
and the "style" of the country concerned.24 State-owned CEDOs, how-
ever, would seem to be a necessity to serve small and medium industries, 
which cannot pay fully for the services they require. Independent CEDOs 
may sometimes offer advantages over captive ones both from the private 
24 One country, through its National Development Bank, has created technical 
groups in areas like forestry and has made them private after some time, continuing 
with its support in the shape of assignments and credit. In India, the government 
has tended to build up its own C&E capacity; government CEDOs act as prime 
contractors in large projects and subcontract certain parts to private CEDOs. 
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and from the social points of view: clients would not be saddled with 
project offices that are active only part of the time, and such CEDOs 
probably have a stronger impact on the diffusion of knowledge by virtue of 
the many clients for which they perform assignments. But large enterprises 
may prefer to have their own captive capacity, which allows them a high 
degree of mastery of the technology in their branch, particularly if R&D 
activities are also carried out and secrecy is a consideration. Multipurpose 
CED Os have fewer problems associated with demand fluctuations, but this 
approach tends to disperse efforts, particularly of key management 
personnel. However, in small countries diversified CEDOs may be 
unavoidable. A closely related question is whether CEDOs should be 
totally independent of ties to technology owners, contractors, capital 
goods producers, and other commercial interests. This issue has been 
debated for a long time. National and international CEDO associations 
maintain that the clients can only get proper and unbiased advice if the 
organization they retain is not tied to any other interests, and they have 
incorporated this principle in their codes of conduct. However, interna-
tional banks allow CEDOs related to such interests to participate in the 
formulation, engineering, and supervision of investment projects pro-
vided that their associates do not supply any inputs. In a developing 
country there are reasons that the principle should not be absolutely 
upheld: for instance, a captive organization belonging to a contractor may 
sometimes represent the best domestic source of C&E; the volume of 
business and particularly the profits will be much larger for a CEDO that is 
integrated within a larger commercial operation, such as a contractor, 
significantly increasing the chances of development of the CEDO; this 
argument is important from the point of view of developing an indigenous 
CEDO capacity; in any case, many developing country CEDOs have 
originated in civil constructors and other enterprises that established an 
engineering department that later became large and went on to supply 
services to other customers. In certain sectors of some countries - for 
example, CEDOs in the process engineering branch in Argentina and 
Mexico - C&E capacity is already extensively tied up with commercial 
interests. 
• The organization of CEDOs nationally and sectorally. In some areas 
the expected work load may not justify more than one or two large CEDOs; 
the danger is that there would exist strong competition and a high death 
rate among many small CEDOs, none of which could aspire to become 
large enough to carry out an efficient task, so that foreign CEDOs would 
continue to be employed indefinitely in key assignments. A monopolistic 
situation may be the only alternative to such foreign domination, con-
tracting and pricing procedures being negotiated and agreed. 
• Relations with foreign CEDOs. A position should be taken regarding 
the place of foreign-controlled and joint venture CEDOs. 
The support awarded to developing CEDOs is essential if they are to 
reach maturity. The main questions are: How much support should be 
given to private CEDOs (a) directly through fiscal incentives, loans, and 
other means, and (b) through contracts for which relatively high rates are 
paid? How much should be invested to create and develop state-owned 
CEDOs in certain key areas and branches? What amount of subsidy should 
be given to the C&E services rendered to small and medium industry by 
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information centres, industrial research institutes, and other organiza-
tions catering to that sector? 
POLICY 
Some policy measures and actions can be taken by users and 
producers of C&E services, and by the government, to help the develop-
ment of national C&E capabilities. Most have been discussed elsewhere in 
the literature; others have been put forth in conferences on C&E or have 
derived from personal conversations with different people. In some cases 
they are being applied in developing countries, as shown in the case 
studies included in this volume. 
USERS 
Measures and actions by the users of C&E services include: 
• Careful appraisal in selection of a CEDO based on expected perfor-
mance. Selection should not be influenced by price considerations; or by 
financial facilities; risk-avoiding attitudes; too much reliance on creden-
tials, especially those of a foreign CEDO. Methods of selection should give 
domestic CEDOs the possibility to overcome the "inherent inequality" 
they suffer in regard to foreign CEDOs. 
• Use of enlightened practices in the preparation and implementation 
of investment projects. Local CEDOs should be given significant respon-
sibilities as well as opportunities to train their personnel and acquire 
know-how even though this may signify a cost. 
• Development of their own technical staff to deal with suppliers. It will 
often be convenient to build up a true technical and engineering 
capability. The process of creating this internal capability is not simple; it is 
not enough to hire professionals; a team should be formed. 
• Careful handling of relations with CEDOs. Terms of reference should 
be precise but flexible. The users should control carefully the work of 
CEDOs and other suppliers. They should integrate their own personnel 
into the CEDO's technical teams for a better overseeing of the work and as 
a means to train people who will later be engaged in operation and 
maintenance. They should provide the necessary feedback information to 
allow the CEDO to learn from its past work. 
CED Os 
CEDOs in developing countries can do much by themselves to 
increase the quality and scope of their activities: 
• They should program their development, establishing concrete 
objectives over time and marshaling the means to achieve them. 
• They should attempt to utilize fully the resources and skills available in 
the country, establishing strong ties with various institutions - univer-
sities, research institutes, development agencies, banks, equipment 
makers-and at the same time creating links between them for the benefit 
of an integrated industrial development. 
• They may pool resources to carry out large assignments. This does not 
exclude foreign inputs through joint ventures or individual consultants to 
carry out specialized tasks. 
• They should form or strengthen professional associations of consul-
tancy organizations, which can be useful in raising professional standards 
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through registration, establishment of codes of conduct, exchange of 
experience, and improved communication channels. 
• They should develop quality assurance mechanisms so that a solid and 
reliable structure of C&E services is created. In developed countries, the 
profession of consulting engineering usually has a self-policing 
mechanism, such as the periodic renewal of a qualification, which gives 
the user some guarantee as to quality. In addition, large CEDOs continu-
ously check the quality of the work in their various projects and can change 
the project managers and their professional staff if necessary. But CEDOs 
in developing countries may have just one or two projects that are 
managed by the principals of the firm. This fact points to the need for a 
central organization, possibly set up by a CEDO association, that supplies 
reliable information to prospective clients, helps in drafting guarantee and 
bonding clauses, and carries out a control of the quality of services 
rendered. 
GOVERNMENTS 
Governments should ideally define a long-term program for the 
development of C&E capacity at national and sectoral levels, with clear 
objectives according to the choices made on several aspects of strategy. 
Within the program, specific policy measures may be adopted at the 
appropriate times. 
Government policies on the demand for C&E services include: 
• Adoption of political support and the right attitudes, which may vary 
from branch to branch. For instance, atomic power development in 
Argentina and India relied from the beginning on domestic C&E efforts, 
disaggregation of packages, increases in local inputs, etc., whereas steel 
and other industries in the same countries relied on turnkey projects for a 
long time. The government may influence attitudes and behaviours 
through persuasion and other means. 
• Awarding of contracts directly to local CEDOs. The government can 
adopt legislation favouring the use of local (in preference to foreign) C&E 
in public investments, although in practice this may not work too well as 
decision-makers invoke urgency, safety, etc., in their justifications for 
using foreign sources. 
• The protection of domestic C&E production through a system of 
preferences. The usual tariff mechanisms do not appear to be effective 
because of operatives peculiar to C&E activity. C&E services are bought-
or should be bought-on grounds of quality rather than price, and, in this 
regard, there usually is a bias in favour of what comes from an industrial 
country; price incentives are largely inoperative because the customer 
prefers to pay more if necessary-this is only a small part of the investment 
cost-and to feel confident that the most reliable and best quality services 
have been acquired. The application of regimens for the control of 
technology imports, foreign investment, and industrial property rights 
does not provide enough inducement to select local C&E services. There 
are many factors in technology choice that escape those regimens; some 
of them are subjective; others depend on how activities that demand 
technology are organized, who takes the decisions, and what decision 
rules are applied. To act on these factors and favour the contracting of 
domestic C&E services, governments may use preference systems of a 
qualitative nature. Domestic CEDOs face stiff competition from foreign 
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firms and are at a disadvantage on account of an inherent inequality in 
financial means and credentials. To eliminate this disadvantage and, furth-
er, to tip the balance in favour of local CEDOs, governments need to do 
two things: first, to devise financial mechanisms that would grant 
adequate credits to CEDOs (for their capital requirements and the prep-
aration of proposals) and to their clients (so that consulting and engineer-
ing services may be had on favourable terms); second, to devise a method 
of selection on the part of the client in which the sheer volume of 
background experience and the renown of professionals do not automati-
cally det~rmine who is to be awarded a contract. Such a method would 
include the development of a point system with standard procedures for 
the assessment of the quality of a firm and of its proposal without undue 
emphasis on the volume of background experience and the awarding of 
extra points if the firm is local. 
• Regulation of demand in the public sector so that CEDOs are not 
exposed to great fluctuations in the work load. 
~ Promotion of exports of C&E services through identification of likely 
foreign customers, use of embassies and missions overseas to assist local 
CEDOs, provision of tax rebates and subsidies for the export of C&E 
services, etc. In some countries a special trading company has been jointly 
founded by the government and exporters of technological services. 
Policies on the supply of C&E services include: 
• Establishment of state CEDOs in certain areas of the economy. In 
some cases these may be captive groups that are pulled outside their 
parent organizations and given a wider role. 
• Preferential tax treatment to CEDOs for activities such as the export of 
services. 
• Creation of credit facilities from which CEDOs may obtain working 
capital, training, research, technology, etc. 
e Support for the establishment and functioning of consultants' associ-
ations. 
Policies on the activities of CEDOs should aim to improve the social 
efficiency of CED Os and that of the investments they serve. Examples are: 
e Support for improved, enlightened practices that mean high social 
efficiency. This will require persuasion and, perhaps, the teaching of such 
practices to investors and CEDOs. 
• Adoption of legislation compelling investors to acquire a percentage 
of their inputs from domestic CEDOs and local suppliers. This type of 
action has been very effective in the case of inputs for automobile produc-
tion, where local subsidiaries have been forced to "integrate" their pro-
duction. In the case of C&E services, success is less likely. Experience in 
Argentina and other countries shows that such legislation is frequently 
bypassed by public enterprises. It is possible, however, to establish a 
control mechanism, as has been done in Brazil and in India. 
• Introduction of regulations that use foreign CEDOs positively for 
technology transfer and training. Such regulations may be implemented, 
for instance, by a technology registry that approves all technology agree-
ments. 
• Promotion of relations between CEDOs on the one hand, and R&D 
organizations, equipment makers, and input suppliers, on the other. The 
government may play an important part in this through its financial, 
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administrative, and technical units, acting in accordance with a central 
policy. 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
Positive policies, especially by governments, will encourage appro-
priate international cooperation with both developing and developed 
countries. Cooperative efforts among developing countries in technical 
matters are especially important not only in the sharing of technology but 
also in the reorienting of conditions now permeating operations of 
technology transfer, foreign investment, etc. 
Technology may be shared through traditional channels (bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation) and through commercial channels (operations of 
technology commerce between a supplier in one developing country and 
a client in another). Technical cooperation through commercial channels 
offers great promise of expansion. The operations may be of benefit to the 
exporting country in terms of a greater mobilization of its C&E potential 
and the expansion of markets for its CEDOs. The receiving country may 
benefit through lower costs, the possibilities of obtaining more appro-
priate technologies,25 and the likelihood that such transactions will create 
much weaker links of dependence and will be endowed with characteris-
tics that make them socially useful for the receiving country, helping the 
latter to build up its own C&E capacity. Cooperation of this sort may lead to 
the creation of large technology markets, the establishment of joint pro-
grams and joint institutions in certain fields, and eventually the achieve-
ment of technological integration between two or more countries. A small 
country may not find it easy to develop independent C&E capacity in 
certain fields, and cooperation with other countries may be the only way to 
obtain a C&E capacity that responds to its interests. Examples may be found 
in the Andean, the Central American, and the Caribbean subregions in the 
Americas. 
The developing countries should cooperate to carry out a 
"technological diplomacy" to improve the conditions now ruling in oper-
ations of technology transfer, direct foreign investment, and others that 
may influence their technological development. The negotiations being 
carried on in UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment) and other international forums on "codes of conduct" for 
technology transfer and multinational corporations should be continued 
25 A large part of the technologies needed by developing countries are already 
used by other developing countries and have been mastered by them; the 
"technology gap" between developing and developed countries as a whole is 
significant only in certain areas and branches, mainly the "science-based"type. 
Also, adaptive efforts, innovations, and cumulative production experience have 
produced "appropriate" technical solutions in many fields. Such solutions consti-
tute "technological assets" that in many cases are implicit in existing plant and 
operating practices. To transfer such technological assets, it is necessary to make 
them explicit, i.e., to derive a "conceptual engineering" from existing practice. 
This needs technical efforts of the "reverse-engineering" type, which may be 
forthcoming if there is a market for such technological assets. With the conceptual 
engineering in hand, a proposal may be prepared in such a way that it incorporates 
the "basic engineering" of a project that fits the clients' needs and contemplates 
the local conditions under which they operate. 
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actively, and it would be convenient to start other actions to change the 
behaviour of various participants such as international and regional devel-
opment banks, productive enterprises, CEDOs, donor agencies, and 
banks of the industrial countries. 
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GUIDELINES FOR A CASE STUDY Of CONSULTING 
AND ENGINEERING DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS 
ALBERTO ARAOZ 
Case studies are useful for researchers just beginning to analyze 
complex situations where many variables and decision centres are 
present. They detail individual situations that incorporate the complexity, 
and they provide insights into the interrelations among all the elements. 
They rely on inductive reasoning and do not imply the collection of data for 
testing conjectures and hypotheses. Although they are not a basis for 
conclusions of general validity, they do provide a basis for conceptual 
interpretations and hypotheses that may be submitted to corroboration by 
statistical evidence. 
The CEDO case studies were not carried out with the purpose of giving 
answers to a list of carefully formulated questions. Although many useful 
insights and some preliminary conclusions were obtained, the principal 
aims were to identify the different instances of decision, the participants 
and the problems they faced, and the influences at work; to define 
hypotheses that may be subjected to verification; and in general to 
contribute to a better formulation of the CEDO project. At the same time, 
the task allowed national teams to get acquainted with research on CEDOs 
and to train their personnel on the subject. 
There is, therefore, a strong exploratory flavour in the case studies. 
The methods were flexible; there were suggestions on the scope and 
content but even these were regarded as guidelines, not compulsory 
procedures, because the output was to be questions rather than answers. 
SUBJECT AND STRUCTURE 
It was suggested that the case studies be of a reasonably mature, 
locally owned, independent CEDO, private or public, and that they 
include the CEDO's past development and present functioning, with an 
example of a recent investment project in which the CEDO played a major 
role, especially in formulation and execution. Such information was 
sought so that a close look could be taken at aspects of the CEDO's 
developing stage and of its mature.state so that hypotheses about some of 
the issues could be made and, later, researched. It was believed that, by 
studying a particular investment project, one could identify the principal 
participants and pose questions to them about alternative courses of 
adion. 
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The investment project was to be medium sized- U.S. $10-50 million 
-anything smaller lacks complexity and larger projects are likely to be too 
complicated for adequate analysis. The client was to be a private investor 
or a public enterprise or agency. To facilitate cross-country comparisons, it 
was suggested that the project be in the chemical process industry and that 
the project be completed recently so that relevant information would be 
relatively easy to obtain. 
A brief examination of, perhaps, six investment projects, and the 
CEDOs participating in them, was suggested as a means for choosing the 
subject of the in-depth case study. The preliminary study was to be an 
abbreviated form of what was to be done later and was to be conducted 
along the same lines, key participants being interviewed about the CEDO's 
development and operations. The result was to be very sketchy case 
studies that would be useful indicators of relevant issues and hypotheses. 
Once the main case study was made, the next step suggested was that the 
results be discussed with those who had been interviewed in the first 
round, so that the findings could be contrasted with other cases and 
experiences, and the final report enriched thereby. 
The empirical information for the in-depth study was to be collected 
through interviews with key informants and through the study of reports, 
records, and other documents. A tentative timetable was 181'2 weeks -2 
weeks for the preliminary analysis, 6 weeks for accumulation of details on 
the CEDO's development, 6 weeks for examination of a recent investment 
project, 1 lz week for discussions with key personnel of other investment 
projects, and 4 weeks for the preparation of a report. A minimum staff was 
considered to be one researcher with the aid of one research assistant for 
at least 12 weeks. For a more complete work, and for training purposes, a 
larger team was recommended. 
THE CEDO AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
The first step was to characterize and describe the CEDO as it is - the 
principal aspects of its "anatomy," its "physiology," and the relations with 
its environment. (This examination would be considerably expanded 
during the second part of the case study.) The following step was to 
analyze the main features in the CEDO's development, from its begin-
nings, to find out about the principal decisions, the most influential 
factors, the relative success of strategies employed, etc. It was hoped that 
the information derived would indicate the salient questions and issues 
related to development so that they could be subjected to research later 
on. The conceptual framework in the previous chapter details the types of 
issues that might be identified. 
Some of the principal points to be covered in the first step were: 
• Characteristics: ownership; dependence on other firms or agencies; 
parameters of size: capital, stable personnel, person-hours per year, 
number of projects handled and their value, sales; branch or branches it 
attends and their main characteristics; type of clientele; 
• Output: structure of the services produced; approximate proportion 
of effort in preinvestment, design, construction, and supervision; other 
services (see Malhotra's classification); degree of specialization of the 
CEDO; the way in which it envisages and accomplishes the functions that 
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make up its social role, such as formulating appropriate investment 
projects, opening technology packages, seeking appropriate technology, 
adapting foreign technology, acting as a link between local R&D and 
industrial users of technology, acting as a link between industrial investors 
and the capital goods producers, contributing to technology diffusion, 
etc.; 
• Market and clients: characteristics of demand, in size, diversity, 
growth, fluctuations, and discontinuities; characteristics of clients in 
nationality, ownership, size, technical level, etc.; attitudes and biases of 
clients; relations with clients through marketing practices and other 
means; types of contracts, bid presentations, formal and legal practices in 
this respect; commercial relations with other CEDOs as collaborators or 
subcontractors to them; exports of services; 
• Structure, operating procedures, management: physical resources 
(buildings, equipment, instruments, etc.); information resources (books 
and periodicals, special technical files, etc.); human resources (structure 
of staff, qualifications); stable and temporary employees; turnover of 
personnel; seniority of present employees; salary levels and salary 
structure; organizational structure (has a foreign model been adopted?); 
capabilities; range of skills; internal procedures and production 
techniques compared with those employed in top foreign CEDOs (for 
instance, planning and programing; use of computers for calculations and 
for drafting; use of advanced quantitative methods for simulation, analysis 
of data, design, scheduling); structure of costs (labour, support services, 
overheads, etc.); structure of finance; management methods employed 
(and opinions of how far usual management methods for normal enter-
prises apply to a CEDO in a developing country); internal communica-
tions, motivation of personnel, promotion of creativity; critical resources: 
human resources - patterns of recruitment of personnel; training of 
human resources (academic, on the job, with foreign associates; problems 
in this training); technology and information resources - patterns of 
access to technology and to specialized expertise; links with foreign 
CEDOs and foreign technology owners; identification and procurement of 
domestic technology; setup for feedback from clients; access to economic 
and technical information through literature, documentation centres, 
trips, meetings, contacts with universities and research centres, etc.; 
storage, internal distribution, and utilization of information; 
• Environment, influences received: local institutions and type of 
relations maintained - government ministries and agencies, universities, 
professional associations, financial institutions, CEDOs, equipment mak-
ers; contextual factors, implicit policies, and explicit policies that have a 
bearing on the CEDO's performance and on its current development; 
efforts of the CEDO to change in its favour its domestic environment by 
itself or through associations with other CEDOs; characteristics of and 
relations with foreign CEDOs (collaboration/competition), experts, 
equipment makers, technology owners; influence of foreign and interna-
tional banks; relations with CEDOs and other institutions in developing 
countries; and 
• Problems, obstacles, opportunities-the main factors contributing to 
the CEDO's success, such as a monopolistic situation in the local market, 
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special relationships, dynamic management, continued access to know-
how, etc.; the main obstacles and problems to be overcome to improve 
further the social efficiency of the CEDO (in its three components, see 
conceptual framework), and what government policy can do to help; the 
opportunities the CEDO perceives in the near future and how it can profit 
from them. 
These facts about the mature CEDO were to serve as a point of 
departure for the second step - study of the past development. They 
would provide a basis for questions such as how each main characteristic 
has evolved, how the critical resources have been procured, what 
opportunities have been used, how obstacles have been overcome, etc. 
They needed to be supplemented by questions on: 
• Origin: Was it a new firm and, if so, what was the previous experience 
of the founders? Was it a spin-off from a government agency or a 
manufacturing firm? Why were a particular technical field and technical 
services chosen? What were the main characteristics of the CEDO in its 
very beginnings? What were the initial assignments? 
• Paths of growth: What were the industrial branches and other 
customers served, and types of services rendered? Were there trends 
toward diversification or specialization? What quantitative indicators 
evolved? What influenced the gaining of expertise, or learning process -
repetitive work, collaboration with foreign CEDOs, recruitment of new, 
specialized personnel, training of staff? When did access to technology 
increase? How did the CEDO's own technology or production procedures 
evolve? How did it establish an image, create confidence among clients 
and other participants, develop clientele? 
• Strategies and policies for development: What was the model for the 
type of institution the CEDO aspired to become? What were its objectives 
at different times? What were the principal obstacles, critical problems, 
and key opportunities in the development process? What were the 
solutions in terms of strategies and policies?26 
• Support received from the government and other participants: Which 
government policies have helped? (The policies that have hindered 
development will have been examined as obstacles.) Have government-
awarded contracts been key inputs in the CEDO's development? What role 
has political support played? What support has come from financial 
institutions and from industry? What other help would have been useful in 
hastening and improving the development process? 
ANALYSIS OFAN INVESTMENT PROJECT 
The main purpose of analysis of an investment project is to obtain 
detailed knowledge about how a mature CEDO performs in a particular 
26 One strategy merits special analysis: a developing CEDO in association with 
a foreign CEDO. This has been characterized by K. Mariwalla as having three 
phases: (1) a division of activities between foreign and local CEDOs, and 
supervision by the former of the latter's work; (2) most work carried out by the local 
CEDO, but the highly specialized work done by the foreign CEDO, which also 
oversees the complex work done by the local CEDO; (3) responsibility with the 
local CEDO, which may consult occasionally with the foreign CEDO. 
56 
instance, how it relates to other participants, and what influences it so that 
the principal questions and policy issues will emerge and shape further 
research on the performance of a mature CEDO and the conditions it 
needs to achieve a high social efficiency. 
The questions to be asked related to the aspects identified in the 
conceptual framework presented in the previous chapter: determination 
of the "products" to be produced, production, distribution, characteris-
tics of the environment, and internal characteristics of the CEDO. Some 
sort of judgment should have been passed by the research team about the 
social efficiency of the CEDO in the particular investment project, the 
components of that parameter (social utility, productive efficiency, dis-
tribution efficiency), the influence of external factors, particularly explicit 
pol_icies, implicit policies, and contextual factors, and the adequacy of the 
salient internal characteristics of the CEDO. 
Alternative courses of action at different points in the investment 
project sequence were to be identified and questions asked about the 
reasons that they were not chosen. A further question was how far work on 
the project had meant a significant learning experience for the CEDO, had 
allowed it to increase its expertise, improve its organization, made it able 
to offer a wider range of services; and in how far such ameliorations had 
permitted the CEDO to tackle successfully more complex assignments. 
The characteristics of other participants and the relations of the CEDO 
with them were also to be studied, particularly in the case of the client; 
other CEDOs, local and foreign; technology owners; the local R&D 
institutions. The client was to be examined from the point of view of its 
technical capabilities, past record on technical matters, and the effect of 
the project in increasing its skills and organizational capacity. Another 
important aspect was the utilization by the CEDO of local R&b organiza-
tions; in many developing countries this utilization is very meagre, and the 
reasons for this should be tentatively explored. 
To take these aspects into account in an orderly manner, the first step 
suggested was to identify and describe carefully the "decision chain" of 
the investment project, i.e., the series of points where critical decisions 
were made from the moment the project was identified until the resulting 
installations were operating to specifications. At each point in the decision 
chain, various elements would be identified: the participants involved; 
the alternatives considered at the time of decision and how they were 
identified and formulated; the alternatives not considered and the 
reasons; the decision method employed, explicit or not; the information 
used for decision-making; and the principal influences at work - explicit 
and implicit policy, contextual factors, motivation and attitudes of the 
participants, characteristics of the production branch, etc. - that have 
operated directly (i.e., through the information employed for decision-
making) or through the participants (i.e., affecting their behaviour). 
It was suggested that the resulting descriptions be summarized in a 
table that would permit fruitful discussions with the participants them-
selves and with other national teams (Table 2). This description was to be 
used as the starting point of an analysis aimed at understanding the 
influences on the outcome of decisions along the investment project, 
which may be related to an appraisal of the relative success or failure of the 
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efficiently) and social objectives (keeping decisions in national hands, 
using more adequate technology, maximizing favourable impacts on local 
production and engineering, etc.). Of particular interest are the limits 
imposed by various circumstances (explicit and implicit policies, contex-
tual factors, characteristics of the branch, etc.) on the action of local 
participants. Another interesting point is the relations between partici-
pants; for instance, CEDO-client, CEDO-foreign CEDO, CEDO-R&D 
system, etc. 
In some cases, it was possible to suggest alternative decisions and 
actions that could have been taken to improve the project's success. This 
aspect comes out more clearly when several national case studies are 
analyzed side by side. 
The set of all possible decisions may be said to make up a "decision 
tree." To examine the alternatives, one must start at the first point in the 
chain and identify alternative decisions that may be taken - those 
explicitly considered by the participants as well as those not considered 
but possible. Each outcome branches out into two or more possibilities, 
and so on. The usefulness of this representation may be improved if 
alternatives are qualified and ranked according to the degree to which they 
are expected to enhance the social efficiency of the investment activity 
(Fig. 5). 
This decision tree cannot in practice be constructed except in very 
simple cases because of the large number of links in the decision chain; 
the possibility that one must go back and change decisions; and the 
likelihood that social efficiency is to be measured ordinally rather than 
cardinally. However, the concept of a decision tree of this nature allows 
interesting discussions to take place with the key informants. For instance, 
it would be possible to specify a "best" chain of decisions in the sense that 
at each point an alternative is chosen that will mean maximum social 
efficiency (Fig. 6). 
In practice an optimal sequence may not be feasible, and the reasons 
for not adopting the "best" decisions should be examined. Some people 
feel that one of the main influences behind a near-optimal decision 
sequence is the positive attitude of the main participants- principally the 
client and the CEDO - and that without a favourable philosophy on their 
part it is easy to fall back on decisions that maximize private but not social 
efficiency. 
1 2 3 4 
1 
Degree of impact on the 
social efficiency of 
the investment activity 
Critical decision points 
Fig. 5. Decision tree - ideal 
representation. 
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Fig. 6. Decision tree - optimal 
sequence. 
It is easier to achieve a high overall efficiency of the complete 
investment project (once the decision chain has been gone through) when 
the first few decisions are optimal. This is in line with the proposition in the 
literature that decisions taken during the preinvestment period largely set 
the stage for later decisions - the choice of a local consultant, for 
instance, would make it much more probable that the technology chosen 
will be more adequate, that local capital goods and other inputs are fully 
employed, etc. 
At some decision points, the outcome of certain alternatives may limit 
the choices in later decisions and be strongly negative for social efficiency. 
This would particularly be the case with the election of the source of 
finance. A decision to accept supplier credit, for instance, would throw the 
sequence into a tailspin. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGINEERING CONSULTANCY 
AND DESIGN CAPABILITY IN KOREA 
JINJOO LEE 
SUMMARY 
The Korea Engineering Co. Ltd (KECL) was founded in 1970 as a joint venture of 
the government with the Lummus Co. (USA), with equity participation by several 
leading Korean enterprises. In 1973, Lummus was replaced by the Toyo Engineering 
Co. of Japan as the KECL partner, and in 1978 the Korean Development Bank sold its 
stock, 50% of the Korean share, to the Sam Sung Co., which now has the control of 
KECL. 
KECL is a multipurpose engineering company, making available all major 
services in the areas of plant and water resource engineering, harbour and coastal 
engineering, irrigation, sewerage, and agricultural engineering, collaborating 
whenever needed with competent foreign CEDOs. 
In its first year, KECL had a large volume of work from the government, but this 
decreased in the second and third years, causing Lummus to retire. Contract 
amounts increased notably after 1976, and the company has now accumulated 
good experience and technical expertise. KECL is expected to grow rapidly after its 
transfer to private enterprise. Personnel went up from 66 in 1971-73 to 129 in 1974, 
and it doubled again to 238 in 1975. In 1978 it was expected to reach 500. 
Most clients have been Korean enterprises. Some subcontracted projects have 
been made for foreign ones. Services have covered feasibility studies (15 projects), 
detailed engineering including procurement and construction management (45 
projects)., and detailed engineering including start-up (two projects). No basic 
engineering projects have been carried out: the firm's technical capability and 
expertise has not yet reached a sufficient level for this. 
Among the problems faced by KECL, a crucial one is the scarcity of competent, 
experienced engineering and technical personnel, especially piping and instru-
ment engineers with plant design expertise. KECL's growth, despite support by the 
government, has not been easy. This experience shows that the engineering 
industry cannot be fostered only with direct government support. Incentives are 
needed to enhance engineering capabilities and to create a demand, overcoming 
the hesitation of most entrepreneurs to use domestic engineering firms on account 
of supposed shortcomings in quality and efficiency. 
KECL has steadily developed its technical capability to handle detailed 
engineering services. The 1960s were a period of foreign dependency for 
engineering services, with almost no Korean contribution. Partial localization of 
such services took place in the 1970s, KECL taking a leading role in this. However, 
no basic design and engineering service projects have been carried out as yet by 
domestic engineering firms using only their own capabilities. Perhaps this will be 
possible in the 1980s if high-risk entrepreneurship is forthcoming on the part of 
clients. 
61 
This case study analyzes two investment projects where KECL has had a major 
role. Both have been successful - as indeed have been all of KECL's projects to 
date. 
One of the projects studied was a styrene monomer plant. The client was a 
company backed by the Korean Development Bank. A preinvestment study made 
by the client led to the choice of the Monsanto process. The Toyo Engineering Co. 
of Japan was chosen as the CEDO, because its parent company, the Mitsui Corp., 
was able to finance the project. The total cost was about U.S.$17 million, of which 
$2 million (12%) accounted for the engineering fee. KECL provided two types of 
engineering services: detailed engineering and plant construction management, 
through a subcontract with Toyo, and all engineering services for an off-site 
building through a direct contract with the client. The latter amounted to 
U.S.$600 000. 
There were few alternatives regarding size, location, and product mix of the 
plant because there was a long-term government plan for petrochemical develop-
ment. Because of the extent of the investment, which could not be funded solely by 
the government, decisions on technical matters were not made prior to financing 
decisions: financing and loans took priority over all other problems, and any 
alternative technological choices had to be made in accordance with financing 
possibilities. 
The government required a breakdown of foreign and local procurement, the 
latter amounting to U.S.$4 million. KECL's role in procurement was the evaluation 
and recommendation of local vendors, supervision of vendor drawing, expediting 
of deliveries, etc. The project gave KECL a good opportunity to acquire expertise in 
activities where it had little previous experience. KE Cl's efficiency was satisfactory: 
the project was completed by the target date, there were no cost overruns, and the 
cost of the plant was evaluated as reasonable or even lower than expected. The 
quality of the engineering services was said to be good according to clients. 
The other project studied was. a resin plant. The client was a private company. 
KECL's services included planning and preinvestment analysis in collaboration with 
the client, detailed design and engineering, procurement services, and construc-
tion supervision. Basic design and engineering were provided by the Japan 
Synthetic Rubber Co., which was the ABS resin process licencer. The project cost 
about U .S.$10 million; KE Cl's engineering fee was about $400 000 (4%). In addition 
there was an undisclosed amount for basic design and engineering. 
KECL made great efforts to localize plant facilities and equipment; only items 
such as high-precision equipment (process, control, and electrical) were imported. 
This high level of local purchasing was possible because the client itself financed 
the project. 
The plant was completed on time and without cost overruns, and it is now in 
good operational condition, showing the satisfactory quality of the engineering 
services. 
For comparison purposes, the case of a very large fertilizer project that was 
handled by a foreign CEDO is mentioned in the study. Investment was U.S.$419 
million, most of which came from foreign loans. The general contractor was a large 
U.S. engineering firm, which was paid $42 million (10%) for the engineering 
services for basic design, procurement, guarantee of the start-up and operation, 
and construction. This amount surpasses the total amount spent on engineering 
services by all companies in Korea in 1977. Total plant facilities and equipment 
amounted to $219 million, of which only 27% was locally procured, i.e., about $60 
million. The localization rate would have been higher if local engineering firms had 
taken responsibility for engineering services. It should be noted that three 
domestic engineering firms, including KECL, participated in the project through 
subcontracts. 
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The emergence of engineering design and consultancy organizations 
in developing countries has been stimulated by the increase and diversifi-
cation of industrial projects. These organizations play an important part in 
economic and technological development, frequently providing a channel 
through which industrial technology is transferred from advanced coun-
tries to developing countries and performing a crucial role by linking four 
systems that need to be integrated for efficient industrial development: 
the finance system, which makes it possible to start a project; the 
engineering design system, which organizes the necessary resources, 
personnel, facilities, money, and skills to implement the project; the 
production system, which applies a specific set of techniques to the 
project; and the science and technology system, which creates/supplies 
the technology required. 
Engineering and consultancy are therefore related to several issues of 
industrial development, such as technology transfer, production efficien-
cy, local engineering capability, product and process improvement, etc. 
They are essential for fast industrial development and technological 
self-reliance. The important benefits from the development of reliable and 
competent engineering services can be realized through reduced 
engineering fees, localization of plant facilities and equipment, reduced 
plant construction costs, development and localization of technology, 
promotion of related technology especially for the machinery industry, 
personnel development, machinery exports, etc. 
Few systematic studies have been carried out to analyze the factors in 
the evolution and the practices of engineering design and cqnsulting 
organizations. Knowledge of engineering activities in developed countries 
is fragmentary and embedded in trade secrets, so that any systematic 
understanding of CEDO practice and behaviour is difficult to achieve. 
According to Machlup (1962), engineering services make up a typical 
subsector of the knowledge industry.27 Engineering services apply scien-
tific principles and knowledge to the planning, design, development, 
construction, operation, testing, and inspection of plants or facilities, 
which are an integration of machines, structure, and equipment for a 
manufacturing process. Table 3 specifies the activities needed for a 
number of main engineering functions and the organizations carrying out 
those activities. 
This chapter will describe and analyze the development of engineer-
ing consultancy and design capability in Korea in the light of the 
knowledge industry, with special reference to Table 3. The levels of the 
analysis are three: national, i.e., Korean engineering service industry as a 
whole; company, i.e., a specific engineering firm, Korea Engineering Co. 
Ltd; and project, i.e., a few engineering projects. 
Before 1961 almost no investment in engineering services took place 
in Korea. During the Five Year Economic Development Plan (1962-67), 
plants for fertilizer production and petroleum refining were built on a 
27 Machlup distinguishes five types of knowledge industry: education, 
research and development, communications media, information machines, and 
information services. CEDOs are concerned with certain kinds of information 
services, especially engineering and architectural services, business services, and 
services rendered to government. 
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turnkey basis, which resulted in little impact on indigenous engineering 
capabilities. Some pioneering efforts to establish integrated engineering 
firms by technical entrepreneurs in the 1960s were not successful due to 
restricted domestic demand and lack of technical capabilities. Only 
Table 3. Activities in main engineering functions. 
Engineering Organization 
functions Activities in charge 
Consulting prior to Resource survey; Integrated engineering firm; 
design labour study; resource development 
market analysis; corporation; 
environmental general trading company; 




System design and Master plan for General trading company; 
basic engineering installation; integrated R&D institute; 
urban planning specialized survey team or firm; 
feasibility study; integrated engineering firm; 
technical feasibility; plant equipment manufacturer; 
overall evaluation industrial firm 
Detailed Total system Integrated engineering firm; 
engineering and design; plant equipment manufacturer; 
design subsystem design; specialized design company; 




Procurement Preliminary Integrated engineering firm; 
procurement study; general trading company; 
market survey; construction company; 
procurement; plant equipment manufacturer 
provision of loan 
Construction and Plant construction; Integrated engineering firm; 
maintenance installation of construction company; 
equipment; plant equipment manufacturer 
various civil 
engineering tasks 
Project Project control; Prime contractor; 
management inventory control; construction company; 




Table 4. Status of engineering firms in Korea, March 1978. 
Number of Professional 
Type of firm firms engineers Engineers 
Plant engineering 6 129 1254 
Specialized services 
Integrated 9 59 419 
Mechanical 6 8 441 
Metallurgical 
Chemical 2 2 11 
Electrical 16 58 159 
Electronics 
Communications 2 2 84 
Shipbuilding 2 4 181 
Construction 35 68 714 
Construction equipment 2 3 8 
Mining 5 9 21 
Textiles 2 2 222 
Nuclear 1 11 78 
Production 
Geology 17 21 245 
Information processing 
construction and architectural design services maintained their opera-
tions. 
In the late 1960s, a partial localization of engineering services was 
accomplished in the construction of several chemical plants by a fertilizer 
company's technical team. In the early 1970s the first integrated engineer-
ing firm, Korea Engineering Co. Ltd, was created under the auspices of the 
Korean government, as a joint venture with Lummus Co. of the U.S. The 
company participated in a few engineering projects, but Lummus with-
drew owing to the lack of a market for engineering services, being 
replaced in the partnership by Toyo Engineering of Japan. 
The government influenced the engineering industry through the 
Professional Engineers Law before 1973 and, thereafter, through the 
Engineering Services Promotion Law. The latter stipulated that a domestic 
engineering company should be the prime contractor for engineering 
services except when not feasible, and it required registration of 
engineering firms and an annual report of their activities. 
Engineering firms registered in Korea28 in 1978 comprised 6 plant 
engineering, 9 integrated engineering, 25 specialized, and 65 individual 
firms (Table 4). They employed 4213 engineering personnel. The value of 
engineering services was estimated at about 1 billion won29 in the late 
1960s, 2.1 billion won for 632 project contracts in 1973, 5 billion won for 
1092 projects in 1974, 8.6 billion won for 1738 projects in 1975, 20 billion 
won for2403 projects in 1976, and 24.6 billion won for3031 projects in 1977. 
28 A registered engineering firm is required to have at least one professional 
engineer and four registered engineers. 
29 One U.S. dollar was worth 275 won in the late 1960s and 485 won after 1973. 
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Table 5. Size of Korean engineering firms. 
1975 1976 1977 
Professional engineers 
1 58 80 65 
2-4 26 29 23 
5-9 7 10 8 
10-19 7 7 6 
>20 0 1 3 
Engineers 
1-4 45 72 0 
5-9 25- 27 48 
10-19 14 12 20 
20-49 6 12 16 
50-99 6 4 12 
>100 2 0 9 
Contract amount 
<W10 million ($20 000) 28 26 13 
W10-50 million ($100 000) 20 29 24 
W50-100 million ($200 000) 18 14 19 
W100-500 million ($1 million) 18 25 33 
W500-1 billion ($2 million) 3 3 3 
>W1 billion (>$2 million) 1 4 13 
Contract amounts have increased sharply since 1976 due to plant 
exports as well as the localization of power plants. Yet the engineering 
service industry is not mature (Table 5). Perhaps less than a dozen firms are 
true engineering firms. Most have only one professional engineer. Of the 
105 registered engineering firms, 35 architectural service companies, 16 
electrical service companies, and 17 geological service companies can 
hardly be considered integrated engineering firms. Contract amounts 
represent only about 10% of the potential market for engineering services 
(estimated as one-tenth of total capital investment in industrial plants). The 
potential market for 1977-81 is es ti mated at $1.6 billion, or more than $300 
million annually. 
Korean engineering services have passed through three develop-
mental stages (Fig. 7). The first stage was a period of foreign dependence in 
the 1960s, with package-type foreign investment and engineering services; 
local participation was restricted to some construction activities. The 
second stage in the early 1970s was characterized by the birth of domestic 
engineering services, helped by an accumulation of technical experience, 
the enactment of a promotion law, and an increase in plant construction. 
Some development was achieved in the areas of detailed engineering, 
procurement, supervision of construction, and project management. 
Construction technology was enhanced significantly. During the second 
half of the 1970s the foreign construction boom (especially in the Middle 
East) spurred the further development of domestic engineering services. 
Turnkey engineering services and plant construction by domestic firms 
became feasible, and some plant exports were achieved. Government 
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Stage of Development 
First stage, 1960s: foreign dependence; 
turnkey projects 
Locally: inadequate technology; lack of 
experience; no development of related 
industry 
Second stage, first half of 1970s: initiation 
of domestic engineering services; partial 
participation in plant construction 
Locally: start to accumulate technical 
experience; enactment of Engineering 
Services Promotion Law; increased plant 
construction 
Third stage, second ha If of 1970s: active 
participation in plant construction 
Locally: turnkey plants by domestic firms 
become possible; localization of most 
engineering services; plant exports 














Fig. 7. Stages of development of engineering services in Korea. 
Construction Project 
management 
intervention caused the localization of most engineering services, espe-
cially for power plant construction. A remarkable upgrading of domestic 
engineering services was, therefore, achieved except for basic engineer-
ing, start-up, and operation guarantee. 
It is not yet feasible, however, for Korean engineering firms to 
construct various types of plants independently with only their own 
technical capabilities. A recent survey shows that plant construction 
c:1pability is best for viscose textile plants, with 78.9 points out of a 
maximum 100, and worst for nuclear power plants with 28.9 points. 
Management and technical capabilities were examined for plant construc-
tion for 311 types of Korean industries and plants in terms of 33 factors such 
as R&D, plant operation, safety, planning, design, training, funding, 
machinery, start-up, construction, etc. 
The future of Korean engineering is bound to be greatly influenced by 
plant exports tied to construction exports, which have grown steeply in 
recent years ($27 million in 1976, $400 million in 1977, and $800 million in 
1978). Plant exports are bound to lead to the accelerated growth of the 
engineering services industry, and because of the low labour costs for 
engineers in Korea, it will be possible to compete internationally for 
engineering contracts. 
GOVERNMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY 
The profitability of the engineering services industry is very poor, 
mainly due to the uncertainty of demand. Government policy and strategy 
should focus on three issues to achieve the likely benefits and links from 
an expansion of this industry: · 
• The creation of demand for domestic engineering services and the 
guarantee of minimum profitability; 
• The promotion and enhancement of engineering service, technical 
ability, and competence; and 
• Balance of development with other related industries and realignment 
of environmental factors to promote domestic engineering services. 
There are several causes for the slow development of domestic 
engineering services. An important one is the lack of demand resulting 
. from the turnkey basis of plant construction. Other causes are the lack of 
capability for planning and feasibility study on the part of investors; the 
shortcomings of the domestic engineering firms themselves (lack of 
specialization, inadequate financing, poor knowledge of management 
techniques, small size, lack of credibility, and low engineering fees due to 
the excessive competition); the underdevelopment of related industries, 
especially the machinery industry, which is weak both in the quality of the 
products and in financing, i.e., provision of long-term loans especially for 
plant facilities. The competitiveness of the Korean engineering services 
industry is, therefore, far below the international level. It is difficult to 
solve these problems independently because they are interrelated and 
they overlap. This means that an action program should solve several 
problems at once. A systems approach is essential in analysis and 
promotion of the industry. 
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The Engineering Services Promotion Law, enacted in 1973 to promote 
the domestic engineering services industry, has two important features. 
First, it prescribes domestic engineering firms as prime contractors for 
domestic plant construction, except when there is technical inadequacy. 
This policy, aimed at creating a demand for engineering services, has not 
been effective in practice.30 A second feature is that it encourages the 
undersized engineering firms to become large scale, specialized, and 
integrated organizations. The law sets minimum qualifications for regis-
tration: one professional engineer for a designated specialization, four 
registered engineers, and a set amount of capital or assets, now $40 000. 
These stipulations have contributed to the expansion of firms, but there 
may well be some adverse effects. Korea is now experiencing a severe 
shortage of high-quality personnel. For example, there are only about 600 
professional engineers, and this number is far below present demand. 
Massive training programs such as in-house training, commissioned 
education at universities, and on-the-job or academic training abroad are 
urgently needed. Technical collaboration with engineering firms in 
advanced countries also seems necessary. Actually, several domestic 
engineering firms have joint ventures, and others have established a 
network for technical assistance. 
Other policy instruments that might help the development of the 
engineering services industry in Korea are a fund for supporting domestic 
engineering services; tax incentives; credit incentives; creation of a trade 
association to support common interests and activities such as training, 
publications, etc.; drafting of a standard code for parts and plant facilities; 
support of exports of plants and engineering services, and development of 
personnel required for efficient engineering services. Basic to t~ese is the 
voluntary participation by the engineering services industry as opposed to 
compulsory mandates by government. 
ANALYSIS OF KOREA ENGINEERING COMPANY LTD 
Although there are more than 100 engineering service firms in Korea, 
only 12 can provide authentic engineering services. One of the most 
important is the Korea Engineering Company Ltd (KECL), which was 
founded in January 1970 with the positive support of the Korean govern-
ment, as an equal partnership, joint venture between the Han Kook 
Engineering Company Ltd of Korea and the Lummus Company of the 
United States. KECL is an integrated engineering and contracting company 
established in Korea to engage in plant design, engineering, water 
resource studies, etc. Whereas one of the original partners in the joint 
venture, the Lummus Company, is an engineering firm of world repute, 
the Han Kook Engineering Company was organized solely to serve as a 
holding company for KECL, with capital from the Korea Development Bank 
30 To help increase demand, the government is considering amending the 
foreign investment law to make it possible to separate capital investment and the 
engineering services embedded in the investment loan. Another policy alternative 
.is to create a fund to support the preinvestment feasibility study or localization of 
plant facilities. It is reported that such a policy program has been successfully 
adopted in Brazil. The Korean government also has a program to promote the 
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Fig. 8. Organization of KECL, 1978. 
and from leading Korean enterprises such as the Sam Sung Company Ltd, 
Dae Woo Industries, and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology. 
In September 1973 the Toyo Engineering Company (TEC) of Japan 
succeeded the Lummus Company as the KECL partner. TEC is also a 
world-renowned engineering company and has provided KECL with all 
available technical assistance. In April 1978 the Korea Development Bank 
sold its stock, 50% of the Han Kook Engineering Company's capital, to the 
Sam Sung Company, which has now become the majority owner of KECL. 
As a result, all of the large conglomerates in Korea now have engineering 
firms under their control. 
KECL's organization chart is shown in Fig. 8. The firm has made 
available to its clients major services in the areas of plant and water 
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Table 6. KECL contract amounts in million won ($2000). 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Contracted projects 5 3 6 27 6 17 20 
Contract amounts 770 80 90 1622 390 1602 2330 
Completion 467 336 96 368 778 1490 2096 
amounts 
resource engineering, harbour and coastal engineering, irrigation, sewer-
age, and agricultural engineering in a reliable and expeditious manner, 
sometimes in collaboration with foreign CEDOs. 
Because KECL was established in accordance with government policy 
and strategy, the government contracted actively with it during the first 
year. But in 1972 and 1973 the government offered no strong support, the 
contract amounts dropping to about one-tenth (Table 6). As a result, 
Lummus decided to withdraw, and Toyo Engineering Company became 
the substitute partner. Since 1976, KECL has performed at a reasonable 
level of activity because of the economic recovery and of its accumulation 
of experience and technical expertise. KECL is expected to grow rapidly 
now that a private enterprise, the Sam Sung Group, has assumed 
jurisdiction over it. 
KECL's clients have mostly been Korean enterprises; a number of 
subcontracted projects have also been undertaken for foreign clients 
(Table 7). 
One-fourth of the projects were feasibility studies and the rest, 
detailed design and engineering jobs. This means that KECL's technical 
capability and expertise have not yet reached the level of full-fledged 
engineering services. The number of engineering projects carried out by 
KECL is minimal compared with the total plant construction and engineer-
ing projects in Korea. Hence, KECL has contributed to the development of 



















1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
1 2 3 1 1 1 3 
4 6 7 10 7 6 
1 1 
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Table 8. Distribution of KECL employees in mid-1978. 
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the engineering industry as a pioneer, but its contribution to the 
development of Korean industry as a whole has not been high. 
From 1971 to 1973 KECL had 66 employees. The number doubled in 
1974 and doubled again in 1975, when it reached 238. Growth has 
continued at a slower pace, and in mid-1978 total staff was 460 (Table 8 and 
9). 
As KECL was founded by the Korean government, its marketing was 
done largely by the government at first. Despite strong government 
support, KECL experienced severe difficulties from the first moment. Its 
growth and development were hampered by the economic recession after 
the energy crisis. The path of KECL's development suggests that the 
engineering industry cannot be fostered only with direct government 
support. Indirect support or incentives to create a demand for domestic 
engineering services and to enhance engineering capability are almost 
essential. Because the quality and the efficiency of engineering services 
ire crucial for plant production, most entrepreneurs still hesitate to use 
::lomestic engineering firms. 
Table 9. Breakdown of personnel specialization in KECL, 1978. 
Project managers and engineers 
Process engineers 








Water supply engineers 
Plant facilities engineers 
Procurement and inspection 
Construction Pngineers/supervisors 
Surveyors 
Cost estimates and scheduling 
Project control 

































Although KECL rates as one of the most capable engineering firms in 
Korea, it has many problems. A crucial one is a shortage of engineering and 
technical personnel. There are few qualified, experienced engineers, 
especially plant engineers; moreover, engineering colleges cannot com-
pletely prepare qualified piping and instrument engineers. Most 
engineers in KECL have come from chemical plants, especially fertilizer or 
petroleum refining. They lack plant design expertise like piping and 
instrument engineering, which is not usually taught in universities. The 
available electrical engineers are relatively competent and mechanical 
engineering can be done if appropriate blueprints are supplied. Most 
important, master planning for plant construction should be done locally, 
but the ability to carry out such an engineering service has not yet been 
developed. More effort should be put into providing internal as well as 
on-the-job training domestically or abroad. Culturally, knowledge such as 
engineering expertise has been regarded as private property in Korea. As a 
result, most Korean engineers are unwilling to exchange technical 
information or accumulate it systematically. 
The future of KECL is uncertain, as is the future of the engineering 
industry in Korea, even though its growth potential is great. Now KECL has 
been transferred from direct government control to a renowned private 
conglomerate, the Sam Sung Group, its development seems promising, 
especially with the huge demand for domestic investment projects and 
great possibilities for plant exports. 
PROJECTS 
KECL carried out more than 60 engineering projects during 1971-77. 
Most were detailed design and engineering projects, which were difficult 
to execute in the early period but are now handled without difficulty. 
However, no basic design and engineering service projects have been 
carried out by KECL or other domestic engineering firms using only their 
own capabilities. Perhaps such a capability upgrading will be possible in 
the 1980s through collaborative efforts with high-risk entrepreneurship on 
the part of clients. 
KECL has not failed in the execution of its engineering projects, so the 
two projects presented here have been successfully executed. The first 
deals with the construction of a styrene monomer plant and the other with 
the construction of an ABS resin plant. For comparison purposes, efforts 
were made to identify unsuccessful engineering service cases carried out 
by domestic or foreign engineering companies, but no data other than 
rumour regarding such failures were collected. As a compromise, a brief 
case study of a successful engineering project by a foreign engineering 
firm has been added for comparison. 
CONSTRUCTION OF A STYRENE MONOMER PLANT 
The styrene monomer plant project was initiated by the Niwon 
Company, which for various reasons could not carry on with it. Following 
government instructions, the project was taken over by the Korea 
Development Bank, which arranged to establish a firm, the Ulsan 
Petrochemical Company, with 75% of the investment made by the Korea 
Fertilizer Company and 25% by Niwon. The original idea was to obtain 
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engineering services from Lummus using Monsanto's new process, but a 
shift was made to the Toyo Engineering Company of Japan because 
Lummus could not provide a suitable loan arrangement. Mitsui Company 
of Japan financed the project. As Toyo was a Mitsui subsidiary company, it 
was natural that Toyo should take the project's engineering services. As 
this was a lump-sum contract between Ulsan Petrochemical and Toyo, 
information concerning the specific amount allocated for engineering 
services is not available, but the total payment including foreign procure-
ment and the engineering fee was $17 million. According to an informal 
source, the engineering fee was around $2 million (Table 10). 
KECL provided two kinds of engineering services through two 
channels. One type was detailed design engineering, through a subcon-
tract with Toyo Engineering, and the other was construction management, 
supervision of local procurement, and all the engineering services for the 
construction of an off-site building, via a direct contract with the client, 
Ulsan Petrochemical. The amount of the subcontract is not known, but the 
amount of the direct contrad was around $600 000. KECL has a special 
relationship with both Toyo and Lummus, so it was not difficult for it to 
contract successfully. Also, KECL is in a good position for contracting for 
the engineering services on government-investment projects. 
The preinvestment analysis for this project was prepared by Niwon. It 
was decided to entrust the engineering services to the Japanese company, 
Toyo, because of its capacity to provide financing. The choice of 
technology and equipment was thus naturally determined. Although 
Monsanto's new process was chosen as the basic process technology, 
Toyo exercised great influence on the foreign procurement, which is 
closely related to the choice of technology as well as to the localization of 
process equipment. It should be added that there were few alternatives 
regarding size, location, and product mix of the plant, because the Korean 
government already had an integrated long-term plan forthe promotion of 
the petrochemical industry. Because of the extent of the investment, 
which could not be supported solely by the government, decisions on 
technical matters were not made prior to financing decisions. In other 
words, financing and loans took priority over all other problems. Thus, the 
technological choice had to be in accordance with financing or loan 
possibilities. 
Because of government intervention in the procurement of process 
equipment, a breakdown into foreign and local sources was carefully 
made. As a result, Toyo was in charge of $17 million of foreign procure-
ment, whereas KECL was responsible for $4 million of local procurement. 
Procurement services may be regarded as an advance in engineering 
services as compared with mere detailed design engineering, and they are 
closely related to the social efficiency of engineering services, i.e., 
contribution to the localization of equipment and machinery, balance of 
payments, employment, etc. KECL's role in procurement was the evalua-
tion and recommendation of local vendors, supervision of vendor draw-
ings, expediting of deliveries, etc. Actual procurement was made by the 
client, i.e., the owner of the plant, through direct contracts. 
·In addition to procurement services, KECL was responsible for plant 
construction management as well as the construction of an off-site 
building. KECL recommended the builders, supervised the progress and 
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Table 10. Data on engineering services 
for styrene monomer plant by KECL. 
Project 
Client: Ulsan Petrochemical Int. Ltd 
Product: Styrene monomer 
Capacity: 60 000 t/year 
Location: Ulsan, Korea 
Period of services 
June 1976 - February 1978 
Scope of services % 
Basic design 
Detailed design 70 
Progress 100 
Process design 
Equipment design 5 
Piping design 35 
Civil/struc. design 30 
lnst./elec. design 15 
Project management 15 





Construction and progress: 100 
supervision, management 
Foreign collaborators 
Process licencer: Monsanto 
Design collaborators: Lummus and 
Toyo engineering corporations 
Table 11. Data on engineering services 
for ABS resin plant by KECL. 
Project 
Client: Lucky Co. Ltd 
Product: ABS resin 
Capacity: 6000 
Location: Yeosu, Korea 
Period of services 
September 1976 - October 1977 
Scope of services % 
Basic design 
Detailed design and progress 100 
Process design 5 
Equipment design 12 
Piping design 38 
Civil/struc. design 20 
I nst./elec. design 15 
Project management 10 





Construction and progress: 100 
supervision, management 
Foreign collaborator 
Process licencer: Japan Synthetic 
Rubber Co. Ltd 
completion of the building and plant, etc. It had little previous experience 
in construction supervision services, and this assignment allowed it to 
accumulate a significant amount of expertise. 
As far as the efficiency of KECL in the production of engineering 
services was concerned, the project was completed within the target date, 
there was no cost overrun, and the cost of the styrene monomer plant was 
evaluated as reasonable or even lower than expected. The quality of the 
engineering services was considered to be good by the clients. Even 
though KECL thought the engineering fee was not sufficient, it did its best 
to build a good reputation, which would be helpful for long-term 
marketing. 
ABS RESIN PLANT CONSTRUCTION 
Whereas the styrene monomer project client was a government-
owned company, the ABS (acrylonitrile butadiene styrene) resin project 
client was a private company, the Lucky Company for which KECL had 
earlier provided engineering services (the construction of a paste PVC 
resin plant). Because of KECL's good performance, Lucky decided to use 
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KECL's engineering services again. Like the Ulsan Petrochemical Complex 
located on the southeastern coast of Korea, the Yeosu Petrochemical 
Complex on the south coast of Korea was an offspring of Korea's industrial 
development plan. As Lucky is an integrated chemical firm and produces 
various types of resin products, the company decided to establish an ABS 
resin plant for high-quality resin products. 
The KECL engineering services included planning and preinvestment 
analysis with the collaboration of the Lucky Company, detailed design and 
engineering, procurement services, and construction supervision. Basic 
design and engineering were provided by the Japan Synthetic Rubber 
Company, which was the ABS resin process licencer. Project investment 
was about $10 million, and the engineering fee for KECL was around 
$400 000. The engineering fee for basic design and engineering is not 
known (Table 11). 
Japan was thought to be the best source of the technology because its 
resin technology was advanced, the language does not present a com-
munication barrier, and it is geographically close to Korea. As the decisions 
on size, location, and product specifications had almost all been taken in 
advance by the Korean government, there were no alternatives on these 
aspects. 
The level of technical sophistication for an ABS plant is lower than that 
for a styrene monomer plant. KECL was in charge of procurement services 
and detailed design and made great efforts to localize plant facilities and 
equipment. As a result, most items were obtained through local vendors, 
the exceptions being high-precision process, control, and electrical 
equipment that could not be produced domestically. Another reason for 
the high rate of localization was that the client financed the project itself, 
so fund utilization was not tied up. Although the basic design was done by 
the licencer, the Japan Synthetic Rubber Company, KECL made slight 
adjustments in the layout of the process and also provided detailed design 
and engineering, construction supervision, and the construction of utility 
facilities. KECL executed complete engineering services for the utility 
facilities from the basic design to guarantee operation and performance. 
The construction of the plant was supervised carefully by KECL 
according to the engineering services contract. Because the technical level 
ofthe client firm's personnel was the best among Korean firms, there were 
no serious problems in the technical follow-up services. The completion 
target for the plant was easily met, and there was no cost overrun. The ABS 
resin plant is in good operational condition, an indication that the quality 
of the engineering services was excellent. 
CONSTRUCTION OF A FERTILIZER PLANT 
A case where engineering services were provided by a foreign firm is 
noteworthy for comparison purposes. The Nam Hae Chemical Company 
procured the services for the construction of a fertilizer plant, one of the 
largest in the world, from the following sources: $52.5 million from the 
Korea Integrated Chemical Company, $17.5 million from Agrico of the 
USA, a loan of $103 million from the national investment fund, and $246 
million in foreign loans. The general contractor for the engineering 
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services was Fluor Engineers & Constructors, Inc., of the U.S. The main 
facilities of the fertilizer complex were eight plants (Table 12). 
The Fluor Company was paid $42 million for the engineering services 
for the basic design, procurement, and guarantee of the start-up, 
operation, and construction. The contract was based on a fixed-fee-plus-
cost method, i.e., a fixed fee of $42 million for engineering services 
including licence fees and construction costs and procurement costs as 
they occurred. The amount of $42 million for engineering services 
surpasses the total amount spent on engineering services by all companies 
in Korea in 1977. This does not mean that the engineering fee was 
outlandish; on the contrary, Nam Hae Chemical invited bids from all 
major international engineering firms. It does imply, however, that 
engineering services are important not only to the engineering service 
industry but also to industrial development as a whole. For example, total 
plant facilities and equipment amounted to $219 million, and only 27% of 
the total facilities and equipment were localized. In other words, foreign 
procurement amounted to $159 million, and the amount of local procure-
ment was only $60 million. Although such a low percentage of localization 
might be attributed to the Korean manufacturers' lack of technical 
capability in the production of capital goods, the localization rate would 
have been higher if local engineering firms had taken the responsibility for 
engineering services. The project lasted 36 months, from February 1974 to 
February 1977. Three domestic engineering firms including KECL, as well 
as several construction companies, participated in the project through 
subcontracts. The quality of the engineering services, including duration 
and cost targets, was assessed as excellent. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One crucial problem in studies of engineering services and 
engineering firms is the difficulty in hypothesis formulation. As suggested 
by Araoz (1977), one must focus on the social efficiency of the engineering 
firm and its services as well as the productive efficiency of the firm. Finally, 
he suggests that the efficiency of engineering services distribution be 
considered. None of these criteria-variables are easily measurable, either 
qualitatively or quantitatively. One indicator or measure of social efficien-
cy or utility is the contribution to industrial development. It is extremely 
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difficult, however, to ascertain the effects of the engineering service 
separately from those of the investment project. If the engineering firm is 
involved in the project from the first moment of planning or preinvestment 
analysis, the effect of engineering services from the point of view of social 
efficiency would be large. If not, the effect would be minimal and could be 
adverse if there were failure in engineering services. To measure such 
effects is extremely difficult. 
Productive efficiency is also difficult to assess, although less so than 
social efficiency. Productive efficiency should be considered in terms of 
both the engineering firm and the engineering services. The latter can be 
measured by cost target, duration target, and engineering service quality. 
Again, it is difficult to measure engineering service quality. The productive 
efficiency of the engineering firm as a whole must be gleaned from a 
general evaluation of the firm. One must borrow various evaluation tools 
for the purpose. 
There are many factors or independent variables that influence the 
criteria-variables. The variables may be divided into uncontrollable 
(parameters or environmental variables), semicontrollable (policy vari-
ables or macrovariables), and controllable (project level variables or 
microvariables). It is best to develop a model that delineates all the 
interrelationships among the variables. Thus one can derive hypotheses 
regarding the engineering services and firms. Some basic data may be 
obtained through case studies. Without a set of such specific hypotheses, 
the subject can hardly be analyzed systematically. A comparative study for 
each variable or hypothesis is desirable. Without proper comparison, the 
result of research is mainly descriptive and not too helpful in the search for 
conclusions and implications. 
The next important issue for the study of engineering services and 
firms in the developing countries is the analysis of the impact of 
engineering services at the project level. Emphasis should be put on the 
execution of the project, with a focus on the role of engineering services. 
Thus, it is useful to compare similar projects to distinguish various ways of 
using engineering services, and their effects. For example, the portion of 
in-house engineering services is probably more significant than that of 
engineering services supplied by independent specialized firms. 
Finally, a longitudinal analysis of a specific industry with a focus on the 
role of engineering services is recommended as a research tool. The 
analysis of an engineering project across various industries seems to give 
less useful information than a longitudinal analysis. A combination of 
longitudinal and cross analysis is ideal. The longitudinal analysis, however, 
should be adopted only in the case of relatively mature industries; 
otherwise little information will result. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BUILDING NATIONAL CONSULTING ENGINEERING IN THE 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY IN BRAZIL 
SERGIO ALVES AND RICARDO BIELSCHOWSKY 
SUMMARY 
Brazil is building up technical capabilities in areas of modern technology such 
as petrochemicals. This case study deals with NATRON, a private CEDO in this 
field, and focuses on the process technology acquisition and the state support for 
it. NATRON was founded in 1967 by a group of chemical engineers from 
PETROBRAS, the state petroleum company. It started life, therefore, with a set of 
highly qualified professionals, who had good connections with the expected main 
client, PETROBRAS. An explicit strategy was adopted regarding the areas to be 
covered, the types of services, and the technology to be acquired. The two 
principal areas were petroleum refining and phosphate fertilizers. The first one had 
to be left aside because PETROBRAS founded its own captive C&E capacity. 
Three stages are shown in NATRON's development: (1) 1967-71: rapid 
growth; many small projects; peripheral installations. The staff grew to 172. In 
terms of technological learning, little progress was made in sulfuric acid; NATRON 
had a full-disclosure licencing agreement with a U.S. producer, and it undertook 
two turnkey sulfuric acid projects. (2) 1972-75: sales multiplied by five, staff by 
three. Contracts became larger. In 1975 NA TRON took up a sulfuric acid project for 
SULFAB, a firm controlled by NATRON itself. Technologically, in this period it 
consolidated its sulfuric acid know-how by working on three projects and 
particularly through the creation of its Department of Industrial Processes (DIP). 
This is seen as an important step toward acquiring the know-how of the phosphate 
fertilizers complex. The main clients were two large state enterprises, which chose 
NATRON because they considered it as a technically capable firm. Although the 
rate of expansion was high, there were limitations to technological progress. There 
was not enough repetitive work, and more importantly, NA TRON mainly worked as 
a subcontractor to foreign CED Os, which gave it little bargaining power and did not 
allow it to obtain the full-disclosure clause that was needed to fuel a learning 
process in basic engineering. (3) 1976-present: a new stage has been entered, with 
a few large projects, of higher technical sophistication. There has been a 
concentration in the phosphate fertilizers area and a beginning in chlorine-soda 
production as a first step in the pulp and paper area. The staff increased from 583 in 
1975 to 1184 in 1977, and the firm now feels it is able to "carry out all stages of 
engineering for productive units related to phosphate fertilizers." 
Two important policies of NATRON were to retain its personnel, thus 
minimizing turnover, and to apply regularly a good part of its profits for the 
expansion of technical staff ahead of new tasks. The major investment in 
technology has been in phosphate fertilizers. The efforts have been successful, as 
shown by the prestige obtained and the recent contracts awarded. The firm has a 
clear determination about technological learning and a good sense of entrepre-
neurial opportunities. It chose an area of rapid growth where technological 
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autonomy was within reach of a medium-sized CEDO and adopted an adequate 
path for technological learning, from the simple to the complex. It started with 
sulfuric acid and should have gone on to phosphate fertilizers but a good 
opportunity was seized for mastering "ahead of time" the technology of phos-
phoric acid. By mid-1978 the firm was doing well in both phosphate fertilizers and 
phosphoric acid, with a group on each in its Department of Industrial Processes. 
This report analyzes the successive steps in the mastery of sulfuric acid, which 
shows the gradual learning process: 1967: technology contract with U.S. firm, with 
full disclosure; 1968-70: two turnkey projects with the simple-absorption process; 
1972: participation in large plant with the double-absorption process; 1973: 
creation of DIP; technological research program on phosphate fertilizers cycle; by 
1975 the double-absorption process mastered; and 1973-75: turnkey project for 
simple-absorption process; 1975 to present: turnkey project for SULFAB, using the 
simple-absorption process with provisions for conversion to the double-
absorption process; prime contractor for large sulfuric acid plant with German 
basic engineering; basic engineering, detailed engineering, and management 
services for a small plant with the double-absorption process; in 1977, same for a 
large project; in mid-1977 SULFAB started production and provided NATRON with 
a "permanent laboratory." 
The sequence for the mastery of phosphoric acid technology started in 1973 
with participation in a project. In 1976, NATRON was prime contractor of a large 
phosphoric acid project and could open up the package to a considerable extent. 
In 1977, it was prime contractor in another project, and with the full support of a 
forward-looking client, it chose a technology that allowed it to have full disclosure. 
In the case of phosphate fertilizers, DIP has a unit devoted to study and to the 
acquisition of experience through reading, visiting plants, analyzing projects, and 
interacting with foreign experts. The lack of projects has been a retarding factor; 
however, NATRON has announced it is able to undertake complete phosphate 
fertilizers projects, including basic engineering. 
This report describes the SULFAB project. In line with a clear policy to support 
and strengthen C&E in this area, NATRON was given a turnkey contract for setting 
up the plant. Its performance was good: the project was finished on time, almost 
within the budget, and the operating performance has been good. The participa-
tion of local industry, however, was not higher than the usual 25% of the total 
equipment that is normal in similar projects. 
NA TRON was helped financially to gain control of SULFAB, and this has meant 
a strengthening of NATRON and has given it the opportunity to expand C&E 
activities, draw on its permanent access to production facilities, carry out tests and 
research, and demonstrate its capacity to prospective customers. 
This report underlines the key role of government through its purchasing 
policy and its financial support policies. This and NATRON's strategy of specializing 
in technologies that could be absorbed were the principal factors in NATRON's 
success. 
The subject of this case study is NATRON in Brazil, the most important 
national CEDO specializing in chemical processes. Among the projects it 
has undertaken, one has been singled out for analysis: the complete 
design of a sulfuric acid plant for SULFAS, where NATRON saw the 
successful culmination of its efforts to master all stages of project design in 
sulfuric acid, which had been one of the principal strategic decisions taken 
at the time the firm was founded in 1967. 
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The study examines the steps followed by NATRON to achieve its 
present stage of development and attempts to identify through the 
examination of the SULFAS project what is the technical and entrepre-
neurial level effectively reached at present. It traces NATRON's evolution 
over the past 11 years regarding its expansion and the services it renders 
and appraises the strategy of expansion in its chosen field of phosphate 
fertilizers. Finally, the SULFAS project is analyzed. 
BASIC ENGINEERING IN BRAZIL 
The mastery of project engineering, and particularly its basic 
engineering component, seems to be affected by three groups of factors: 
• The technological characteristics of the sector served - the univer-
sality and complexity of techniques, the technological dynamism, and the 
importance of technology as a marketing instrument (it is more difficult to 
attain mastery in techniques that are complex, known by few, highly 
dynamic, and a key to market control); 
• The behaviour of public enterprise on questions of national 
technological autonomy; and 
• The continuity of investments in the sector, the source of funds for 
expansion, and the level of the capital goods industry in the country. 
These basic influences have combined in Brazil in recent years in such 
a way as to help it attain a good level of technical capability in two sectors, 
hydroelectricity and railways; in other sectors such as iron and steel, 
petroleum refining, and petrochemicals, the level is still low. 
In hydroelectricity, roads, and railways, technology is largely tradi-
tional, and technical information is easily obtained. Local CEDOs pre-
dominate and are able to assume global responsibility for a project. In fact, 
projects have been exported in recent years. Public enterprises have 
generally adopted a policy of preferring local CEDOs, and in practice this 
has almost eliminated the presence of foreign-owned CEDOs. 
In iron and steel, petroleum refining, chemicals, and petrochemicals, 
the technology is almost always under foreign control. Foreigners prepare 
the "basic" project even when a local firm is the prime contractor; the 
latter, in such a case, will only have - in addition to the opportunity of 
carrying out detailed engineering design - a better "post of observation" 
of the basic engineering tasks entrusted to the foreign CEDO. In iron and 
steel, where technology evolves slowly, the participation of local consult-
ing and engineering in the main units, or the core processes, is usualry 
confined to detailed engineering. The same is true in petroleum refining, 
chemicals, and petrochemicals, where dependence on foreign process 
engineering and basic engineering is even greater. In addition, technology 
in these sectors is highly dynamic, and it is a basic instrument for market 
control. This fact further restricts the possibility of achieving local mastery 
of technology. 
The building of a national engineering capability in these sectors is of 
fundamental importance, but the necessary teams have been formed only 
recently. The most important one is CENPES, within PETROBRAS, the 
Brazilian state petroleum company. At present, CENPES is concentrating 
efforts on basic and intermediate units in petroleum refining, ammonia 
and urea for fertilizers, and petrochemicals. Among the private CEDOs, 
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NA TRON emerges as one of the three orfourthat are potentially capable of 
advancing into the areas of process and basic engineering. Its efforts are 
concentrated in the important field of phosphate fertilizers and their basic 
inputs, sulfuric acid and phosphoric acid. 
EVOLUTION OF NATRON, 1967-78 
NATRON was founded in 1967 by a group of chemical engineers from 
PETROBRAS; 11 years later it had grown into a solid and profitable 
chemical engineering enterprise, with almost 1300 employees. Three 
periods may be distinguished in NATRON's evolution: 1967-71, the initial 
period; 1972-75, when NATRON became medium-sized; and the period 
starting in 1976, when it became one of the largest CEDOs in the country. 
Until 1971 there was a rapid growth, which took place through a 
succession of small projects. By that year the staff numbered 172. In 1972 
sales grew sharply and were multiplied by five in 1975 in comparison with 
1971, while staff tripled. The firm was able to create a technical nonopera-
tional group, the Department of Industrial Processes (DIP), which would 
later show a high indirect profitability. Contracts became larger, and in 
1975 participation in SULFAS was assured. 
In 1976 a new stage started. The firm went on to work in a small 
number of large projects. Sales grew 113% in 1977. Staff grew from 583 in 
1975 to 1184 in 1977; within this expansion, the highly qualified staff grew 
more than proportionally, showing a growing technical sophistication of 
the services rendered. The firm announced that it was able to develop all 
stages of the engineering services needed for various productive units in 
its priority sector, the phosphate fertilizers market. 
Two more observations may be made. First, an explicit policy of 
NATRON was to retain personnel and minimize turnover. This policy, 
which was different from that of other CEDOs in Brazil, contributed to 
building its technological strength. Second, profits were regularly applied 
to a selective expansion of the technical staff ahead of new commitments. 
Whereas at first glance this gives the impression of an increase in current 
expenditure, it is to a large extent an investment in the most important 
asset of a CEDO. Finally, there has been a high rate of profit in the most 
recent contracts, and this, compounded by higher sales, has allowed the 
firm to invest heavily in human and technological capital. 
MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY 
The firm's "project book" gives information on 49 projects, 12 of them 
still in progress. Qnly small consulting services are left out. The firm's 
markets are state petroleum and petrochemical enterprises (PETROBRAS/ 
PETROQUISA); users of phosphate fertilizers including sulfuric acid, 
chlorine and soda, and others. No data were obtained on the value of the 
projects, but it is clear from general sales information that 1967 projects 
were small and grew in size over the years. 
In 1967-71, there were many small projects for the state firms and 
"other" markets, covering many types of engineering services for "off-site 
battery limit." In terms of technological learning, not much progress was 
made toward basic engineering and process engineering in these various 
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segments, because such progress would have required continuity in the 
same or similar tasks for the same process. But there was an exception: the 
preparation in 1968-69 of two turnkey projects for sulfuric acid units, for 
which NATRON had a licence agreement (1967-77) with a major foreign 
producer. 
In 1972-75, NATRON consolidated its know-how in sulfuric acid 
production, with the development of the double-absorption process that 
had been introduced in the U.S. and Europe in the 1960s. For this it 
counted on DIP, and the opportunity of working almost simultaneously on 
three sulfuric acid projects. NATRON was starting to specialize, which it 
considered to be an essential step toward entrance into the phosphate 
fertilizers industry as a whole, and in fact the creation of DIP corresponded 
to the decision of advancing in technical knowledge in two basic areas, 
fertilizers (including sulfuric acid) and petroleum refining. 
The latter area, however, was abandoned when it became clear that 
PETROBRAS would get directly involved in it. After the 1975 creation of 
CENPES, NATRON decided to concentrate its technological learning 
efforts in the fertilizer area. 
The two state enterprises, PETROBRAS and PETROQUISA, were 
NATRON's main clients and accounted for 11 of the 17 projects contracted 
during this period. NATRON was frequently chosen by those clients 
because it was considered to be one of the two main national firms in the 
engineering of industrial processes (among some 20 CEDOs, of which 
several were foreign owned), on account of previous experience, 
technological level, financial solidity, and adequate prices. 
NATRON had to expand continuously during its first 8-9 years, but 
there were limitations to its technological progress. These were partly a 
result of the variety of tasks undertaken, which involved little repetition; 
but they were principally because in most of the important, relevant 
projects, it acted as a subcontractor to foreign CEDOs, which were 
engaged as prime contractors by PETROBRAS as a consequence of a 
safety-first policy of this state firm. The policy greatly limited the possibility 
of transfer of foreign know-how to NATRON, which was left with little 
bargaining power and could not ask for a full disclosure that would allow a 
learning process in basic engineering. 
From 1976 onward, NATRON's concentration in the phosphate 
fertilizer area has resulted in success. In 1976 and 1977, four of the seven 
contracted projects were in this market, and NATRON has had to double 
its staff. Also in 1977 production started in SULFAS, the sulfuric acid unit 
controlled by NATRON itself. Moreover, NATRON has become increas-
ingly less dependent on the two state enterprises, as it has expanded into 
phosphate fertilizers and chlorine-soda. 
Recently, NATRON has undertaken two contracts for chlorine-soda 
plants, products that are essential for the pulp and paper industry. It is 
likely that the firm will use these as a way to enter the pulp and paper 
industry market, where there is place for a local CEDO (most pulp and 
paper projects are now being absorbed by one CEDO of Finnish origin). 
The recent succession of detailed engineering projects, and the ability 
already shown by NATRON to absorb basic engineering know-how are 
favourable signs. 
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NATRON's main line of work is in phosphate fertilizer production, 
where it competes with subsidiaries of large foreign chemical.engineering 
firms (Lurgi, Davy Gas Power) and with another local CEDO (EIM). 
STRATEGY OF EXPANSION AND TECHNOLOGICAL LEARNING 
The firm's founders envisaged two areas of expansion: one was in 
petroleum refining, a natural area for former employees of PETROBRAS, 
the state petroleum firm; the other was in chemical products related to the 
agricultural sector, especially pulp and fertilizers. The first area has been 
left aside, at least for the time being. The pulp area has not yet been 
properly explored, although a beginning has been made through the 
taking up of detailed engineering projects in chlorine and sodium. The 
major investment in technology of the firm has been in phosphate 
fertilizers, a successful venture as evidenced by the prestige acquired by 
the firm and the recent contracts awarded to it. 
Looking back on NATRON's policy toward this sector, we note a clear 
determination regarding technological learning and a sense of entrepre-
neurial opportunity, shown whenever there was the possibility of an 
important qualitative jump. The firm made a good choice of its client 
sector, which grew rapidly during the last 10 years (about 25% a year in 
1967-76), capitalizing on the expectations held in 1967 that large invest-
ments were soon to be made in phosphate fertilizer plants. So the market 
for NATRON's services could have reasonably been expected to be there, 
but there is another important dimension in the decision: the feasibility of 
technological learning by the firm. 
To master a technology, one must make an investment. NATRON's 
choice of sector was adequate. The technology of sulfuric acid production 
is not too complex and is well known; it is therefore accessible to a local 
CEDO. Phosphoric acid production technology is also accessible, particu-
larly if the purchasing power of state enterprises is properly used to 
support good procedures of technology acquisition. NATRON chose a 
sector where technological autonomy was within reach of a medium-sized 
CEDO, contrary to, say, ammonia, urea, or the FCC process, where 
mastery of basic engineering would have been hardly possible. 
NATRON was also able to outline an adequate path for its technologi-
cal learning. The strategy was to proceed from simple to complex- in this 
case, sulfuric acid to phosphate fertilizers to phosphoric acid. Good 
advance in sulfuric acid was made in 1967-76, and the next step would 
have been to initiate efforts in the second area. However, a very gooq 
opportunity came up for mastering the technology of phosphoric acid, and
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this altered the expected sequence. By mid-1978 the firm was making goon 
progress in its technological learning in both fields and had two working 
groups in its DIP, one for phosphoric acid and the other for phosphate 
fertilizers. 
A number of steps can be identified in the process of acquiring 
expertise in the sulfuric acid technology. It all started with a 10-year 
technology contract signed in 1967 with a U.S. firm, which included a 
full-disclosure clause. Two turnkey projects were carried out in 1968-70 
with the simple-absorption process. After 1972, NATRON took part in a 
project for a large unit using the double-absorption process, where it 
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undertook the general administration, including the coordination of 
foreign contractors, and carried out the detailed engineering of utilities 
and peripheral facilities. In 1973 it created its Department of Industrial 
Processes, which started a technology research program. In 1973-75, 
NATRON carried out a turnkey project for a medium-sized sulfuric acid 
plant with the simple-absorption process, and in 1974-75, DIP mastered 
successfully the double-absorption process. 
In a final stage of technological learning, from 1975 onward, NA TRON 
executed a complete project for a medium-sized plant for SULFAS 
(simple-absorption process to be later adapted to double-absorption). 
Starting in 1976, NA TRON became the prime contractor for all engineering 
and project management services for a large plant with German basic 
engineering, which will enable it to absorb German sulfuric acid know-
how. In December 1976 NATRON undertook all engineering and man-
agement services for a small plant using the double-absorption process, 
including for the first time the basic engineering. Since March 1977 
NATRON has been performing management and engineering services, 
including the basic project, for a large sulfuric acid unit with the 
double-absorption process. Here a foreign expert was brought in because 
sulfur was being reclaimed from residual gases from copper refining. In 
the second half of 1977 SULFAS (where NATRON has equity control) 
started to produce sulfuric acid and thus became a "permanent labora-
tory" for the study of the process. 
In sum, NATRON was able to make good use of technical and 
commercial opportunities. It was able right from the start to negotiate 
efficiently foreign technology, which it could absorb as it applied it in two 
projects. At the appropriate moment it created its own department for the 
study of processes, which allowed it to systematize the accumulated 
knowledge and provide a backing to the technological competence of the 
firm. In little more than 5 years it signed contracts for six projects, of which 
four were large; in two of these large projects, it carried out the basic 
engineering; in one it became the prime contractor, and in the remaining 
one it coordinated the foreign process. In the two smaller projects it 
undertook all engineering steps and also the project management. 
With its last two projects, NATRON can be said to have completed its 
cycle of technological learning in sulfuric acid. At th.e same time it carried 
out a first pliase of learning in the other products of the phosphate 
fertilizers industrial complex. In fact, technology absorption in phosphoric 
acid started in 1973 with the participation in a unit for sulfuric and 
phosphoric acid, where NATRON was coordinator of foreign contractors. 
Contact with the same foreign technology was repeated after 1976 through 
NATRON's participation in a project for a large phosphoric acid unit, as the 
prime contractor, and in this capacity it obtained a larger opening of the 
technological package. 
A most significant step toward the learning of the basic engineering in 
phosphoric acid production was taken in 1977, with a contract that gave 
NA TRON the responsibility for choosing the technology for a new unit and 
that would appoint it as prime contractor for the later steps of the project. 
This opened an opportunity that was efficiently used. NATRON's purpose 
was to choose a technology supplier, from the four principal companies in 
the international market, that gave the new unit a technology transfer 
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contract with a full-disclosure clause, even though this technology had less 
tradition at an international level. The client, a state enterprise, went along 
with NATRON in this trade-off, as it had done in the case of a sulfuric acid 
project where the risk was smaller. The conscious position here was to 
enable the technological strengthening of national consultancy. (This 
enlightened attitude contrasts with that of another state client, which in a 
sulfuric acid project argued that NA TRON did not have sufficient technical 
capability to undertake the basic engineering design and gave this to a 
foreign firm at three times the price.) 
It can be said that by 1978, when this case study was made, NATRON 
was learning fast regarding phosphoric acid production, and in fact one of 
the two teams at DIP was devoted to this technical area. The other team was 
engaged in phosphate fertilizers, where there had been few opportunities 
to acquire experience; know-how was being gathered from the literature, 
visits to factories, analyses of projects to which access was obtained, and 
interactions with some foreign experts. Although the lack of projects has 
been a negative factor, NATRON has announced it is in a position to 
develop basic engineering in this area too. 
THE SVLFAB PROJECT 
The SULFAB plant started operating in October 1977. NATRON's 
performance in engineering and managing the project has been very 
good, as measured by several indicators: work was finished on time and 
practically within the expected budget (other neighbouring chemical units 
built at the same time at the North East Petrochemical Pole were different 
in these respects) and has shown a satisfactory performance with hardly 
any technical problems. The project did not imply a higher than usual 
participation by local industry; the usual types of equipment were 
imported, amounting to about 25% of all equipment. The interest of the 
case study resides in the significance of the SULFAB project as a 
demonstration of the entrepreneurial capacity of NATRON. 
COPENE, the North East Petrochemical Company, invited NATRON to 
take total responsibility for a sulfuric acid plant, including control of 
equity. This was a very good opportunity, technically and commercially. 
The participation of NATRON meant its strengthening as an enterprise, 
and a valuable economic support for the expansion and concentration of 
its consulting and engineering activities, which were subjected to the 
usual ups and downs of the trade. Strong financial incentives were offered. 
NA TRON negotiated very well and got good support from industrial policy 
organs and from the government financial institutions. It argued that it 
would be strengthened as a firm, that through having permanent access to 
industrial facilities it would acquire a complete mastery of acid production 
from elementary sulfur, and that the plant would serve as a demonstration 
of NATRON's technical achievements, thus reinforcing the chances of 
obtaining new clients at home and abroad. NATRON's equity participation 
came from the engineering services it rendered and from an important 
loan by FINEP, which also participated in the equity along with other 
government financial agencies. 
The 400 t/day plant employs the traditional simple-absorption process 
but is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the more modern double-
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absorption process. NATRON took complete responsibility for the pro-
ject, which was turnkey. This, plus its equity control, gave it permanent 
access to the plant, from which several advantages follow: a demonstra-
tion effect on possible clients (this has become the main advantage); a 
continuous optimizing and feedback of process data; the possibility of 
verifying in practice equipment, materials, operating costs, etc; the 
constitution of a permanent team to render start-up services to other 
sulfuric acid units. 
Recognition of the experience acquired by NATRON was a decisive 
factor in its being chosen more recently to carry out two new sulfuric acid 
projects, in competition with well-known foreign suppliers. In fact, it is 
possible to perceive a clear favouritism toward NA TRON by the state policy 
and financial organizations, an attitude that will no doubt be a constraint 
on enterprises that favour foreign firms for the work on new sulfuric acid 
units. 
The SULFAS plant will be employed by SULFAS and NATRON for R&D 
programs, for optimization of processes, and in particular for the devel-
opment of know-how that may allow local production of the catalyst. For 
such purposes, 10% of SULFAS's net earnings will be allocated to a 
"technical fund." The incentives granted to NATRON for participating in 
SULFAS were not dissimilar to those granted to other investors in the 
petrochemical complex being built. There was, however, an important 
aspect that merited state support, i.e., the strengthening of national 
engineering capabilities. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The case of NATRON is of great interest as an example of concentra-
tion of efforts to achieve the mastery of process engineering in certain 
areas. It also shows the key role of government through its purchasing 
power and its financial support policies in favour of technological 
development. These instruments, appropriately used, did bring about 
favourable conditions for the advance of basic engineering capabilities. 
NATRON's succe.ss is based not only on its strategy of specializing in 
technologies that can be absorbed, a strategy that was favoured by a 
succession of similar projects, but also on the support it was able to obtain 
within government organizations, notably financial agencies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING DESIGN 
CAPABILITY IN THE PHILIPPINES 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION (PHILIPPINES) 
SUMMARY 
The Philippines project was for the production of caustic soda and vinyl 
chloride monomer (VCM), owned by the MVC company (of 100% local capital). 
MVC had installed a small plant in 1965 and later expanded in 1970 and 1972. Its 
Planning and Projects Department (P&PD) outlined three alternative projects for a 
new VCM plant: petrochemical-based, petrochemical-cum-carbide, and carbide-
based; the last was chosen, even though it was considered obsolete international-
ly, because it required a lower investment and used locally available raw materials 
(principally limestone and charcoal, the latter a labour-intensive product and thus 
socially desirable). 
The company decided to undertake the project with in-house capacity, 
disaggregate it into core and peripheral technology, acquire the components from 
different sources, and use local consultants, equipment suppliers, and construc-
tors where possible. This decision was justified by the past experience of the firm, 
the high cost of foreign C&E services, the many possibilities to procure local 
equipment of adequate quality and cost, and the access to extra tax incentives. 
The main point was whether MVC could use its in-house capacity of P&PD plus 
plant engineers to manage the whole project. There was experience in soda-
chlorine, acquired through former expansion projects, on aspects of basic flow 
process design, detailed engineering, bidding for suppliers and equipment, bid 
evaluation, installation, and construction management. Furthermore, P&PD had 
carried out a desk research program, exhibits had been regularly attended, and its 
members had been exposed to the latest technology and equipment. As a result, 
management was confident that the project could be undertaken solely with 
in-house resources. 
P&PD prepared the basic engineering of the project, and a technology survey 
was started. Lists of equipment were prepared, and lists of suppliers were drawn up 
from catalogues, referrals, publications, and information gathered at international 
exhibitions. A team was organized to survey and choose equipment by visiting 
manufacturers and users in several countries. These activities took 3 months, and a 
bankable feasibility study was prepared during February-March 1974. By August 
1974, this had been registered by the Board of Investments and the project was then 
eligible for a number of incentives. 
The cost of the project was about U.S.$30 million, of which one-half was 
available locally. A loan was requested from the International Finance Corporation, 
which required that the company should have an accredited foreign CEDO to 
undertake the management of the project, a condition that was not accepted by the 
company. Putting together the financial package was lengthy, because several 
different sources had to be used. This took from February 1974 to August 1976. 
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Some comments may be made on the contracting and unpackaging of 
technology. Detailed engineering was subcontracted, so that the company could 
avoid hiring people expressly for the task, only to be dismissed afterward. A local 
CEDO, TECHSERVE, was engaged. This firm had extensive experience in the 
petrochemical field, and MVC had already used its services. MVC used the bidding 
process of the Philippines Development Bank, which strengthened its negotiating 
power. Most standard items of equipment were locally supplied. Local contractors 
carried out the civil works, some peripheral installations, and instrumentation. 
Construction management was undertaken by SERETE, a French firm, as required 
by one of the funding sources. 
In 1977, MVC was asked by the government to reduce the output of its 
projected plant to one-third the original capacity. VCM production was thus made 
uneconomic, and the VCM plant was postponed. The company decided to 
concentrate its project in chlorine-soda production. It became necessary to 
reformulate the project accordingly. 
P&PD was responsible for overall project management. SERETE got four 
expatriates to supervise and inspect construction activities, affording a good 
training opportunity for the 10 MVC engineers who worked with them. Installation 
of equipment and the construction activities were carried out by a local firm. Some 
MVC engineers went overseas for training. It was expected that the new plant 
would be commissioned in early 1979. 
The local CEDO engaged in the project, TECHSERVE, was founded in 1970 by 
two recently retired professionals with 15 years' experience in Caltex and Union 
Carbide; the idea was that these partners would work as subcontractors for Caltex 
projects. TECHSERVE's technical capability is based principally on the know-how 
and experience of the founders, who have acquired their expertise in the 
petrochemical industry- a good basis for work on any chemically based process 
industry. The firm has no links with foreign CEDOs. 
By 1973, the staff had grown to some 30 engineers, the present complement. 
The firm has hired fresh college graduates and has trained them on the job for 
periods of 3-4 years. The turnover, however, has been high, perhaps because of 
moderate salaries and distant work locations. Most of the staff members have 
specialized in three areas: mechanical engineering/piping/equipment; chemical 
process engineering; and electrical/instrumentation. A few of them are in 
civil/structural/materials. Very specialized skills have been obtained from consul-
tants. 
Services rendered range from chemical process flow design to detailed 
engineering work. The main service lines are detailed engineering and project 
management. About 30 major projects have been carried out since 1970. Services 
usually start with detailed engineering, go through the preparation of bid 
qocuments, and include advice on the evaluation and selection of suppliers and 
contractors - in particular, the identification of local ones, which usually results in 
lower investment costs - as well as assistance in project management. 
The firm gives on-the-job training to its clients' engineering staff - this was 
notable in the case of MVC - including the transmission to them of engineering 
standards and formulas. 
Among the constraints on growth are a limited market, the lack of senior 
qualified staff, and the fast turnover of trained staff engineers. The principal market 
is Caltex, which has confidence in the two partners, but market expansion is 
difficult because of limited acceptance of local CEDOs. This is a reflection of two 
extreme attitudes: risk aversion (little confidence in local CEDOs - foreign ones 
are employed even though they cost four to eight times as much), or risk taking 
(many enterprises do not spend on C&E services, feeling they are unnecessary or 
too expensive). 
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This study examines the development of a well-established CEDO in 
the Philippines, its characteristics and activities, and the environmental 
influences on it: As a corollary to this, an analysis of an industrial 
investment project in which the CEDO had a significant participation is 
presented. Essentially, the case study focuses on the analysis of the 
cause-to-effect relationships as they influenced the decisions affecting the 
characteristics of the CEDO and the development of an industrial project. 
The research work itself was useful as a learning process and provided a 
tentative framework for a full-scale study of CEDOs. 
The major sources for data and information were documents, reports, 
and personal interviews. Four sets of questionnaires were employed, 
dealing with characteristics and operations of CEDOs, development and 
implementation of industrial projects, impact areas of CEDOs, and impact 
areas of industrial projects. Five business firms were selected as prospects 
for the CEDO case study. Three of them were CEDOs involved in civil, 
mechanical, and electrical work, and the other two were primarily civil 
construction companies. The research team gathered knowledge about 
these firms and conducted preliminary .interviews with their principal 
officers. 
The search for a suitable investment project to be studied required 
interviews with officers of three chemical processing firms. The integrated 
caustic soda and vinyl chloride monomer (NaOH-VCM) project of 
Mabuhay Vinyl Corporation (MVC) was chosen as the subject of the 
project case study. Major factors considered in the choice of MVC were: 
access to and cooperation of MVC's top management; its being an 
ongoing project, which was not turnkey; this meant that decision points 
were significant and researchable. 
It was then decided that the subject of the CEDO case study should be 
Technical Services Philippines (TECHSERVE), a small group of professional 
engineers that undertook the process detailed engineering of the MVC 
project. Extensive interviews were conducted with the top executives and 
project staff of MVC regarding the caustic soda-VCM project, and with the 
head of TECHSERVE. Interviews were also conducted with other units, 
principally the Board of Investments, the Central Bank, the Development 
Bank of the Philippines, the Private Development Corporation of the 
Philippines, and SERETE Consultants. These were to verify information 
because each source was prone to bias to protect its own interest. 
The results of the interviews and research of TECHSERVE and MVC 
were synthesized, analyzed, and documented as case studies. These case 
studies included not only factual narration but also integration of opinions 
and analysis of the interviews, particularly regarding the decision points 
and their influences. Validation interviews were then conducted with MVC 
and TECHSERVE, based on the draft case studies, to verify case contents, 
incorporate additional feedback, and finalize the case studies. 
Moreover, the results of interviews with the DCCD Engineering 
Company and with LMG Chemicals were written up as preliminary case 
studies, because it was felt that they provided information regarding other 
modes of technological activities; that is, DCCD exemplifies· a typical 
CEDO in the fast-growing construction sector, whereas LMG's project 
represents a typical case of turnkey technology importation. 
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Based on the analysis of the four cases, we identified important 
research issues regarding CEDOs, and the extent of their influences and 
implications is briefly described in the last section of this chapter. It was 
concluded that none of the government policy instruments had any 
significant influence on the development and operation of CEDOs, except 
for the Oversea Construction Act. The only notable effect of government 
policies has been to induce development in the production sector, which 
in turn would have enhanced the engagement of CEDO services. 
Nevertheless, some policy instruments that may have had an indirect 
effect were: 
• Investment Incentives Act, 1967 (RA 5168). To encourage Filipino and 
foreign investments (that are in line with development policy), with 
various incentives for registered enterprises and "pioneer" enterprises 
(tax exemptions, accelerated depreciation, antidumping protection, loan 
facilities, tariff protection for pioneer industries, etc.). It is administered by 
the Board of Investments (BOI). 
• Foreign Investments Act, 1968 (RA 5455). To regulate entry of foreign 
investments greater than 30% of stock; BOI evaluates proposals in 
accordance with the existing laws and national economic goals. 
• Export Incentive Act, 1970 (RA 6135). To promote exports of services 
and manufactures using domestic raw materials to the maximum extent. 
60% of capital should be Filipino and 50% of sales should be export sales. 
Tax benefits and increased deductions over those of the Investment 
Incentives Act. 
• Developing and Regulating the Overseas Construction Industry, 1977 
(PD 1167). To provide opportunities to export materials, labour skills, 
technical and managerial expertise in the construction sector, with 
incentives to Filipino overseas contractors: foreign tax refund, accelerated 
depreciation, tax benefits for labour training, net operating loss carryover 
for 3 years. 
• Amendment to Patent Law, 1977 (PD 1263). To meet the demands of 
national development, establishing approval of licence contracts by the 
Technology Resource Center, a limit of 5% royalties on sales, nullifying 
restrictive clauses, and establishing the possibility of compulsory licenc-
ing. 
• Central Bank Circulars 365 and 393, 1973. To regulate, respectively, 
repatriation of foreign investments and remittance of profits and 
dividends, and approval of royalty/rental contracts and remittances of 
royal ti es/rentals. 
AN INVESTMENT PROJECT OF MABUHAY VINYL CORPORATION 
Mabuhay Vinyl Corporation is a Filipino-owned firm, producing since 
1961 PVC resins, vinyl chloride monomer, hydrochloric acid, caustic soda, 
and PVC compounds. MVC's first PVC and caustic soda project was 
financed by a $2.1 million loan from the Philippine War Reparations 
Commission. The plant, located in lligan City, was completed in late 1965. 
It was designed to produce 6000 t/year of PVC resins and 5000 t/year of 
causti.c soda. In 1970, the firm undertook a=F2 million expansion, which 
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increased the plant's capacity by 60%, followed by a bigger expansion in 
1972 involving a capital outlay of=F12 million, increasing capacity to 9000 
t/year of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM). In that same year, MVC's 
Planning and Projects Department (P&PD) further increased PVC capacity 
to 28 000 t/year through infusion of technology and other innovations with 
minimal investments. 
PROJECT CONCEPTUALIZA T/ON 
Vinyl chloride monomer is the major raw material in PVC resins. With 
the PVC expansion in 1972, the plant operating at full capacity required 
around 30 000 t of VCM; as only 10 000 t were being produced by 
Mabuhay, the company's Management Committee directed its Planning 
and Projects Department to study the different processes of producing 
VCM and to compare their financial viability against that of importation, 
taking into consideration other factors such as the reliability of world 
supply and the inevitable price increase of VCM on account of the oil crisis. 
P&PD developed three alternatiyes, which employed respectively the 
petrochemical-based process, the petrochemical-carbide-based process, 
and the carbide-based process. 
The carbide-based VCM process was chosen because, although 
considered obsolete internationally in view of advanced developments in 
petro-based technologies, it required a lower investment and used major 
raw materials (charcoal and limestone) that were available locally. This 
choice was supported by the Development Bank of the Philippines, which 
noted that the production of charcoal would require considerable land 
and labour in the agricultural sector, the use of which was in line with one 
of the major developmental thrusts of the government. 
PROJECT PLANNING 
Several questions were raised by MVC's management regarding the 
source of consulting and engineering services and the way in which 
technology would be acquired. MVC's past experiences with its initial PVC 
plant and subsequent expansions had implications for decisions in four 
areas: 
• Turnkey or unpackaged technology. MVC's first PVC plant, acquired 
on a turnkey basis, encountered numerous problems, especially when an 
attempt was made to increase the normal capacity level. Debugging 
activities of MVC's engineers revealed that the unbalanced design of the 
whole production system permitted production only at a normal level. Any 
further increase within its rated or maximum allowable level would 
subsequently produce .overflows or bottlenecks. Furthermore, MVC's 
engineers in the process of debugging and dismantling certain subsystems 
of the PVC.plant discovered that certain equipment and materials were 
either locally available or could easily be made locally. 
o Use of expatriates. Expatriates' professional fees are normally eight 
times higher than local consultants' fees - an amount that excludes 
incidental charges suth as overseas travel costs, living expenses, and 
others. These usually total a large amount of money, usually in foreign 
currencies aAd add greatly to the project cost. 
o Locally available equipment and materials. Through MVC's exposure 
in the initial plant installation and expansion programs, MVCfound·that 
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locally fabricated items were comparable to imported ones, with the 
former having an added feature of shorter delivery time. More important is 
the lower cost of locally manufactured equipment plus the tax credit 
incentives provided under existing legislation. 
• In-house technical capability. The final area was whether or not the 
Planning and Projects Department together with the line engineers could 
manage the total project from planning (front and tail engineering) to 
project management, implementation, and control. P&PD's experience 
was basically in MVC's earlier expansion, covering the front and tail 
engineering, which included basic flow process design and detailed 
engineering, suppliers and equipment bidding and evaluation, and actual 
installation and construction management. P&PD also conducted con-
tinuing research of journals, periodicals, and other technical publications. 
Regular attendance at international-science and suppliers' fairs by P&PD 
and line engineers had exposed them to the latest technologies and 
equipment. 
With these experiences, MVC's management was confident that it 
could undertake the project solely with in-house resources and decided 
that the VCM project should be undertaken by its own P&PD and line 
engineers; that the entire VCM expansion project should be disaggre-
gated into its core and peripheral technology components, for acquisition 
from different sources depending on their quality and reliability; and that 
use of local consultants, equipment suppliers, and constructors should be 
the first consideration before use of foreign expatriates and imported 
equipment. 
PROJECT OPERATIONALIZATION 
The front engineering, which entailed the design of the basic flow 
processes, was prepared by P&PD. The basic engineering process 
included the materials and energy balances and required quality and 
specifications of process outputs including general instrumentations. 
The items of equipment came out of the basic engineering flow 
process designs, and a listing of respective suppliers (local and foreign) 
was prepared. The listing was based on publications, suppliers' 
catalogues, referrals, and information acquired in international fairs. 
A five-person team was organized to survey and inspect needed 
equipment and to negotiate with suppliers for acceptable terms and 
conditions. The members of the team included the firm's president and 
vice-president, one of the directors, the construction superintendent, and 
a senior project engineer. The team started its work in November 1973 and 
visited India, Japan, the U.S., Germany, and France. The team was guided 
mainly by three factors: guarantees on reliability of equipment; equip-
ment costs, financial terms, and conditions; and delivery date. The team 
traveled extensively and inspected equipment in actual operations, 
inquiring from users about the reliability (quality and specifications of 
outputs) of such equipment. In early 1974, the team arrived back in the 
Philippines. 
With relevant information on equipment price, terms, and payments 
serving as background, a bankable feasibility study was prepared. The 
marketing group of MVC together with P&PD prepared the market study, 
which showed basically the demand-supply forecast and analysis of VCM, 
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caustic soda, HCI, chlorine gas, and liquid chlorine. P&PD prepared the 
technical aspects, which involved the basic flow process and the equip-
ment requirements. The financial study was prepared by P&PD, with 
assistance from MVC's finance group, and included financial statements 
with financial and ratio analyses. 
Registration was applied for in March 1974, and the project was 
approved by BOI in August 1974. After being registered, the project could 
apply for fiscal and other incentives, which often determine whether a 
project is financially viable. The incentives awarded to MVC as provided by 
BOl's Incentive Act (RA 5156) were tax credits on domestic capital 
equipment and withholding tax interest; tariff exemptions on imported 
equipment; tax deductions for capital reinvestment and net loss carry-
over; accelerated depreciation; and double deduction of preoperating 
expenses. 
Total funds required forthe projectwere=F260 million, which included 
a foreign currency (U.S. dollars) requirement amounting to $14.2 million 
or just under40% (in 1974, U.S. $1 was equal to=F7.15). The finance group of 
MVC took charge of securing the necessary funds from all sources 
available at reasonable rates and conditions. It eyed the World Bank-IFC 
as one source, thinking that with IFC's approval ofa loan, it would be easier 
to secure other funds. However, IFC insisted that MVC have an accredited 
foreign CEDO to undertake project management of the VCM project; its 
unwillingness to fund the project, according to one of MVC's key officers, 
was a result of its previous experience with a local construction/consulting 
firm that bungled an industrial project. 
In the end, the=F260 million was secured from the Development Bank 
of the Philippines, $6.6 million; Private Development Corporation of the 
Philippines,=1?19.0 million; Trident International Finance Ltd, $2.2 million; 
Bank Dreyfus, $3.5 million; Manila Banking Corporation, =1?10.0 million; 
City Corporatibn,=1?15.0 million; and the balance from cash generated by 
MVC's operations. The syndication of loans started in February 1974 and 
was completed in August 1976. The Private Development Corporation of 
the Philippines (PDCP), a private financing institution with its main thrust 
in financing development-oriented projects, offered its services to pack-
age the loan for MVC as early as April 1974. MVC declined because of the 
high service charges involved. There was a 2-year delay in completing the 
total loan package, and a consequence of this delay, according to PDCP, 
was opportunity costs that MVC incurred in its inability to cash in on the 
VCM market as programed. 
The French financial package extended by Bank Dreyfus required that 
85% of the loan should be used for French equipment and services. 
CONTRACT/NC AND UNPACKACINC TECHNOLOGY 
Additional technical personnel were needed for detailed engineering. 
The option of hiring technical people just for this aspect of the project and 
maintaining them after the work had been completed was deemed too 
costly; hiring foreign consultants likewise was considered too great a 
burden on project funds and was in conflict with the management policy of 
using local expertise whenever possible. TECHSERVE, a local consulting 
and engineering design organization, was contracted by MVC to do 
detailed engineering for the brine purification, power substations, refrig-
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eration plant, air compressor plant, instrumentation, electrical works, civil 
works, and hydrochloric acid plant (this last, in collaboration with a foreign 
company). Detailed engineering for the electrolysis, evaporation, and 
liquid chlorine plants was performed by foreign firms, but TECHSERVE 
took charge of equipment and instrumentation installation and supervised 
local equipment fabrication. MVC hired TECHSERVE's services, consider-
ing the latter's extensive experience in the process and detailed engineer-
ing in the petrochemical industry. TECHSERVE had previously been hired 
by MVC to undertake the basic process design and detailed engineering 
for the manufacture of acetylene black. 
MVC decided to accept bids for the supply of all equipment (local and 
foreign) in compliance with the requirements of the Development Bank of 
the Philippines. Equipment bidding enabled MVC to attain the most 
advantageous prices and terms of payments, early delivery dates, and 
better guarantees on quality and service features. 
Local fabricators supplied most of the standard equipment such as 
atmospheric and pressure tanks, stainless and mild steel, heat exchangers, 
distillation columns, flow reactors, filters, strainers, water-softening 
equipment, and rubber linings. Use of local fabricators enabled MVC and 
the local suppliers to acquire tax credits as specified in BOl's incentive 
program. MVC decided to handle directly the importation of certain 
construction materials, such as special pipings, valves, and fittings, even 
though they were available locally through trading companies. This 
decision meant MVC could take advantage of BOI tax incentives on 
imported materials and equipment, but it also entailed hidden costs 
because the VCM plant construction schedule was delayed by 3 months 
due to the delay in the release of the imported materials from the Bureau of 
Customs. 
All civil works jobs were awarded to local contractors. Engineering 
Equipment Incorporated (EEi), a local construction and fabrication firm, 
won most of the contracts of the VCM project and supplied all the 
necessary local construction materials. Contracts included the electrolysis 
and evaporator structure, HCI substation, refrigeration, air compressor, 
pipe racks and foundations, installation of all piping, equipment and 
wiring, distribution transformers, and motor control centres. Minor civil 
works contracts were awarded to contractors close to the plant site. 
Site grading and development were awarded by MVC and P&PD to the 
lowest bidder, F.F. Cruz; this work included relocation of existing 
pipelines and provisions for a new water supply line from Mimbalut Creek. 
Instrumentation was awarded to a local firm - Process Instruments 
Designers (PIO) Inc. 
SERETE S.A. of France was contracted to handle the construction 
management of this project. SERETE introduced MVC to French financing 
firms -an act that eventually led to the securing of a $3.5 million loan from 
Bank Dreyfus in 1976. Although local construction management and 
engineering firms were available, SERETE's services were secured primarily 
due to the French loan requirement. 
PROJECT REPLANNING 
In 1976 the Board of Investments sent a letter to Mabuhay Vinyl 
Corporation reducing VCM production from 30 OOOt to 10 000 ton account 
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of a government-supported project (Asian Petrochemical Development 
Corporation - Hooker) establishing a petrochemical complex with 
150 000 t VCM as one of its product lines. In April 1977 BOI formally 
amended MVC's registration to produce 10 000 t VCM and 6000 t liquid 
chlorine. Some equipment items had already arrived, with others in 
transit; most of these items were not standard but were built to MVC's 
earlier specifications. This move placed MVC in a quandary. 
The Planning and Projects Department immediately undertook stud-
ies and came up with two alternatives: to continue with the VCM project 
with a 10 000 t/year capacity or to establish a caustic soda (NaOH) plant, 
which was a subsystem of the total VCM plant. P&PD studies showed that it 
would be highly uneconomic for MVC to produce 10 000 t VCM with a 
plant designed for 30 000 t/year. Thus, the NaOH plant was considered to 
be the best option. This plant would produce concentrated hydrogen 
chloride, liquid chlorine, chlorine gas, and caustic soda. Furthermore, the 
other two firms in the country producing caustic soda, with locations 
within Metro Manila, were faced with possible closure or complete 
relocation as a result of new government pollution regulations. 
The NaOH plant would include the following subplants: 23 500 t/year 
caustic soda plant using the diaphragm process; 20 500 t/year HCI 
synthesis plant; 6000 t/year chlorine liquefaction plant; and 10 000 t/year 
VCM plant using the conventional carbide route process (this phase was 
deferred). P&PD recommended a diaphragm-type cell instead ofa mercury 
cell for its electrolytic plant because of a possible mercury pollution 
problem. 
The NaOH project involved a total cash outlay oW170 821 million, with 
a revised financing scheme: Trident, $2.0 million; DBP, $5.0 million,=1?19.0 
million; Dreyfus Coface, $3.5 million; PDCP, $1.8 million; Citibank/FEAT!, 
=1?10.0 million; new equity,=1?30.0 million; and internally generated funds, 
=1?19.8 million. 
VCM's Board decided, in line with P&PD's recommendation, to 
postpone the VCM plant and instead to continue with the caustic soda 
plant. In fact, the decision proved favourable to the company, for in the 
latter part of 1977, the world price of VCM declined due to the dumping of 
chemicals by the developed countries. 
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 
This responsibility was entrusted to P&PD, which worked partly from 
the Manila headquarters (with P&PD's vice-president, who was the overall 
project manager; an engineering superintendent; a technical services 
officer; and a draftsperson) and partly from the plant site (with a 
coordinator, two senior and two junior engineers, a civil works inspector, 
and warehouse staff). They worked with SERETE personnel that handled 
the construction management and with the project constructor from EEi. 
On matters of problems in chemical processes and piping designs, 
P&PD had the final word. Likewise P&PD reviewed all recommendations of 
SERETE. However, when problems arose from detailed engineering 
designs, they were brought to TECHSERVE as one of the conditions of the 
service contract. SERETE's role was in the construction management of the 
NaOH-VCM plants. It supervised and inspected the work of EEi for 
conformity with detailed engineering specifications and budgeted costs. It 
96 
submitted feedback sheets to P&PD for appropriate action on construction 
problems, revisions in detailed engineering designs, and other relevant 
matters. To ensure that installations were properly made, SERETE con-
ducted water tests to determine piping connections and flow. 
SERETE's project organization was composed of four French expa-
triates and about 10 Filipino technical and clerical staff members. SERETE 
originally planned for an all-French staff; however, MVC pointed out that 
local expertise in both clerical and technical fields was available right in 
MVC's own organization. MVC granted leaves of absence to employees 
who were assigned to SERETE and requested SERETE to maintain the salary 
scale so that the overall MVC salary structure would not be disrupted. 
Aside from the savings in project costs, this move provided MVC staff with 
exposure that enhanced in-house technical capabilities. SERETE com-
mented on the quality of the detailed engineering prepared by 
TECHSERVE, stating that some aspects of the designs and specifications 
were inadequate, such as provisions for supports of certain pipes or 
instruments and others. EEi noted the same weaknesses. TECHSERVE 
agreed but maintained - and was backed by MVC - that these were 
extremely minor in nature and could easily be revised. 
EEi was responsible for civil construction and equipment installation. 
There was a 3-month delay in relation to the schedule, which was basically 
due to a delay in importing construction materials and the fact that there 
were contracts for each phase instead of one general contract for all 
phases, which limited EEi's flexibility in allocating construction materials 
and assigning people to certain work areas in the construction of the plant. 
MVC's engineers were sent overseas to be trained by equipment 
suppliers on operations and maintenance. Furthermore, vendors' repre-
sentatives were assigned to the project site to assist in the proper 
installation of the equipment. Three line supervisors (one chemical and 
two mechanical engineers) from MVC's other plants were assigned to the 
project, to assist and observe the installation and construction of the plant. 
These engineers would eventually assume positions in the actual line 
operations of the NaOH-VCM plant. 
COMMISSIONING 
The plans were that representatives of equipment vendors and 
suppliers would commission the respective plant for proper turnover to 
MVC. This was to be done with representatives of MVC and the 
Development Bank of the Philippines present during the commissioning 
stage, following a policy of the Bank.31 The project was expected to be 
operational by early 1979. 
31 The purpose of the policy is to ensure that quality and other specifications of 
equipment output/product are being met according to agreements. It was adopted 
because of past experience; in some earlier DBP-funded projects, the desired 
quality, volume, and other specifications were not attained after the commission-
ing stage. Furthermore, DBP would not release final payments unless all contract 
·conditions had been fulfilled. 
97 
THE LOCAL CEDO: TECHSERVE 
Technical Services Philippines was organized in November 1970 as a 
partnership between Juanita M. Andres, a chemical engineer, and 
Francisco Jimenez, a mechanical engineer, after about 16 years of technical 
work in Caltex and Union Carbide respectively. These two highly experi-
enced technical engineers had retired, but both felt they still had many 
more productive years ahead of them and could increase their income with 
their wide engineering experience by catering to the engineering and 
technical requirements of the Bataan Oil Refinery Plant of Caltex (Philip-
pines), particularly for its various plant expansion and modernization 
projects. This was considered feasible because Caltex had found it more 
manageable and economic to subcontract technical work than to maintain 
an expanded engineering staff or commission foreign consultants. No 
feasibility studies or long-term plans were prepared by the partners at the 
formation stage of the partnership because both viewed the venture as a 
short-term project-to-project existence with Caltex. 
TECHSERVE started with a team of six engineers, including the two 
founding partners. The team was organized in December 1970, when the 
first project was contracted with Caltex (the engineering design and 
project management of a cooling tower with a capacity of 25 MM BTU/h). 
The staff numbers grew as more projects with Caltex were contracted. In 
1973 there were 30 engineers, and at present there are 25 permanent staff 
members and six consultants. 
In its first year of operation, TECHSERVE's gross revenue was=F250 000. 
By 1977 it had doubled. Most came from Caltex contracts. The expected 
revenue for 1978 was about=F750 000. 
ORGANIZATION 
TECHSERVE is headed by a managing partner who handles all the 
administrative requirements of the organization, such as signing of 
contracts, personnel recruitment, collections, and specialized technical 
and engineering work. The other partner functions as the operations 
manager, responsible mainly for implementing and coordinating the 
projects being undertaken. The rest of the staff is composed of senior 
engineers, junior engineers, and draftspersons. The engineers cover fields 
such as mechanical/piping/equipment, chemical/process engineering, 
electrical/instrumentation, civil/structural, and materials, with the major-
ity of the staff working in the first three fields. To augment its capability, 
TECHSERVE has a group of on-call consultants in specialized fields. 
TECHNICAL SERVICES 
TECHSERVE basically provides engineering design services ranging 
from chemical process flow design to detailed engineering work. The 
services encompass process design and cost estimation; detailed process 
flow charts with material and energy balances; plant layout; piping 
isometrics and orthographies; and civil, mechanical, and electrical 
engineering detailed design. The group also offers management services, 
such as preparations of bid specifications and invitations, bid evaluations, 
contract awards, materials procurement, technical training, cost control, 
design interpretations or revisions of project constructions and installa-
tion, start-up assistance, and other phases of project management. 
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The firm has so far completed about 30 major projects. These range 
from utility surveys to operator training programs to design/engineering/ 
project management of a terminal grease plant (project cost: U.S. $1 
million) to detailed engineering of an integrated vinyl chloride/caustic 
soda plant with a capacity of 30 000 t/year. 
TECHSERVE's major services line is in tail engineering work, which is . 
detailed engineering and project management. The vital skill required for 
detailed engineering lies in the application of established standards and 
computation formulas. TECHSERVE has not been heavily involved in front 
engineering work (basic process design); the basic chemical processes are 
either highly standardized or proprietary information. 
SKILL FORMATION 
TECHSERVE's technical capabilities are founded basically on the 
know-how and experience acquired by the founders in research, devel-
opment, design, and engineering work in Caltex and Union Carbide, both 
petrochemical industries. To ensure adequate technical staff support, the 
two partners hired fresh college graduates and provided them with 
on-the-job training and guidance for an average 3-4 years. However, the 
turnover rate among these staff members has been rather high, primarily 
due to TECHSERVE's uncompetitive compensation and distant work 
location. 
To augment its technical capability, the firm has on call a pool of 
consultants, each specializing in a technical field, to assist in design work 
and in checking the work of the staff engineers. Most of the consultants are 
former or retired employees of Caltex. Currently there are six consultants 
who have been contracted full-time for various projects. In addition to the 
limited market, a major growth constraint for TECHSERVE has been the 
lack of qualified senior technical staff to undertake design and engineering 
work. This problem is aggravated by the fast turnover of its trained staff 
engineers. 
MARKETS AND CLIENTS 
TECHSERVE's primary market is Caltex Philippines; in fact, its working 
office is based in Caltex's Batangas Refinery. Caltex's confidence in the 
quality and dependability of work done is not based on TECH SERVE per se 
as an organization but rather on the two partners -Andres and Jimenez-
and their technical capabilities. 
Through the years, TECHSERVE has been involved in projects with 
other companies more as a result of coincidence than of any marketing 
strategy or effort. These projects were collaboration with a local equip-
ment manufacturer, HON IRON Philippines, in the flow process design of a 
sugar milling plant, and in the design of certain equipment to be locally 
fabricated- an assignment secured because one of the key executives of 
HONIRON was formerly a Caltex employee and had learned of 
TECHSERVE and the type of services it offered; and preparation of most of 
the detailed engineering of the integrated VCM-soda plant of MVC -
again, because of the personal acquaintance between one partner and 
MVC's management staff. 
The oil crisis in 1974 dealt TECHSERVE a nearly fatal blow, as a 
consequence of its dependence on Caltex as its only client. At that time 
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Caltex froze all its contracts because of the uncertainty of the oil industry. 
The option considered then by TECHSERVE was to advertise and look for 
project engagements elsewhere. Coincidentally, at about the end of 1974, 
Mabuhay Vinyl Corporation contracted TECHSERVE to do the detailed 
engineering for its VCM project. This provided work for TECH SERVE up to 
1976, when Caltex again started to undertake plant expansion and 
modification projects, and engaged TECHSERVE's services once more. 
Another major growth constraint of TECHSERVE, in addition to the 
lack of technical personnel, has been the limited acceptance of local 
consulting and engineering design services. This is brought about by two 
extreme attitudes characteristic of local entrepreneurs: 
• Risk aversion: local entrepreneurs (includingfinancial institutions) do 
not have enough trust or confidence in local CEDO experts because of 
their limited track record. As a result, foreign CEDOs are preferred 
although project fees are four to eight times the local ones. 
• Risk-taking: local entrepreneurs take CEDO work as an expensive 
item that can be dispensed with without hampering eventual project 
operations - this attitude is particularly prevalent among small- and 
medium-scale industries. As a result, local consultancy/engineering fees 
are expected to be relatively small. 
These attitudes not only hinder the growth of all local CEDOs but also 
provide sound reasons for TECH SERVE to stick it out with Caltex, a stable 
client, and not develop marketing plans for seeking other clients. 
ROLE IN TECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION 
Upon finalizing the detailed engineering aspects of a project, 
TECHSERVE prepares a materials list including installation drawings, 
specifications, quotation requests, and invitations for bidding on 
technological requirements. It usually plays an important advisory role in 
the evaluation and selection of particular suppliers and constructors for its 
major client, Caltex. Often it has been able to identify and make use of 
qualified local suppliers and constructors, resulting in lower project 
investment costs. It assists clients in project management by monitoring 
and controlling all activities and costs during project implementation, thus 
protecting the client's interests. 
During its work with MVC in the detailed engineering of the caustic 
soda-VCM plant, TECHSERVE imparted supplementar"y on-the-job train-
ing to MVC's engineering staff and provided engineering standards and 
formulas for their use. This service has increased the technical capability of 
MVC's staff and enabled them to undertake design revisions and inter-
pretations on their own during the project implementation stage. 
TECHSERVE is now providing consultancy services to MVC on a monthly 
retainer basis. A key role of TECHSERVE has been to make use of local 
technical experts in the various fields of consultancy and engineering 
work. For instance, the firm recently contracted one project for process 
operator training, which is being handled on a full-time basis by a 
consultant associated with TECHSERVE. 
LINKS WITH FOREIGN CEDOs 
TECH SERVE has no formal ties with any foreign CEDOs and does not 
compete with foreign CEDOs for local engineering work. The provision of 
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engineering services to Caltex is sufficient to keep TECHSERVE busy and 
profitable. The firm recognizes that the lack of senior technical staff is an 
obstacle to undertaking large-scale engineering work, and, moreover, 
when financing is obtained from foreign sources, the CEDOs engaged 
tend to be foreign. Yet there was a case of a foreign engineering firm that, 
by virtue of its track record, secured the refinery's instrumentation 
modernization project; ironically, six of the well-trained junior staff of 
TECHSERVE were "pirated" to work with this foreign outfit. 
At one time, TECHSERVE was seriously considered as a subcontractor 
for the engineering and the project management of a nickel refinery plant 
but did not undertake the work because the partners could not be 
assigned full-time to the remote project site due to their heavy work load. 
PRELIMINARY CASE STUDIES 
DCCD ENGINEERING 
DCCD, one of the leading CEDOs in the Philippines, was founded in 
1957 by a group of professors at the College of Engineering, University of 
the Philippines. It provides a wide range of integrated professional 
engineering services for the planning, detailed design, and construction 
management of civil, electrical, mechanical, sanitary, and structural 
engineering projects for both the private and the government sect'ors. It 
employs more than 400 persons, including some 250 engineers and 
consultants, of which 25 hold graduate degrees. The firm has been 
engaged in more than 600 projects throughout the Philippines, as well as in 
Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Thailand. 
The firm has six technical divisions (civil works, construction man-
agement, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, sanitary 
engineering, and structural engineering), whose work is organized along 
project lines. Each project is headed by a project manager who deals 
directly with the client at all stages of planning and execution. The 
technical decisions and expertise are provided by the chief engineers and 
consultants of each participating division. Administrative services, name-
ly, accounting, finance, personnel, systems and procedures, computeri-
zation, documentation, and the data bank, are handled by its Operations 
Department. 
The firm is employee-owned. Professional services of its consulting 
engineers and project managers are compensated on a direct profit-
sharing basis for each project undertaken. Gross revenues in 1977 
amounted to =F26 million, with a return on equity of 49%. Of the gross 
revenue, about=F2 million was subcontract fees paid to surveying and other 
outside services. 
DCCD can take care of all the successive stages of consulting services 
from project planning to implementation, in electric generation and 
distribution, water resource development (water supply, reservoirs, 
irrigation systems), site civil works, roads, bridges, waterworks, sewerage, 
buildings and industrial plants, air conditioning, and ventilation. More 
than half of its engineering assignments involve detailed engineering, 
although a minor, but significant, percentage entail construction supervi-
sion jobs; others include design review and evaluation, design studies, 
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and feasibility studies. The increasing emphasis of government on 
infrastructure development in the 1960s and 1970s has meant large-scale 
and complex engineering jobs for DCCD. 
The firm has recruited its professionals from reputable schools, 
preferably with graduate degrees, and has provided them with further 
training on the job. Two problems have been found regarding the junior 
staff: first, recruits have shown inadequate levels of technical compe-
tence, probably because of poor college training, and second, the 
turnover is high once recruits have been trained. Turnover at the senior 
staff level is not too much of a problem because staff members are 
co-owners of the company. But they have sometimes left to set up their 
own consulting firms - a loss of expertise and even clients for DCCD. 
There are no permanent ties with foreign CEDOs, but often DCCD has 
associated with them for specific projects. In many cases DCCD's role has 
been that of a subcontractor with minor technical work and little decision 
power. The main reasons for such a subordinate role are the short track 
record of DCCD and the requirements of bilateral financing agreements. 
More recently DCCD has participated in a very large project as a 
subcontractor but was assigned important technical jobs and acted as 
cosignatory to any recommendations thus made. 
Although contracts with foreign CEDOs do not normally contain 
explicit provisions for the training of local technical staff, DCCD and the 
foreign firms implicitly accept that training is part of the working 
arrangements. DCCD assigns senior and promising staff to work closely 
with the expatriates. An important area where local staff have been able to 
learn much from foreign consultants is project management and control. 
DCCD suffers stiff competition from foreign CEDOs, both in international 
bidding and in the local market, even though foreign fees are five to seven 
times more than those charged by DCCD. Foreign CEDOs moreover tend 
to employ local personnel, aggravating the turnover problem. 
In contrast, DCCD has yet to venture strongly into foreign markets 
because the domestic demand for CEDO services is still relatively high; in 
addition, only recently has the government provided fiscal and credit 
incentives to local contractors and indirectly to local CEDOs to undertake 
technical work abroad. However, the competitiveness of local CEDOs in 
foreign markets will depend on factors such as track record and degree of 
trust of developing countries or financing institutions in Filipino technical 
capability. 
In its planning and design work, DCCD has not extensively adapted or 
modified technologies to local conditions (e.g., labour intensity, local raw 
materials) primarily because design technologies in civil and structural 
work are highly standardized. What can be modified to suit local 
conditions are the construction techniques and materials. Moreover, 
there have been no specific professional or governmental guidelines to 
define and enforce the adaptation of technologies to suit local conditions. 
In the preparation of books of tender and in the bidding for construction 
works, DCCD has been recommending the use of domestic enterprises 
whenever possible because the construction business and technical skills 
in the country are relatively well-developed. 
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ALKYLBENZENE PROJECT OF LMG CHEMICALS INC. 
LMG Chemicals Inc., a subsidiary of Chemical Industries of the 
Philippines Inc. (CHEMPHIL), a 100% Filipino company, was organized in 
1968 to engage in the manufacture and sales of dodecylbenzene, a basic 
ingredient in the manufacture of synthetic detergents, which up to that 
time had been imported. Contact and preliminary discussions with 
potential alkylbenzene customers were not difficult because they were 
existing customers of CHEMPHIL. Although the market was definite, 
negotiations were necessary to standardize product specifications for the 
potential users. Other favourable factors were the existence of fiscal and 
other incentives provided by the Board of Investments and the long 
experience of CHEMPHIL in the chemical process industry. 
FIL International Management Corporation undertook the project 
feasibility study. The results were encouraging, and it was decided to 
proceed with the project. The various sources of technology and equip-
ment were then considered. One source of this information, according to 
one executive, was the compilation of available processes by the Stanford 
Research Institute. Information also came from the potential users. The 
processes considered were the Chevron process and the Universal Oil 
Products (UOP) process. A decision was easily made in favour of the 
Chevron process because the foreign suppliers of potential customers 
were using it and the feedstock could be supplied by Caltex Philippines. 
Two foreign engineering companies with licences from Chevron were 
considered by LMG Chemicals to design and install the plant: Nigata-
Chevron from Japan and Prichard Chevron from the U.S. Prices were 
similar, but the choice went to Prichard Chevron because of a yen 
revaluation clause of the Nigata-Chevron proposal. The agreement called 
for Prichard Chevron to supply all the equipment, supervise the installa-
tion of the plant to be undertaken by the Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. 
(AG&P) of the Philippines, train key engineers, start up the plant, and 
extend technical assistance for a number of years. In return for a guarantee 
of the process and equipment, CHEMPHIL was not permitted to modify 
either without approval from Prichard Chevron. It was pointed out by the 
LMG staff that technological adaptation in this particular situation is 
difficult. At most, it would be limited to minor equipment modification 
through the application perhaps of value engineering and economic 
analysis. 
Prichard Chevron decided on equipment fabricators and supervised 
the local engineering contractors. However, the project proponents felt 
that some engineering design tasks could be undertaken locally, especially 
the purchase of equipment from other suppliers. In fact, one executive 
noted that its own staff members who were in the U.S. for training actually 
did some follow-up on suppliers of Prichard Chevron just to minimize 
project delays. 
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. of the Philippines was contracted to 
undertake the civil and mechanical work. The project was not fully turnkey 
because the proponents had made the decision as to the local contractor 
even before the engineering design and consulting firm was decided 
upon. 
As part of the agreement, Prichard Chevron provided training to eight 
LMG personnel. These included the general manager, plant manager, and 
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six engineers who were trained in similar plants in California for an average 
6 weeks. However, the "training" included the development of operating 
manuals and follow-up of equipment subcontracts, which LMG felt should 
have been done by Prichard Chevron. 
The installation of the plant took about 3 years, starting in 1973, with 
the equipment coming in 1974 and finally being installed in 1976. The delay 
was caused by several factors and aggravated by the oil crisis, which caused 
an upward adjustment of prices. There was, however, no provision in the 
contract as to delays; hence no action could be taken by any party. With 
the termination of the plant guarantee period, LMG is now free to 
undertake equipment or minor process modifications. Studies are being 
made to improve operating efficiency and utilization of raw materials. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The case studies carried out have made it possible to identify a number 
of questions for further research. 
Cf DO TYPES AND CEDO DEVELOPMENT 
Should CEDOs be in-house units in manufacturing organizations, 
independent business enterprises, or government agencies; and to what 
extent should these various modes of operation coexist? For instance, the 
in-house units of manufacturing organizations could concentrate their 
work on technology acquisition and project management, whereas the 
independent CEDOs could specialize in design and engineering work. 
What type of business organization of CEDOs would enhance their 
stability and growth? Possible types are single proprietorships, profes-
sional partnerships, employee-owned corporate units, corporate sub-
sidiaries, and autonomous government corporations. 
How far should CEDOs be awarded fiscal and credit incentives to 
enhance their development and their links with the science and technolo-
gy infrastructure? Should the development of CEDOs be considered as a 
natural by-product of industrial growth, as in the current policy perspec-
tive in the Philippines? 
TECHNICAL SERVICES AND MARKET COVERAGE 
What mechanisms may be used for upgrading C&E capabilities? Skill 
formation has faced a number of obstacles, such as limited market 
opportunities, limited acceptance, inadequate training, inadequate links 
with foreign CEDOs and research institutes, and concentration of local 
technical expertise in manufacturing industries. Accreditation and profes-
sionalization of local CEDOs would be desirable. 
Regarding the markets to be covered by local CEDOs, there should be 
priorities in line with development policy. In what industrial sectors 
should CEDO development be concentrated? For instance, should it be 
existing industries based on local resources, like sugar refining and 
metallurgical mining? What CEDO services may be provided to small and 
medium industries? 
What technical areas should be given priority for upgrading of CEDO 
capabilities? This question is related to development policy and to existing 
conditions as well. Should competence be developed initially at the 
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technical level of detailed engineering and project management or in the 
field of technology negotiation and acquisition? 
SELECTION AND CONTRACTING OF CED Os 
There is now a dualism in the market structure of C&E services. Large 
enterprises, with an aversion toward risk and with strict requirements, 
tend to engage only CEDOs with a proven track record; here market 
opportunities are limited to foreign CEDOs, and fees are large. Small and 
medium enterprises consider C&E services as part of a package technology 
deal or as an expense item of project development that may not necessarily 
affect efficient project operations. In this case, market acceptance is 
limited and C&E fees are expected to be low - facts complicating the 
problem of getting qualified local experts to undertake C&E work. 
Financial institutions crucially affect the choice of a CEDO and tend to 
protect their interests through the selection of CEDOs with a proven track 
record, as in the case of large enterprises. Local CEDOs are at a 
disadvantage and cannot increase their own track record because work 
opportunities are limited. Another common practice of financial institu-
tions is to require that a certain proportion of the loan be spent on services 
and equipment of a particular country or enterprise. 
Working relationships of local and foreign CEDOs should be defined 
so as to protect the clients' interests and the local CEDOs' professional 
status and to allow for the upgrading of local CEDO capabilities. Particu-
larly, to what extent should it be required that local CEDOs be the lead 
consultant? What should be the technical functions and the role in 
decisions of local CEDOs that have been subcontracted by foreign CEDOs? 
Although CEDO services should ideally be contracted apart from 
other activities required in an investment project (particularly the supply of 
equipment), frequently this does not happen because of the turnkey 
nature of projects, the exclusivity of the process know-how and equip-
ment to the extent that the equipment vendor is contracted as the CEDO, 
or the investor's desire to hasten the project cycle. 
ROLE IN THE CHOICE AND ABSORPTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
A key role of CEDOs in technology commercialization is in the choice 
and adaptation of technologies to suit local conditions such as labour 
intensity, economies of scale, and local material content. Mechanisms for 
inducing such a role include formal links with R&D institutes and 
technodata banks of the country and among cooperating countries, and 
various government incentives, for instance tax credits for the acquisition 
of locally fabricated equipment. 
Another key role is in the unpackaging and acquisition of technology 
components in terms that are beneficial to the client and to the country's 
development as well. This requires CEDOs to intensify their capabilities in 
identifying core and peripheral technology components that can be 
supplied by domestic enterprises; engineering and integrating various 
technology components obtained from different sources; and evaluating 
and negotiating technology agreements and licences. 
The functions of project management and technical assistance of 
CEDOs should go beyond the mere coordination of plant construction and 
installation, to include three vital functions: checking that equipment and 
105 
construction comply with specifications; integrating technology compo-
nents from various sources; and fine-tuning of the plant and its operations 
to clear up bottlenecks and increase capacity utilization and production 
efficiency. 
FRAMEWORK FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
An in-depth, action-oriented effort should be made to define the 
mechanisms for upgrading local CEDO capabilities. This would require: 
• Survey of local CEDO capabilities, including in-house units in manu-
facturing firms; this would provide comprehensive information about the 
current status of CEDOs and would permit the identification of gaps in 
CEDO capabilities; 
• Review of policy instruments and government programs that directly 
or indirectly affect research and production and of their effects on CEDO 
development; this is to ensure that the existing programs and policy 
instruments shall be synergistically linked to any government measures 
proposed for CEDO development; 
• Comprehensive analysis of CEDO issues; the factors and constraints 
affecting CEDOs should be widely s·tudied through personal interviews 
with CEDO management staff, users, government officers, etc., focusing 
on the cause-to-effect analysis _of specific policy issues rather than 
documenting company cases; and 
• Recommendations for upgrading CEDO capabilities, through the 
formulation of priorities regarding sectors and technical areas where 
CEDO capabilities should be upgraded and the development of policy 
measures and mechanisms to carry out such upgrading. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY Of A CONSULTING AND DESIGN ORGANIZATION 
IN ARGENTINA 
LUIS STUHLMAN, WITH COLLABORATION FROM 
BIBIANA DEL BRUTIO 
SUMMARY 
ABC is a medium-sized firm engaged in the engineering and construction of 
civil and industrial projects. It was founded in 1951 and worked on installation and 
construction activities for several years, after which it gradually created an 
engineering capacity, which today is relatively substantial. ABC now employs about 
600 permanent staff of whom 140 are engineers and other professionals; it also 
engages a fluctuating labour force engaged in construction and installation 
activities of some 1500 persons on average. 
ABC grew through successive assignments of increasing size and complexity 
for state and private clients, progressing from a small construction and installation 
firm to a complex organization, in a not too favourable environment and with no 
special help from government policy. Four stages can be identified: (1) during the 
1950s a succession of small and sometimes medium-sized jobs was done for 
electrical companies and industry; (2) in the 1960s there were diversification and 
growth. Projects were larger; clients were in a wider spectrum of branches, notably 
railways, telephone, gas, and electricity. The technical office, however, was small; 
the firm's business was not engineering design but project execution and local 
purchasing services. A deep crisis was weathered in the mid-1960s when public 
investment decreased substantially; (3) in the early 1970s, the rate of growth 
increased, and there was more diversification. The firm entered into industrial 
projects and started to do some process engineering when it won two bids for 
simple process plants (peripheral to existing plants). (4) In 1975 ABC joined other 
larger firms in an engineering consortium for a technologically complex sector. It 
then needed to build up a strong engineering capability, ahead of likely contracts 
(rather than line up technical help after getting a job, as tended to be the case 
earlier on). A sizable engineering department was rapidly formed, with 120 staff 
members (70 engineers) in 1976; the team that had been working on the two 
projects mentioned above constituted the basis for the new engineering depart-
ment. At the same time, the management cadre was expanded, several experi-
enced professionals being brought in, and the management style itself underwent 
a significant change: the shop became a true enterprise. Forward planning was 
introduced. A decision was made to hire 10 young professionals and train them for 
several years (although this has had to be postponed for the time being). Numerous 
proposals were drafted, and the firm entered a number of bids, primarily to gain 
experience (from its work and from the comparisons with competitors' offers) and 
also as a means of getting to be widely known. 
More recently, the firm experienced severe setbacks when several projects on 
which it counted, or which had been successfully bid, did not materialize for 
various reasons. At the same time, public investment has slackened, and the firm 
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has been facing a deteriorating situation at a moment when it has to support much 
higher fixed costs on account of the large, expensive engineering department. 
A number of interesting points may be mentioned: (1) the struggle to survive 
and grow may be seen from the variety of fields of the recent projects for which bids 
were successfully entered, to wit: (a) part of detailed engineering and construction 
of a large hydroelectric plant; (b) detailed engineering and construction of a 
petroleum refinery; (c) same for rail electrification; (d) same for telecommunica-
tions network; (e) same for copper rolling mill. All of these projects except the first 
one were to be done in collaboration with a foreign firm; (2) this wide variety -
covering a large spectrum of C&E activities, as well as many unrelated branches -
probably reflects the facts of life in ABC's environment in Argentina, where the 
largest client is the public sector, with large fluctuations in its demand; each branch 
is a relatively small market for C&E and construction services, and there is stiff 
competition from other CEDOs and contractors; (3) the main technical decisions 
are normally made by the client, which is usually a large public enterprise with a 
certain amount of C&E in-house capability. The outside engineering firm does not 
participate closely in the preinvestment stage but is brought in to engineer and 
implement the resulting decisions; it complements, but does not take the place of, 
the client's own C&E capacity. In fact, the client is bound to have a larger and more 
sophisticated capability than the local CEDO, which is really a constructor for 
which engineering is somewhat of an excuse to win a bid and obtain a contract. It is 
in construction that profits are made, not in engineering; and (4) like other 
engineer-contractors and consulting firms, ABC has almost no connections with 
the local science and technology system and does not carry out technical 
development work. Its access to technical information is through the technical 
literature, frequent trips overseas, participation in technical meetings, temporary 
association with foreign CEDOs, and very importantly the hiring of experienced 
professionals including university teachers. 
The history of engineering firms in developing countries is shorter 
than in the industrialized countries, extending for not more than 40-50 
years. In Argentina, there were a few sizable engineering firms before the 
1950s; these were engaged in public works construction, usually in a 
subordinate position to foreign firms. During the 1950s several events took 
place that helped the appearance of local CEDOs: 
• The availability of an important number of well-trained engineers; 
• The impetus given to infrastructure development plans: water 
resources development, railway improvement, ports, roads, etc., some-
times with the support of the World Bank; toward the end of the decade 
there was a large effort in petroleum exploitation, and large direct foreign 
investments were made in automobiles and other branches; 
• The increasing links with the international financial agencies, which 
led to the setting up of a planning mechanism that channeled outside 
financial resources; those agencies, at the same time, demanded 
technoeconomic studies to justify project feasibility-a requirement that 
boosted C&E services (IBRD 1974); and 
• The influence of U.S. consulting and engineering in the postwar 
years; C&E services were imported from that country, as well as an 
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organizational pattern for engineering firms (Perichitch 1978). This pattern 
affected Argentina in three ways: many foreign engineering firms came for 
an isolated project; a few installed themselves permanently, particularly in 
the early 1960s, originally bringing foreign personnel, who were gradually 
replaced by local people (this sometimes happened in response to a 
continuing demand by the public sector or foreign enterprises, which 
could be satisfied by cheaper local engineering personnel of good 
quality); and more importantly, local engineering firms developed, from 
different origins but tending to adopt the U.S. pattern of an engin_eering 
firm, an autonomous entity, separated from production, with differen-
tiated services of the staff type. 
During this period, groups of professionals who were not tied to 
production began to act as advisers in the solution of diverse problems. 
They used a set of techniques, some of them sophisticated (operational 
research, CPM, etc.) that could be applied to different fields for the 
improvement and modification of design. The organizational model -
groups of advisers acting autonomously - was transferred to Argentina 
and its new engineering firms. 
Toward the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s a number 
of local engineering firms came into being. Civil, electrical, and mechani-
cal engineers were the first to find a place in this type of activity, and these 
specializations are still more developed today than others. In the 1960s, 
with the military government's emphasis on planning and on infrastruc-
ture, other consulting areas grew, such as those devoted to economics 
(economic analysis and profitability estimates to evaluate projects and 
define investment priorities), sociology, and mathematics, with a tenden-
cy toward the integration of interdisciplinary groups. Some state organiza-
tions, such as those in charge of roads and hydroelectricity (Direcci6n de 
Vialidad and Agua y Energia Electrica respectively), accelerated the process 
through their increasing demand for C&E services, as did other state 
enterprises later when building their plants. 
In the 1970s, ups and downs in the country's economic and institu-
tional situation particularly affected engineering firms. One prime reason 
is the ways these firms came into being, what may be termed their mode of 
emergence (EM), which strongly influences development of a firm, the 
characteristics it acquires, and the policies that may promote its develop-
ment. The common modes of emergence are: 
• Branching off~ a large foreign firm making its services available to 
others, similar to the process taking place in multinational enterprises. 
• Differentiation and increasing complexity - the most frequent case 
being engineering firms in civil construction that took up process 
engineering, perhaps in two or three stages; this is related to another 
mode of emergence, differentiation and growth; 
• Organizational autonomization ~ engineering departments that 
become true engineering firms, using fresh opportunities of profiting 
from their accumulated experience and their infrastructure; sometimes 
this takes place in harmony with the mother firm, which keeps links with, 
and gives backing to, the more autonomous engineering department; in 
other cases some degree of conflict is involved in the process of gaining 
autonomy; 
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• Development, through necessity, of complementary services 
engineering firms originating from equipment makers, which to increase 
their output and sales need to give their customers a growing technical 
support and end up discovering they have a technical structure able to 
provide engineering services that are profitable per se in addition to 
increasing sales capability; 
• Segmentative - a branching off from process engineering firms 
taking place after process engineering consultancy has achieved a suffi-
cient degree of institutionalization (i.e., a group branches off from an 
engineering firm to form a new engineering firm); in Argentina there is 
only one case of this among the process engineering firms; 
u Organizational creation - several engineers deciding to create a 
process engineering firm; frequently the partners have spent a long time 
abroad and have acquired the necessary experience, which they then 
capitalize. 
A survey of engineering firms in Argentina (Suarez and Stuhlman 
1975), has shown the percentages offi rms that have emerged by branching 
off (11%), differentiation and increasing complexity (22%), differentiation 
with increasing complexity and growth (22%), organizational autonomiza-
tion (15%), complementation of services (5%), and organizational creation 
(25%). The most recent mode of emergence, organizational creation, 
accounts for one-fourth - a figure showing the increasing process of 
institutionalization of the type of activity. Although stable branching off 
represents only 11 % , other foreign engineering firms continuously appear 
in the market to bid for large contracts; though nowadays they must 
associate with a local firm. 
The process engineering firm that is the subject of this study, the ABC 
Company, may be classified within the mode of emergence "differentia-
tion with increasing complexity and growth," with the virtues as well as the 
limitations of this style. The firm complies with the criteria set forth in 
chapter 2: it serves the process industries and has been engaged in a 
medium-sized investment project. Unfortunately, we were unable to 
gather sufficient data to provide an analysis of the project. 
ABC was founded in 1951 (under a different name) by a group of 
engineers, as a limited liability company. The CEDO was initially created to 
take up diesel engine repairs, and later their installation, together with 
ancillary elements, in electric power plants. There were five partners 
originally; three of them have remained to this day and are the firm's 
owners. 
One of the original partners had been the president of a large state 
enterprise. Another, an electrical and mechanical engineer, had studied 
and worked in European countries and had some experience locally in 
planning, feasibility studies, and projects in electrical installations. A third 
partner was a civil and hydraulic engineer with some experience in the 
public service. A fourth partner had a degree in aeronautical engineering, 
had worked for the Transport Ministry, gathered experience through a stay 
in Europe, and had been technical manager of a firm engaged in 
mechanical work. 
Some important points in the firm's evolution were: 
o The first assignment was a high-tension transmission line, for which it 
had to subcontract another engineering firm to complement its 
capabilities. 
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• In 1957 the firm split into three, one of which became ABC. Atthattime 
there was a strong interest in expanding the field of action and consolidat-
ing the experience as contractors to the state. 
• In 1961 ABC became a corporation: "at that moment we understood 
that we also had to become an engineering company .... This needed our 
development in the electromechanical area: project design, procurement, 
installation, tests, start-up, sometimes even supervision and technical 
management, [we were] trying if possible to reach the turnkey stage." 
During this period the firm built a complete power plant, including 
high-tension lines, fuel deposits, buildings, installation of a 4550 kW 
group, cooling tower, etc. 
• The most important project in the early 1960s was a power plant for a 
large state enterprise, including the civil and the electromechanical 
components (two turbogroups of 10 000 kW each). 
• In the late 1960s, faced with a decline in public investment, ABC 
diversified. However, at the end of the decade an important assignment 
was undertaken for procurement services and installation of a 132 kV line, 
138 km long, with transformer substations. Laying this line was a complex 
task, which needed numerous special solutions that enriched considera-
bly the company's technical knowledge. During this period ABC also 
started to work on industrial projects. 
• An interesting milestone was a high-tension line in 1970. ABC 
prepared the projects for supply and installation, but because the towers 
were steel, ABC engineers were placed in the firm that manufactured 
them, so that this became an instance of local supplier development 
through the technical support of the engineering firm. 
• The first half of the 1970s showed an important quantitative and 
qualitative growth of the firm (Table 13). In spite of the ups and downs of 
the economy and the virtual freezing of public works in 1971, the first two 
large (for ABC) industrial projects took place: an asphalt blowing plant and 
a paraffin treating unit. 
• Another element characterizing ABC's growth and development in 
this period was its association with the large CEDOs that operated locally, 
which until then had formed a closed circle of three firms that shared the 
large projects among themselves. In 1973 ABC joined one of the large 
CEDOs in a bid for a high-tension line. In the second part of the decade 
ABC won, in association with one of the large firms, the high-tension line 
for a large hydroelectric project, and together with the same associate and 
another of the large firms, it won the bid for an important communications 
network. 
• A more important indicator of development was the inclusion of ABC 
as an associate in an engineering consortium for the engineering and 
installation of atomic power plants. This consortium is made up by the five 
largest construction and engineering firms in the country. ABC partici-
pates with 17% of the capital. 
When this study was made (late 1978), the CEDO was going through a 
critical stage of growth and consolidation of its structure. A new organiza-
tional structure and a different policy toward human resources would 
mean large expenses, particularly a very high payroll (U.S. $8 million a year 
for the engineering departments only), which the firm could not afford. 
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Table 14. ABC's role in 139 projects between 
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The firm's aim is "to be able to carry out all types of industrial 
projects," in the words of one of its directors. The goal of progressing from 
engine repair and electrical installation to the design and execution of 
large industrial projects has been met in part. The achievement is indicated 
by the projects in hand in late 1978: procurement services, installation, 
start-up, and commercial exploitation of seven mobile power stations; 
project design, construction, and commissioning of several high-tension 
transmission lines; auxiliary systems (lubrication oil, compressed air) for a 
large hydroelectric plant; signal system for a subway line; procurement 
services, installation, and start-up of several telecommunications centres; 
detailed engineering, complement of process engineering, procurement 
services, construction, installation, and start-up of a waste liquid treatment 
plant; installation of a pit furnace for the heating of special steel; assembly 
and installation of belt transport equipment; and electrical and mechanical 
installation for a foundry. 
Even though the CEDO now offers a wide range of services, it started 
as an installation firm, and its most important activity is still installation, 
although projects now offered include industrial plants in the petroleum 
and petrochemical sectors; industrial plants in other sectors; transmission 
lines, networks, power plants, substations; networks for the distribution 
of gas and water; railway networks; and civil works. The services supplied 
by ABC in each case have been engineering (usually detailed); construc-
tion and installation; procurement; start-up; prefeasibility; maintenance 
and repairs. 
The firm states it can study, design, plan, supervise, and execute any 
type of industrial project. Its involvement goes from the project's 
feasibility study to turnkey delivery, including all the intermediate stages 
such as project design, procurement, installation and assembly, tests 
according to national and international standards, and training of 
specialized personnel. 
ROLE OF THE FIRM 
The ABC company carried out 139 projects since its inception. In all of 
them the firm was in charge of construction and installation (Table 14-17). 
Most projects (43%) were carried out during 1974-78, ABC gaining 
prestige in the internal market since 1970. 
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Table 15. Type of project according to ABC's role. 
Role of ABC (% control) 
Procure- Mainte-
Project ment lnstal- Super- Start- nance, 
Type of project design services lation vision up Study repairs 
High-tension 
networks 60 65 100 13 12 33 
Petroleum/ 
petrochemicals 75 65 100 30 40 25 
Industrial plants 50 15 100 62 58 27 
Railway system 50 25 100 50 50 
Civil works 43 14 100 43 
Communications 100 33 100 66 
Gas networks 66 100 6 
Other 40 20 100 20 20 
Table 16. Proportions (% of total projects) represented by different types by 
period. 
Electric Petroleum, Industrial Gas Civil 
Period projects petrochemicals plants networks works Other 
1954-58 41 16 43 
1959-63 86 14 
1964-68 66 6 13 15 
1969-73 65 11 14 9 1 
1974-78 36 10 17 22 12 3 
Table 17. Value (% of total value for each type) of project, by period. a 
Electric Petroleum, Industrial Gas Civil 
Period projects petrochemicals plants networks works Other 
1954-58 1.4 2.3 3.2 
1959-63 4.7 3.2 
1964-68 5.5 1.1 4.7 15.6 
1969-73 28.4 15.5 12.3 7.5 5.5 
1974-78 60.0 79.0 86.6 89.3 95.3 78.9 
aBefore calculation of percentages, the value of projects was converted to U.S. dollars at 
the mid-period rate of exchange. 
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In the first period, 1954-58, the firm supplied procurement services in 
most projects, but only in half of them did it carry out the engineering 
project design. In the following stage (1959-63), the firm provided a 
greater proportion of supervision services. In the last period, there has 
been an increase in the proportions of project engineering and start-up, 
botb of which are technologically complex; a significant proportion of 
projects have included preliminary studies (consulting). 
Increasingly since 1970, ABC has provided all services for its projects. 
The principal source of income has been electrical projects, and this focus 
has been a reflection of market demand, especially by the state. Du ring the 
last few years ABC has become more involved in industrial projects and 
less so in petroleum, petrochemical projects and electric and gas net-
works. 
POLICIES OF THE FIRM 
HUMAN RESOURCES 
A survey of ABC's professional staff showed that in 1975 58% were 
between 30 and 39 years old (2% under 30, 21%40-49 years, and 19% over 
50); professionals included civil engineers, builders, and architects (37%); 
electrical and mechanical engineers (electromechanical 16%, electrical 
5%, and mechanical 25%); and other engineering specializations (17%). 
Formal training after graduation was low: 53% had not taken any courses 
and 41 % had taken postgraduate courses. 60% had worked previously in 
local private firms, 42% in foreign-owned private enterprises, and only24% 
in public administration; 48% had worked in engineering firms, 18% in 
foreign-owned engineering firms; 44% had worked in engineering 
departments. At the time of the survey, 35% had teaching activities. 
Although the human resources were substantial, as ABC continued to 
grow and have prospects of more complex and larger assignments, it 
required higher technical and management skills. Thus, in 1977, it drafted 
an ambitious plan for managing and training its human resources. 
Two aspects of this plan are of special interest. First, developing 
human resources meant modifying the firm's management structure. 
Thus, in early 1978, the firm recruited a general projects manager and two 
projects managers (who came from firms operating in the local engineer-
ing and installation market), a supplies manager (from another CEDO), an 
engineering manager (an Argentine previously working as engineering 
manager of a Brazilian CEDO several times larger than ABC), and six other 
professionals (previously in responsible positions in Brazil). In this way, 
ABC obtained a very good management team, through high remunera-
tions and improved its image in the market as a growing and developing 
company. Second, a large sum was allocated for a special recruitment and 
development program to search for and train a group of 10 engineers, of 
high promise. The 5-year program called for training overseas, in CEDOs, 
industrial enterprises, R&D institutions, etc., and would produce a 
technological reserve for ABC. Although the program has been delayed on 
account of the current economic difficulties of the firm, it has not been 
abandoned, and high hopes are attached to it. 
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In 1978, the firm's total personnel, including manual workers, num-
bered in the thousands, 585 being permanent salaried personnel (Table 
18). 
RELATIONS WITH USERS 
Suarez and Stuhlman (1975) commented on process engineering firms 
and the forms of association among these firms as a basic commercial 
strategy. They found that firms of similar size and prestige seldom compete 
with one another to provide services locally, although they may compete 
for foreign markets. The exceptions are medium-sized firms, which 
sometimes form associations but frequently maintain competitive rela-
tions. 
The large firms, which have adequate marketing strategies, share 
risks. The size of their staffs means high fixed costs, which they balance by 
sharing the work load among themselves. Hence, in a not too covert 
manner, they decide which one of them will take up a certain job, basing 
the decision on available personnel, relative regional advantages, etc. This 
strategy allows them to control the market of large jobs that demand a 
good track record and experience that only these firms have. The lack of 
competition is clearly perceived by small and medium firms, which 
complain: "This is an unpredictable market for us but not for the large 
installation firms, which always associate among themselves. There is no 
legislation protecting us against this." 
Medium-sized firms, reflecting a traditional tendency of small and 
medium enterprises toward isolation, do not generally adopt a strategy of 
cooperation; they compete for projects that, on account of their volume, 
are of no interest to the large firms. They have only occasionally entered 
into association. 
The strategies of small firms are more varied. They scarcely compete 
among themselves, or with others, but the forms of cooperation that they 
use or propose are diverse. One frequent practice is to carry out specific 
Table 18. ABC's permanent salaried staff in 1978. 
Other Non-
Office Engineers professionals professionals 
General manager 1 
Finances 2 42 
Administration 3 29 
Human resources 1 21 
Advisory (legal, audit, 
taxes, control, costs) 2 3 11 
Sales 4 5 
Commercial 1 3 
Contracts 2 1 3 
Technical 1 1 
Construction 36 5 91 
Industrial works 31 1 80 
Procurement 2 2 62 
Engineering 36 9 93 
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chemical engineering tasks for local large and medium firms. In other 
cases they prefer to associate with other small firms, usually: 
• To complement services and help each other in surviving; the modest 
aim is not to disappear from the market; and 
• To associate with foreign firms to learn the trade and increase the 
possibilities of winning bids; if an association is formed, the firm usually 
shares its work with other small firms. 
ABC has established links with foreign firms for certain jobs - at first, 
with English, French, and U.S. firms, for electrical and installation works. It 
has preferred occasional associations because more permanent arrange-
ments, according to an ABC official, are: "not convenient in Argentina, 
since currently the process is chosen by the client, not the engineering 
firm." ABC has favoured occasional associations, both with foreign 
suppliers of equipment and with local engineering and installation firms, 
to lower risks and even out the work load. For example, in 1971, it joined 
SULZER (Switzerland) for the engineering, construction, and installation of 
a compressed air plant for a large state enterprise, SULZER manufacturing 
the equipment locally; in 1972, it formed ties with a large local firm for a 
220-kV line; in 1975, with a large local firm for a 33-kV line and the start-up 
of imported equipment for the railways; and in 1977, with a French firm 
that supplied rail equipment. 
The preferred commercial strategy is association rather than direct 
competition, which was possible only when ABC reached a level where it 
could compete with other large local firms. The firm has its own financial 
resources, through a financial company it owns; in large jobs it associates 
with banking groups that organize the financial package, which is then 
submitted to the client. In most cases, the contract with the user is through 
bids, as the user is usually in the public sector (Table 19). 
Regarding foreign users, ABC has adopted an interesting commercial 
and technical approach. The fluctuating government policy on nontradi-
tional exports has brought about insecurity and difficulties in the export of 
engineering services. However, ABC has systematically submitted bids on 
international projects, even though the chances for winning the contract 
were slim. This was done for two reasons: to gather experience on 
adapting to the rhythm, deadlines, and quality of presentation required by 
international practice; and to be able to examine the proposals presented 
by foreign firms. 



























RELATION WITH TECHNOLOGY 
ACEDO, as any other organization, requires technological inputs to 
transform them into services. Although the technological management of 
a CEDO appears to be restricted to the least complex aspects of 
engineering technology, because of the nature of relations proposed by 
the user, who chooses the technology to be employed, there has been a 
good deal of technical progress on the part of ABC. Since the early days of 
electromechanical installations, the firm has evolved considerably. Today 
it is participating in nuclear power plants, having progressed from a small 
project office to a Department of Engineering. Though the firm does not 
have a central technical file, depending rather on personal files, it is 
studying the convenience (already perceived) of having a central file with 
up-to-date technical information. 
To the extent that a wider role is expected in the future, the firm 
wishes to develop its links with the technology-producing system, which 
would allow it to produce basic engineering. This aspect, however, is more 
declarative than real in Argentina (with perhaps only one exception, 
TECNOR), because this is not the heart of the business. In any case, ABC 
has generated one stable link of this type. An agreement has been signed 
with an Italian firm for projects in petroleum, petrochemicals, cement, and 
pharmaceuticals; bids would be presented jointly, the foreign firm 
supplying technology of its own and basic engineering, and ABC supplying 
detailed engineering, construction, procurement services, installation, 
and start-up. In this way, a new role has o,pened up - that of offering 
turnkey p'lants, instead of receiving orders somewhat passively. 
RELATION WITH THE LOCAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM 
"Engineering firms emerging through branching-off, or by increasing 
complexity and growth, have no awareness of the local S& T system, and 
only get to the point of perceiving university centres, which they regard as 
academic and not too useful," according to Suarez and Stuhlman (1975). 
The position of ABC should be seen within this frame. Its perception of the 
local system is as stated by Suarez and Stuhlman (1975): "We have no links 
because the system is too isolated. It would be interesting to get 
connected, but truly this would not be too useful for us, save perhaps with 
the Atomic Energy Commission." 
FORMS OF ACCESS TO TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
The most usual ways rn which engineering firms keep up-to-date 
technically are reviews, 69%; trips abroad, 46%; head office, 16%; 
congresses, 16%; courses, 16%; and university teaching, 16% (Suarez and 
Stuhlman 1975). ABC employs several of these resources. It has subscrip-
tions to about 15 international reviews. Frequently, staff travel to the U.S., 
Europe, and Japan. Some information comes from meetings of the 
Argentine Petrochemical Institute (where at the same time commercial 
contacts are made). But probably the most important method for updating 
is the recruitment of university teachers (who account for one-third of the 
professionals) as well as the later identification of new human resources 
(outstanding students). 
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EXPORT OF SERVICES 
ABC has tried to export its services, particularly in high-tension lines 
and telecommunications systems. The company has entered several bids 
in recent years, in Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador, but has not 
won any of them. 
HANDLING OF THE CONTEXT 
The state influence on ABC is decisive because it is almost the sole 
client. The firm tries to influence investment policy, legislation on price 
adjustment, and other regulatory aspects, so that they become favourable. 
CEDOs of relatively large size, like ABC, join forces in the Argentine 
Chamber of Construction, whereas the small CEDOs do so in the 
Argentine Chamber of Consultants. 
An institutional publicity campaign was started in 1976, through a 
prestigious and sophisticated agency. Advertisements are regularly pub-
lished showing ABC's achievements. Sponsorship was given to the junior 
Chamber for its prize to the Ten Outstanding Young Persons in 1977. 
ACHIEVEMENTS 
ORGANIZATION OF WORK 
The CEDO has a general organization for the enterprise and a different 
one for its Engineering Department (since 1978). This department has 
begun to be structured in matrix form, like the large U.S. CEDOs, with task 
forces whenever necessary (in general, however, task forces are avoided 
because they are considered to be expensive; they are employed only as a 
last resource). 
The CEDO has had internal problems (not with its users) on account of 
the quality of its detailed engineering, the persons in charge of construc-
tion being forced to solve too many questions on the spot (it must be 
remembered that ABC started as a construction and not as an engineering 
firm). The problem (says the firm) is faced by all CEDOs that carry out both 
construction and engineering. To overcome it, the firm made an interest-
ing innovation. As was explained by one of the Engineering Department 
managers, "usually the man designing the project does not know whether 
the man in the building site has trucks or tractors, or how much manpower 
is available with what skills. You cannot expect the man at the drawing 
board to have familiarity with construction activity. A solution we have 
employed is to bring people from the building site to design the projects. 
But this is no good; they are men with their own tricks, and very empirical. 
The solution is coparticipation. This is the experience we are getting, with 
excellent results. Those from the construction side of the firm come and 
work with us when the project is about 30-40% advanced, and then, when 
the project is to be built, they know it well. Also, groups of engineers install 
themselves permanently at the construction site. We have obtained in this 
way more rapid communication, technological improvements, and a 
reduction in costs." 
Daily work routines are based on the circulation of documents that 
must be checked and signed by those ~esponsible for the different 
specializations. The firm has a library in the Engineering Department, and 
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data processing facilities for technical calculations, material specifications, 
and project planning and control. The programing of tasks is done both by 
manual PERT and by computer processes. 
The normal routine of work, once a contract has been signed, is: 
• One person is given global responsibility for the contract; 
• Another person is assigned to be responsible for the project, and also 
a planner, to estimate total engineering hours, according to the number of 
documents to be prepared; 
• Personnel requirements are estimated; a team is outlined; times for 
the different tasks are estimated; and the first provisional GANTI chart is 
prepared; 
• The task is divided into what will be supplied by the user, the CEDO, 
and outsiders; 
• Each document that is prepared goes to the filing section, which is 
responsible for its handling; 
• At a certain moment the procedure starts to be handled by Supplies, 
which gives the data from Engineering to the vendor and from the vendor 
to Engineering; 
• The set of documents is sent to the user for approval; 
• When the documents are returned, modifications are incorporated or 
discussed; documents then go to the checkers (specialists in each task) for 
quality control; and 
• Once approved, documents go to the building site. 
THE SUCCESS OF ABC 
The great success of the CEDO is eminently economic and is shown by 
the enormous growth of sales in the 25 years since its foundation. This, 
according to the firm's managers, is due to a very dynamic handling of the 
enterprise, good commercial contacts, good economic decisions at the 
right moment, and a continuous improvement in the technical level. 
In terms of impact on the context, rather than of enterprise growth, 
the firm has had some influence on the development of equipment 
suppliers and has repatriated an important group of Argentine profession-
als that had emigrated for lack of opportunities. But, at least up to the 
present, ABC has not had a significant impact on autonomous technologi-
cal development. This is probably due more to the nature and modalities of 
the Argentine environment than to the vocation of the CEDO itself. 
Indeed, in Argentina the large users have their own engineering capability, 
which is employed as internal consultancy for investment projects, and 
can then purchase technology and basic engineering abroad, allowing the 
CEDO only the role of builder and installer. 
Thanks are due the officers of ABC company for their collaboration during the 
case study and Dr Francisco Suarez for his advice. 
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REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL CASE STUDIES 
ALBERTO ARAOZ 
The four national case studies carried out in Korea, Brazil, the 
Philippines, and Argentina describe the characteristics and evolution of a 
CEDO and analyze how it has performed in an investment project. This 
chapter reviews and compares these national experiences (Table 20) and 
derives some conclusions from the exercise, pointing to further research 
activities on the subject. 
The characteristics of the four CEDOs differ substantially. Three are 
nationally owned and in the private sector; the Korean example (K) is a 
joint venture with a foreign CEDO, in which originally the local partner was 
the state. Three are medium to large organizations, ranging from 500 to 
1200 persons; one, the Philippines CEDO (P), is small (30 persons). The 
Argentine example (A) is a builder-contractor, only recently counting 
engineering as an important activity, and the CEDO in Brazil (B) owns and 
runs a production plant. Perhaps the only mature one is B, which has 
mastered the technology of some processes and is able to undertake for 
them the complete range of C&E services, including basic engineering. 
The other CEDOs offer preinvestment, detailed engineering, and project 
execution services. 
Band P have specialized in one market, whereas A and K serve diverse 
markets. The state is the most important client for all except P, which 
practically works for one private client, a petroleum refinery. Only K has a 
stable relationship with a foreign CEDO, but the others carry out projects 
in collaboration. B has been able to diminish its use of foreign CEDOs as its 
own know-how and expertise have increased. 
K was explicitly founded by the state, whereas the others were 
founded by a few professionals. The founding partners of B and P were 
highly experienced. Three were founded around 1970, and, although A 
was founded in 1952, it took up engineering as an important activity only in 
the early1970s. The original know-how was that of the founding partners in 
B, P, and A (not too high in this case), whereas in Kit was brought in by the 
foreign associate. 
Only B originally set out an explicit strategy for its evolution: to master 
the technology of the phosphoric-fertilizers complex through the se-
quence sulfuric acid-phosphate fertilize,rs-phosphoric acid (the goal 
now largely accomplished); and to work on petroleum refining (this goal 
being discontinued when the principal client created its own engineering 
division). K had a general idea of acquiring experience in a number of 
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How it originated 
Original sources of 
know-how 
Strategy envisaged by 
founders (fields and 
activities) 
Evolution 
Evolution of markets 





Private CEDO; staff 500 (1978) 
Joint venture with Toyo Eng. Co. 
(Japan) 
Preinvestment studies, detailed 
engineering, project services 
Diverse; civil and industrial projects, 
for private and state clients; some 
exports 
Stable relationship with partner, Toyo 
Engineering Co. 
Founded 1970 as joint venture of 
Korean government and Lummus Co. 
(U.S.) 
Principally the know-how and 
expertise of the foreign partner, first 
Lummus, then Toyo 
To work as a multipurpose CEDO in 
various fields 
Served first state, later private sector; 
diversified its services, became 
multipurpose; some exports; big role 
expected now that firm is wholly in 
private sector 
Could get few qualified professionals; 
had to recruit from chemical plants 
and to hire fresh graduates who had to 
be trained in design skills 
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Table 20. Comparison 
Brazil 
Private CEDO; controls, operates a 
sulfuric acid plant; C&E staff 1200 
(1977) 
Fully national 
Complete range of C&E services, 
including basic engineering, for 
sulfuric acid and phosphate fertilizers 
Sulfuric acid, phosphate fertilizers, 
phosphoric acid, Cl-Na; state almost 
only client 
Diminishing use of foreign CEDOs as 
own know-how and experience grows 
Founded 1967 by a group of 
professionals from the state petroleum 
company, PETROBRAS 
Know-how, expertise of partners 
(considerable); know-how licence for 
sulfuric acid with a U.S. firm, with 
full-disclosure clause 
To master technology of phosphate 
fertilizer complex, through sequence 
sulfuric acid-phosphate 
fertilizers-phosphoric acid; to work 
in petroleum refining (this failed) 
Period 1: rapid growth of market; 
many small projects, peripheral 
installations; most important market is 
detailed engineering for state sulfuric 
acid plants; period 2 (1972-75): sales 
multiply by five, larger contracts, start 
with phosphoric acid; period 3: fewer, 
larger projects, wider front as 
phosphate fertilizer and chlorine are 
started 
Rapid incorporation of manpower 
(origin not specified); policy to train 
well and to retain professionals, 
leading to heavy investment in human 
resources 
- CEDO case studies. 
Philippines 
Private CEDO; engineering staff 30 
(1978) 
Fully national 
Detailed engineering, project services 
One main client, Caltex (petroleum 
refining), and occasionally other 
clients 
Projects usually employ fo1 eign basic 
engineering; no stable relation with 
foreign CEDOs 
Founded 1970 by two retired Caltex 
engineers 
Knowledge, expertise of partners 
considerable 
To work principally for Caltex in areas 
well-known to the partners 
Firm has always worked for the same 
client, Caltex, except on two 
occasions, and on the same type of 
project, even to this day 
Hire young graduates, train them; 
high turnover; regular use of 
experienced consultants for certain 
tasks 
Argentina 
Private contractor with CEDO 
capabilities; staff 600 plus about 1500 
construction personnel (1978) 
Fully national 
Preinvestment studies, detailed 
engineering, project services, project 
construction 
Very diverse; civil, infrastructure, 
industrial projects; state is most 
important client 
Most recent projects are in 
collaboration with foreign CEDOs 
Founded 1951 by five partners, three 
of them with experience in 
electromechanical installations 
Knowledge, expertise of partners 
No definite long-run strategy except to 
make use of opportunities, adapting to 
a context that changes its nature every 
few years 
Firm took different jobs in 
construction, installation, in diverse 
markets; engineering was a separate 
activity started much later; many 
different types of projects were 
prepared (detailed engineering), 
wishes to look for opportunities in a 
not too stable context 
On forming engineering dept. in 1975, 
quickly acquired personnel, 
apparently from market; hired group 
of experienced managers; formulated 










on demand side 
(contracts, 
responsibility) 
Govt. support on 
supply side 
(finance,incentives) 





Apparently much learning on the job 
from partner, foreign associates; 
much progress b.ut not able yet to 
carry out basic engineering stage 
Close, stable relationship with partner, 
Toyo Eng. Co. (details not specified) 
Government demand very important, 
particularly during the first few years 
Government created the CEDO, 
enacted legislation in 1968 favouring 
local C&E 
Difficulty in hiring trained 
professionals; hesitation of investors 
to employ local CEDO 
Good success in work; one of the few 
Korean CEDOs able to provide 
"authentic engineering services" 
EVOt.UT/ON 
Brazil 
Clear long-run strategy: choose areas 
where technology may be mastered, 
go from simple to complex; main 
instruments: full-disclosure clauses, 
get to be prime contractor, have own 
dept. for study and research, own 
sulfuric acid plant, much trained staff; 
support from clients' confidence; high 
profits reinvested in learning; reached 
basic engineering stage 
Look for full disclosure; have 
aggressive policy to learn as much as 
possible and to achieve higher 
responsibility in. projects, if possible as 
prime contractor 
Key role by granting contracts, 
allocating increasing responsibility, 
backing negotiations with foreign 
CEDOs; weak support in early years 
probably retarded technical progress 
of firm 
Seems to have been significant in 
SULFAB investment and apparently 
also in other cases 
Risk aversion by state clients at early 
stage 
Good management; good market 
strategy; good strategies, procedures 
for learning 
A and K became multipurpose'CEDOs, working in a variety of markets 
and in the case of K exporting services. Thevariety is particularly striking in 
the case of A, showing the wish to profit from opportunities. Excepting P, 
which has shown almost no significant changes' the firms have progressed 
in the range of services rendered, and the projects undertaken have 
become larger and more complex. B has moved cautiously, mastering the 
technology and the whole·project cycle in one area before moving on to 
another; it has been helped in tnis by the relatively large, fast-growing 
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Philippines 
No explicit policy beyond using 
know-how of partners and 
consultants; learning on the job 
No links with foreign CEDOs 
Government plays no role: not a client 
No role is played by the government 
Expansion is difficult because of risk 
aversion, lack of senior professionals, 
difficulty in recruiting and retaining 
human resources 
Careful to do high-quality work 
Argentina 
In contracting stage, on-the-job 
learn_ing; later, technology acquired 
through hiring experienced 
professionals and through the 
preparation of a number of proposals 
(in cooperation with foreign CEDOs in 
many cases) and also on the job; 
learning not concentrated in one or 
two major fields; still far from 
reaching basic engineering stage 
On projects employing foreign 
know-how (little information on this) 
Firm prospers when government 
demand increases; strong 
fluctuations, no policies to even them 
out 
Not indicated 
Fluctuations in government work; no 
explicit promotion policy for CEDOs 
on the part of government 
Good eye for opportunities; firm now 
interested in progressing 
technologically, in diversifying, and in 
linking up with foreign CEDOs to 
supply turnkey plants 
Brazilian economy, which has assured a sufficient volume of work in new 
plant C&E. 
All firms heavily recruited young graduates and found it necessary to 
put much effort into training them, particularly in engineering design 
skills. A prepared a 2-year training program for young professionals, which 
has been postponed until business again picks up. K has hired profession-
als from industry, and A has recruited several experienced managers for its 
expansion into engineering activities. P regularly uses experienced con-
sultants (usually retired people) for certain tasks; it is not clear whether the 
other firms, which are larger, find it necessary to do likewise. 
125 
B is notable for its clear long-term objectives and for the strategies it 
adopted. It chose areas where technology mastery could be achieved; it 
went from the simple to the more complex; it obtained full-disclosure 
clauses in contracts with foreign CEDOs; it got to be the prime contractor; 
it devoted abundant resources to the training of personnel; it created its 
own Department of Industrial Processes, for study and research; and it 
became the controlling shareholder in a sulfuric-acid plant, which it now 
operates, using the plant not only for production but for experimental and 
demonstration purposes and retaining part of the profits for research and 
experimental work. It was strongly supported by the confidence placed in 
it by its clients and financial institutions and by substantial profits in its 
operations, which it has largely reinvested in training, research, and 
learning. As a consequence, it has reached the stage of basic engineering 
in sulfuric acid and in phosphate fertilizers. New goals are now to reach 
this stage in phosphoric acid and in the chlorine-soda complex, the latter 
as a prelude to going into pulp. 
A acquired its engineering skills by recruiting experienced profes-
. sionals and managers, and much of the expertise was acquired on the job. 
P has drawn on expertise of partners and consultants but has not devoted 
special efforts to technology acquisition. K has apparently learned from its 
foreign associate, as well as from its own experience. 
Whereas K has a stable relationship with its foreign associate, and P 
seems to have no links with foreign CEDOs, A and B associate with foreign 
CEDOs through project work. B carries out an aggressive policy to learn as 
much as possible from the foreign CEDOs with which it works. It looks for 
full disclosure and aims at sharing the major decisions and in fact at having 
full responsibility by becoming the prime contractor. 
With the exception of P, demand from public-sector investments has 
been crucial. A has prospered when this has been high; but there have 
been strong fluctuations, and no countercyclical government policy has 
existed for its benefit or that of other CEDOs. For K, government demand 
has become less important in recent years as private demand has 
increased. 
In B, public-sector investors have played a key role by granting 
contracts, allocating increasing responsibilities, and backing up the firm's 
negotiations with foreign CEDOs. Such support was not fully given at first, 
and this hesitation somewhat retarded the firm's technological develop-
ment. Confidence placed in B seems to have played a crucial role in 
enabling it to participate as an investor in the SULFAB project and to take 
up the turnkey operation. Such confidence has been important in the rest 
of its assignments in recent years. How to create credibility and confidence 
in prospective clients remains a most important question. 
No indication of government support on the supply side has been 
given in A. In K, this support has been very important, first through the act 
of creating the firm by decision of the government and with its financial 
participation, and second through the 1968 legislation favouring local C&E. 
In P, the government seems to have played no role at all. In B, assistance of 
government financial agencies has been sizable, particularly in relation to 
the SULFAB project. 
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The following would appear to be the most important problems faced 
by the firms during development: 
• Risk aversion of clients, which limits the market and limits the scope of 
responsibilities assigned to the CEDO (mentioned by B, P, and K); 
• Fluctuations in government investments and hence in demand for 
C&E services (A); 
• No explicit government policy that in practice favours local C&E; 
• Difficulty in recruiting and training capable professionals (P, K); and 
• Lack of senior professionals (P). 
The CEDOs studied have all been successful and have shown good 
management characteristics, although the management style has varied 
according to the circumstances: A needed adaptability and a good eye for 
opportunities, whereas P with its sole client could principally concentrate 
on doing a good technical job. B is notable for its well-thought-out 
strategies regarding markets and technological learning. 
PERFORMANCE IN INVESTMENT PROJECTS 
An important question is how far the CEDOs have improved the way 
investment projects have been carried out, by increasing their social 
efficiency. There are indications that each one has improved social 
efficiency to a certain extent, although it is difficult to appraise the results 
from a mere reading of the studies. 
B carried ·out the SULFAB project totally by itself, as a turnkey job, 
including the basic engineering. The technical performance was good; the 
work was finished on time and practically within the budget (other 
investments at that time in Brazil's petrochemical sector had large cost 
overruns), and the plant has performed well in operation. Purchases from 
local industry were not higher than in other cases - about 27% - so there 
does not seem to have been an extra impact here. However, one may point 
to other benefits such as the impact on the firm's technical progress during 
the investment work itself and during the operational phase afterward. 
Two investment projects in which K participated were studied. In the 
first one, a styrene monomer plant, preinvestment work was done by the 
client; a foreign CEDO (in fact, K's associate) had responsibility for the 
basic engineering for some ancillary facilities. The government, which was 
the majority owner of the project, pressed for local purchasing, and, 
thanks to this effort, the share of local supplies was increased notably; K 
surveyed and recommended local suppliers whom it helped to comply 
with the requirements. These activities undoubtedly had a favourable 
impact on social efficiency. However, finance was a problem; financing 
and loans took priority over technical matters, and alternative technologi-
cal choices had to be made according to the financial possibilities. K's 
technical performance was considered satisfactory. The second invest-
ment project was an ABS resin plant, and K was in charge of most stages of 
the project except basic engineering. Great efforts were made to increase 
the local component, and there were no obstacles on the financial side 
because the project was being self-financed by the client. Once again, 
technical performance was good. For comparison purposes, a turnkey 
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project with a foreign CEDO was briefly analyzed. It was a large fertilizer 
plant, and the engineering fee was also very large; some of it went to local 
CEDOs that were subcontractors. The local supply of components was 
considered to be lower than if local CEDOs had had a more important 
participation. 
The case study from the Philippines is no doubt the most carefully 
documented as regards the analysis of an investment project. The 
preinvestment work was done by the local project owner with his own 
staff. The technology chosen was a process that was more adapted to local 
conditions and had a higher employment potential than more modern 
processes would have had. It was decided to undertake the project's 
engineering and execution principally with in-house capacity. This meant 
later that a possibility of financing by I FC had to be foregone. The owner's 
Planning and Projects Department prepared the basic engineering project 
and took up project management responsibilities. Detailed engineering 
was subcontracted to a local CEDO - the one studied - and the 
supervision of construction was given to a French firm by request of a 
financial source from that country (learning opportunities here were used 
well). Local procurement was maximized. There were problems with 
government programing that required changes in the project, but appar-
ently this project has been successfully carried out. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The CEDOs under study show quite different characteristics (Table 
20), which to a certain extent reflect the diversity of national situations. 
Although their development has been highly idiosyncratic, it is clear that 
they share certain problems and face them in not too dissimilar ways. Such 
behaviour is roughly in line with what is expected on the basis of empirical 
and conceptual analysis, as reviewed in chapter 1 and would tend to show 
that regularities exist, so that comparative research on these topics may be 
significant and useful. Even though these CEDOs are all independent 
organizations, a study of their experience may shed some light on captive 
CEDOs, particularly regarding the acquisition of human resources and 
technology. 
The four CEDOs have been successful (one of them very much so) as 
judged by their growth and by the results of their project work; thus, one 
cannot learn much from them about unsuccessful CEDOs. What can be 
gleaned, however, from some of the national situations is that very few 
CEDOs are able to prosper and mature from a much larger field of 
candidates: markets for C&E services in developing countries - at least, 
markets for domestically produced services - are not large. This means 
that diversification may be needed if a high and stable income is to be 
achieved. This we find in three of the four CEDOs reviewed. 
An interesting feature comes out clearly. Large public and private 
enterprises frequently use their own in-house C&E capabilities to carry out 
a substantial part of the preinvestment work for their investment projects, 
down to the choice and negotiation of technology and the purchase of 
basic engineering. Outside C&E services are contracted to provide some 
inputs for those tasks and later on to carry out detailed engineering and 
other project services. One or more CEDOs may be involved, including 
foreign CEDOs. To understand the present role and future prospects of 
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local C&E capabilities, one would have to learn about the usual practices of 
the major investors regarding the contracting of C&E services. This may 
need (as suggested by the Korean team) a longitudinal study in production 
branches. 
The case studies have also supplied evidence of the positive role of 
domestic CEDOs when they are given the opportunity to disaggregate 
investment projects and engage local inputs. The tendency to do so seems 
to be present in all of the CEDOs reviewed, but it needs an enlightened 
project owner and the backing of authorities and local financial institutions 
if it is to be brought to fruition. 
The important role of the state regarding CEDO development and 
performance, both as a client and as a direct supporter of CEDOs, is 
abundantly confirmed by the case studies. When state support has not 
been forthcoming, the result has been a long struggle in which the CEDO 
is forced to engage in whatever endeavour it can; like the luckless 
Spaniard in Manrique's famous poem, "Coplas," "con oficios non debidos 
se mantiene" (with unwonted trades surviving). 
Finally, the case studies have largely fulfilled their primary purpose of 
helping to produce an understanding of the problems in developing and 
using C&E capabilities in developing countries, to indicate the research-
ability of the subject, and in general to contribute to a better formulation of 
an international collaborative project. The researchers who undertook the 
case studies were unanimous in their appreciation of the importance of the 
subject and, through their largely successful efforts, showed that it is 
possible to get access to the sort of information needed for a fruitful 
analysis of the subject. They identified important issues, recommended 
methods and approaches, and made concrete suggestions for further 
research, which they felt should be of an action-oriented nature. These 
contributions and those of the participants in the St. Jovite seminar are 
taken up in the next chapter, which deals with future research on CEDOs. 
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CHAPTER 8 
FURTHER RESEARCH ON CONSULTING AND ENGINEERING 
ALBERTO ARAOZ 
The case studies and other documents were examined at a review 
meeting that took place in St. Jovite, Quebec, Canada, in October 1979, 
with the participation of a group of professionals with great experience on 
the subject. In the very rich and imaginative debate that took place, the 
participants raised a number of interesting points that complement those 
included in the papers reviewed at the meeting. It seems valuable to 
review them, briefly. 
THE ROLE AND ACTIVITIES OF A CEDO 
Consulting and engineering design have recently become a separate 
economic activity that is concerned with the management and utilization 
of certain kinds of information. More needs to be learned about the 
economic role of this activity, on account of its importance for develop-
ment and the achievement of technological self-reliance.32 
One important aspect of this role is what may be called disaggregation 
of the package of risk. A large project, when taken as a whole, may appear 
to be too risky for local handling, but a local CEDO may disaggregate it into 
smaller parts, many of which can be handled locally without undue risk 
(like structure, electricity, steam, and other peripheral processes), leaving 
the core aspects to be managed by a foreign CEDO or supplier. 
Regarding the role of a CEDO in linking productive units with the S& T 
system, participants remarked that a CEDO normally works with state-of-
the-arttechnology; if a locally developed technology is to be introduced in 
an investment project, the risks must be assumed to a large extent by the 
project owner. 
The success of a CEDO from a social point of view may be expressed by 
quantitative indicators such as: 
• Technological self-reliance ratio (TSR) =Total cost of local inputs in a 
project/Total cost of the project; 
32 Alternative definitions were offered for this concept: capability to select 
technology appropriate to the country; capability to select and perform basic 
engineering and to develop basic know-how within the country where projects are 
based; capability to design and engineer projects that utilize locally available 
resources of personnel, finance, and equipment and that promote their develop-
ment when not there; capability to increase proportion of local-to-foreign inputs in 
the implementation of investment projects. 
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• Coefficient of use of local services and equipment (CE) == (Cost of 
locally provided C&E + surveys + equipment)/Total cost of the project; 
• Coefficient of use of local technology (CRo) = Cost of projects based 
on local technology/Total cost of all projects; and 
• Coefficient of use of local basic engineering (C8 E) = Cost of basic 
engineering performed by local CEDOs/Total cost of basic engineering in 
the project. 
These indicators may be expected to increase with successful expansion 
and use of local C&E capabilities. 
CEDO DEVELOPMENT 
It was suggested that political stability is a necessary condition for the 
development of C&E capabilities to a mature stage. In the development of 
a CEDO, the efforts of the owners and staff combined with favourable 
market conditions and some general support by the state may allow the 
CEDO to reach a certain point. To go beyond this point, i.e., to acquire 
sufficient size and maturity expressed in capabilities for basic engineering 
and turnkey projects, extraordinary support measures are needed, 
including profitable large contracts, strong support vis-a-vis foreign 
technology owners, risk-taking on the part of clients, ample credit, and 
other facilities. This hypothesis, which seems to be borne out by the 
findings in the Brazilian case study, has significant policy implications. It 
would be important to identify the moment when a promising CEDO has 
reached the "inflexion point" in which a package of measures may speed 
up and consolidate its development; and it would be useful to develop 
guidelines for the design of those measures. 
THE ORGANIZATION OFA NATIONAL C&E CAPABILITY 
The development of C&E capabilities implies the development of 
CEDOs and that of design capabilities in project owners, productive units, 
construction firms, and capital goods manufacturers. It is very important to 
develop in-house capabilities related to the "factory floor," and it was 
mentioned that of some 100 cases of exports of turnkey plants from 
Argentina none had been done by an independent CEDO. 
The problems in building up a national C&E capability are bound to be 
very different in countries of different size and production structures (for 
instance, Peru and India), so that policy suggestions cannot easily be 
transferred from one to the other. Different sectors show different types of 
CEDOs, which may require different promotion policies. 
TYPE OF KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO SECTOR 
From (1) to (5) in the following typology, there is an increase in (a) the 
intensity of links in the industrial system that are produced by CEDO 
activities and (b) the volume of consulting and engineering design services 
as a proportion of the total cost of investment projects: (1) civil works, 
infrastructure, building: knowledge - embodied in civil engineering 
construction; CEDO - civil engineering design firm; (2) textile, plastics, 
mechanical, and similar manufacturing industry: knowledge - embodied 
in layout, organization of production, and internal transport; CEDO -
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engineering design firm oriented to the industrial buildings, equipment 
installation, the supply of utilities, a general engineering design firm; (3) 
steel, cement, paper: knowledge - embodied in equipment; CEDO -
engineering design firm specializing in the erection of heavy equipment; 
(4) automated installations (telecommunications, automatic transporta-
tion of products, automatic production plants): knowledge - embodied 
in the software; CEDO - automatic systems engineering design firm; and 
(5) chemicals, petrochemicals: knowledge - embodied in the process; 
CEDO - process engineering design firm (J. Perrin, contribution at the St. 
Jovite meeting). 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Finally, the participants discussed the question of further research on 
consulting and engineering design. There was general agreement about 
the major role of C&E capabilities in development and the need for explicit 
government intervention to build those capabilities to the level of basic 
engineering. Further studies were felt to be necessary on the subject, and 
it was agreed, on the basis of the results shown by the case studies, that 
significant policy issues could be identified and subjected to research 
through the use of appropriate social science research methods. 
The participants agreed that this research is not easy. How developing 
countries may acquire and utilize C&E capabilities is a complex question, 
on which there is much scattered knowledge but also much ignorance. 
Empiric research tends to come up with many anecdotal views, which have 
to be pieced together. Mention was made of the iterative approach taken 
in the past 10 years by researchers at Grenoble University: hypotheses 
were made about the role of CEDOs and C&E services in economic 
development, and case studies were conducted in different locations, 
leading to a new round of reflection and theorizing, more case studies, etc. 
Although the formulation and the testing of hypotheses in this field 
were recognized as difficult tasks, some major lines of inquiry were 
suggested that could lead to testable hypotheses: 
• The CEDO as a link between different activities related to industrial 
development (production, construction, capital goods, R&D, training, and 
finance) and between the services required to formulate and implement an 
investment project (feasibility studies, basic engineering, detailed 
engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning, etc.); 
• The factors affecting the development, functioning, and utilization of 
CEDOs: explicit and implicit policies, characteristics of the national 
context, characteristics of the international context; and 
• Alternative strategies for the development of CEDOs and the mea-
sures required by each. 
It was agreed that research should be action-oriented, looking for 
results that are directly useful to policymakers and promoting the 
participation of the latter and other important participants in the research 
process itself and in the discussion of results. 
The participants felt that a concerted effort to carry out studies on C&E 
in a number of developing countries would enhance the value of research, 
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through discussion and comparison of results; this would naturally call for 
a common method and instruments of resear~h as uniform as possible.33 
THE SHAPE OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
What shape is further research to have? What topics should it deal 
with, and how? Partial replies to these questions came up in some of the 
case studies presented in this volume and in the conclusions of the St. 
Jovite meeting. 
CONCEPTUAL, POLICY, AND PRACTICAL RESEARCH 
Research may touch on a large number of topics; in some cases it may 
have as its principal objective an increase in knowledge about a specific 
aspect of C&E and of its impact on development. This conceptual research, 
leaning toward theory, is needed both to increase the basic understanding 
and to help prepare the ground for research programs of a more applied 
nature. 
Policy research, i.e., research aimed at identifying policy options and 
evaluating policy instruments and concrete measures, would probably be 
a more important endeavour in developing countries, because of its direct 
relevance to policymaking and policy implementation, particulary when 
conducted in an action-oriented fashion. 
Empiric research may also be carried out on very practical questions, 
such as the development of useful procedures, guidelines, and methods 
of immediate application to the management of CEDOs and of investment 
projects. On this there is already a certain amount of experience in some 
developing countries, which it may be worthwhile to examine, codify, and 
make available to other such countries. A promising way to accomplish this 
task is through a cooperation network of mature CEDOs in several 
countries. 
MAIN AREAS AND ISSUES FOR RESEARCH 
Research on the development and utilization of C&E. capabilities in 
developing countries may be carried out at three levels: that of the 
organization producing C&E services, the focus being on its evolution, 
maturing, and functioning; that of the project, the focus on performance 
of local CEDOs and the value of the services they produce; and finally, at a 
general, macro level, an examination being undertaken of the supply of 
C&E capabilities, nationally and by sector, and their utilization by public 
and private units. 
Some of the principal aspects that merit research are: 
• The mature CEDO and its functioning: (a) role of a CEDO as a link, or 
an intermediary, between technology-generating activities and productive 
activities, and between the capital goods sector and the productive 
activities, with experimental evidence of this role; (b) rationalities of 
33 An international collaborative research project on Consulting and 
Engineering Design Capabilities in Developing Countries was drafted by the 
participants in St. Jovite as a basis for a proposal to be submitted to the 
International Development Research Centre. 
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different types of CEDOs-the captive CEDO, the state CEDO, the private 
CEDO (is the profit motive detracting from the potential social role; when 
can private CEDOs function as pure CEDOs, and when do they need to be a 
part of a larger organization with other activities such as construction or 
production?); (c) efficiency of a CEDO and of the services it produces; 
here one may use the approach suggested in the Korean report; depen-
dent variables would be the productive efficiency of the engineering 
services (achievement of cost and duration targets, production of quality 
services) and the productive efficiency of the CEDO; factors affecting 
them are environmental (noncontrollable), policy level (semicontrolla-
ble), and project level (controllable); a model would have to be developed 
about the interrelations among the variables, from which hypotheses may 
be derived for a systematic analysis; and (d) models of CEDOs in the 
mature state; differences with CEDOs of developed countries. 
e Development of a CEDO: (a) influence of CEDO origin on later 
development; (b) acquisition of human resources; problems and solu-
tions; training; (c) acquisition of technology; paths of technological 
learning; regularities; the main problem here is how to acquire basic 
engineering capabilities, and ultimately the capability to innovate on basic 
technology (can an independent CEDO do it in a developing country, or is 
a captive CEDO the solution to achieving the mastery of technology in the 
dynamic branches? See the enumeration of factors affecting the achieve-
ment of technology mastery in project engineering in the Brazilian case 
study); (d) relations with foreign CEDOs (are there typical patterns; what 
are the problems in participating in the crucial project decisions so that 
one may achieve full transfer of technology?); (e) government policies and 
their effects on demand, particularly purchasing practices; types of 
contracts; pricing policies (what can the state do to minimize fluctuations 
in demand, and what can the CEDO do to cope with them?); (f) effect of 
government policies on supply. 
11 The investment project: (a) the advantages of local C&E services over 
foreign ones; here a large number of questions dealing with the private 
and the social efficiency of C&E may be posed, having to do with the 
impacts on the various participants and the country at large, the costs, the 
self-reliance aspects, etc.; (b) the provision of local C&E services; the 
complementarity of in-house capacity and outside CEDO capacity in 
different types of investment projects; terms of reference and types of 
contracts; etc:; (c) the associations between local and foreign services; 
responsibilities given to local C&E capacity; demands made to the foreign 
CEDO, ensuring technology transfer, full disclosure, training of C&E 
personnel, etc.; (d) the source of funding as a barrier to the use of local 
C&E capabilities, technological inputs, equipment, etc.; what evidence 
may be gathered regarding different sources; what may be done (for 
instance, a persuasion campaign in regard to local development banks, or 
a joint international effort vis-a-vis international and regional banks); and 
(e) the effects of certain attitudes toward risk on the part of state and 
private project owners as a barrier to enlightened project formulation and 
implementation and what can be done about them. 
• Building up and utilizing the national C&E capacity: (a) organization of 
the national C&E capacity; the C&E capacity needed for the major sectors 
in the economy; criteria for appraising requirements and for planning the 
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development of capacity; the advantages and drawbacks of different types 
of CEDOs, in the context of a certain sectoral/national situation: large or 
small; in-house or independent; public or privately owned; specialized or 
multipurpose; pure or attached to another type of activity (construction, 
equipment-making, production); and the problems of small- and medium-
scale industry (what type of C&E capability may be set up for them?); (b) 
government policies in favour of demand for C&E services locally 
produced, such as legislation favouring the use of local C&E; protection 
measures for the C&E infant sector; and selection procedures that will not 
discriminate against local C&E; requirements for well-prepared invest-
ment projects for presentation to state banks and to the departments in 
charge of administering investmentincentives; modification of unfavour-
able attitudes and behaviours of public-sector investors; regulation of the 
demand for C&E services by the public sector so that fluctuations are 
minimal, creation of a fund to finance certain studies not urgently needed 
that CEDOs can carry out when demand slackens; criteria the government 
can use in bargaining with foreign financial sources to ensure a higher local 
C&E participation; (c) government policies in favour of the supply of local 
C&E services, such as credit lines for working capital and preparation of 
proposals; incentives of various kinds for supplying the local market and 
for exporting C&E services; regulation of the participation of foreign 
capital in local CEDOs - for instance, rules of the game to prevent 
undesired takeovers of successful national CEDOs; and (d) policies in 
favour of cooperation with other developing countries regarding C&E; 
creation of larger markets in one or more sectors at a subregional or higher 
level; guidelines for export of C&E services from one country to another so 
that the latter receives full benefits. 
It is clear that research efforts at the three levels of CEDO, project, and 
country should not proceed independently but should be integrated. The 
same issue will come up in two or more levels, and findings in one level will 
frequently"feed another level. In the case of an international comparative 
research effort, frequent comparisons of the results achieved by different 
national teams would be useful feedback for the quality of the work. 
Research at the level of the CEDO should concentrate on: 
• CEDOs serving modern infrastructure or industrial sectors that carry 
out large investment projects, where the main agents are public enter-
prises and agencies; such CEDOs may be captive or independent, public 
or private; they are crucial if a country is to achieve self-reliant develop-
ment; they serve sectors such as infrastructure (buildings and civil works, 
roads, ports, airports, water and sewage systems, transport systems, 
communications systems), energy (oil and gas extraction, generation of 
thermal, hydro, and nuclear energy, electricity transmission lines), mining 
(coal, iron, copper, tin, etc.), basic metallurgy (iron and steel, aluminum 
and copper smelting and refining, etc.), and process industries (chemicals, 
petrochemicals, pulp and paper, etc.). 
• CEDOs that provide a wide range of C&E services to small and medium 
industry; they may be a part of an institution like a technology institute, 
information centre, productivity organization; some countries have 
developed special consultancy institutions for the small-scale sector. 
These CEDOs are mostly in the public sector, have a very large variety of 
customers, and may charge only nominal fees for their services. Once 
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again, they share many similar problems that are worth studying. In 
particular, the case of technology institutions may constitute a worthwhile 
focus for research efforts; and 
e CEDOs that principally carry out preinvestment work; these include 
government groups in ministries, development banks, or special agencies 
that are devoted to the preparation of investment projects; more or less 
stable in-house groups of productive units; and small private foms that 
may also offer a narrow range of engineering services as subcontractors to 
large CEDOs. 
At the project level, one may follow the suggestion contained in the 
Korean case study and carry out a combined cross-sectional and longitudi-
nal analysis. The first step would be ·to examine a number of similar 
projects, and the second would be to analyze investment projects carried 
out during the last 10-15 years in a branch or branches and to outline their 
evolution in terms of the way they have been carried out. The focus of such 
research should initially be on the CEDOs reviewed in this publication, as a 
natural extension of the information gathered thus far. 
Finally, at the country level, a survey should be made of the evolution 
of C&E activities, relating it to the characteristics of industrial and 
technological development in the past. This information would serve as a 
framework for studies at the CEDO and project levels and would shed light 
on the factors that have influenced the past development and utilization of 
C&E capability. Another general aspect to be examined is the national 
environment within which CEDOs operate at present - policies, legisla-
tion, contextual factors. Such an examination would permit a more 
adequate discussion of possible actions in the policy areas under study. 
Here, as suggested in the Philippines case study, it would be desirable to 
focus research on cause-effect analysis of specific questions, rather than 
to make case studies. The methods can be designed on the basis of some of 
the categories and approaches developed in the STPI project. 
PROBLEMS 
Research on C&E presents certain difficulties, springing from the 
relative novelty of the field, the complexity of the subject, and the 
problems in gaining access to data. 
The relative novelty of this field as a focus for research means that 
basic concepts have not yet crystalized sufficiently and that there is a need 
to structure properly this field of work.34 Thus, further exploratory work is 
needed before efforts on theory, formulation of detailed hypotheses, and 
the application of the hypothetical-deductive methods of social science 
research will be meaningful. The comparison between national and 
sectoral experiences may show those aspects that are specific to certain 
sectors and countries and those that are more universal. 
The complexity of the subject is reflected in the fact that there are 
many different participants and a large number of variables (related to the 
environment, the policies of government, and the characteristics of 
CEDOs, clients, and projects). This complexity makes it difficult to 
34 The novelty came out clearly at the St. jovite meeting, where new concepts 
and new situations were being introduced into the discussion almost up to the last 
moment. 
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formulate testable hypotheses, and the testing is often difficult because 
not enough cases may be found for statistical validation in developing 
countries - few CEDOs worthy of study,, few investment projects with 
significant local CEDO participation in which data may be collected, etc. 
Also, CEDOs, taken as units of analysis, are sometimes difficult to define 
(when does a technical group in a firm become an in-house CEDO; what 
part of an industrial research institute may be considered as a CEDO?) and 
show widely varying characteristics, with strong idiosyncratic overtones in 
their structure, behaviour, history, relations to other participants, etc. 
Thus, a search for regularities and general conclusions is difficult.35 
The study of the process of development of C&E capabilities faces the 
problem that whatever factors have been important influences in the past 
may no longer be significant and, therefore, their study would be of little 
use as a basis for predictions or as a guide to action at present. A successful 
strategy used by a CEDO in the past may not be successful today for a 
similar CEDO. 
In addition, there may be problems in gaining access to information 
about CEDOs and investment projects. Even with a great deal of openness 
and goodwill on the part of the CEDO, it may be difficult to carry out the 
necessary series of interviews with key personnel, who are busy and 
always on the run or to obtain information from documents and files, 
which may be in disarray, if they exist at all. In the case of projects it may 
not be easy to get in touch with all the principal participants, particularly if 
the task has been carried out long ago. However, the successful experi-
ence of the case studies included in this volume has shown that the 
necessary information can be collected if the research team makes 
sufficient efforts and makes a correct approach to the different participants 
possessing the information. 
METHODS 
At this relatively early stage of knowledge about the subject, research 
has to rely mainly on inductive methods, which gather a large amount of 
information and extract tentative conclusions on a weight-of-evidence 
approach; statistical testing of hypotheses is feasible only in a few 
well-defined situations. 
Case studies, cross-sectiorial analyses, longitudinal or time-series 
analyses, historical analyses of the development of an industrial sector and 
the role played by the C&E design capability, and prescriptive analyses of 
policy issues are potential first steps. Various research instruments should 
be developed, among them: measurement scales for a number of 
parameters (such as those mentioned earlier in this chapter); interview 
guidelines and questionnaires for users, project owners, CEDO managers, 
and policymakers; guidelines for prescriptive analysis, etc. The collection 
35 An example is the study of technology acquisition by a CEDO in a certain 
branch. It is likely that very few CEDOs will be found in one branch and country for 
which it makes sense to study this characteristic; hence the universe is small. Each 
CEDO in a certain way is unique; technology acquisition seems to be a highly 
idiosyncratic process where personal and chance factors play an important role. 
Perhaps anthropologic approaches would be better, because they would retain the 
richness and diversity of the process under study. 
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of data would take place mainly through the analysis and summary of 
existing literature, surveys of quantitative information, questionnaire 
surveys, and interviews. 
Case studies, in particular, are useful ways of starting research in 
complex situations where many variables and decision centres are 
present, as in many aspects of C&E development and utilization. Case 
studies incorporate this complexity in the detailed descriptions of indi-
vidual situations. Because they require the use of an inductive 
methodological approach and do not imply the collection of data for 
testing conjectures and hypotheses, they cannot give conclusions of a 
general validity. But the analysis of all the elements of a situation and their 
interrelations permits the identification of aspects that otherwise would 
not be clearly perceived. Case studies performed in different sectors and 
countries on the same situation and issue (for instance, training of C&E 
personnel through association with a foreign CEDO in an investment 
project), if done with a similar design as regards the main questions asked 
and the type of information collected and examined, may allow a certain 
degree of comparison of results and make it possible to formulate 
conceptual interpretations and hypotheses that may later be submitted to 
further corroboration, perhaps through statistical evidence. 
As has already been said, research should be action-oriented, aiming 
at producing not only intellectual results but also a number of practical 
results, principally a change of attitudes, a learning process in those 
participating in the work or being in close touch with it, and the collection 
and analysis of much useful information through the study and compari-
son of experiences, the discussion of results, and the gathering of data in 
general. 
As indicated by Sagasti in Science and technology for development: 
main comparative report of the STPI project (1978, Ottawa, Canada, IDRC, 
IDRC-109e), in action-oriented research the objective should be to 
generate useful knowledge for policymaking, decision-making, and plan-
ning. This goal calls for an attitude different from that in academic social 
science research. 
Action-oriented researchers should avoid simplifying a problem too 
much but rather look at it in all its complexity. The temptation should be 
resisted to fragment a problem too much and to introduce simplifying 
assumptions that would allow the use of more conventional research 
approaches. There should be an effort to understand the nature of 
conflicts, the value premises, and the attitudes of different participants. 
The collaboration of researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds 
would seem to be important so that issues may be considered from 
different viewpoints. 
The involvement of policymakers and participants is essential in 
action-ori~nted research. This close interaction may bring about important 
practical results, as a consequence of the collective learning exercise. 
PROSPECTS 
Although the subject of consulting and engineering design is still to be 
thoroughly examined and requires further exploratory work, a number of 
important problem areas and issues can be identified and may be explored 
principally through inductive approaches that need the gathering of ample 
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evidence. In a novel and complex field of research such as this, there are 
limits to the possibilities of experimental verification and to attempts at 
explaining clearly causal relations between policy measures and effects. In 
the face of such limitations one may not be able to give a definitive reply to 
questions, but it may be possible to develop explanatory hypotheses, 
which, when confirmed to a certain degree, may be able to reduce the 
uncertainty borne of ignorance and help in connecting knowledge with 
action. Successive approximations may enable one to produce a signifi-
cant answer to a clearly formulated question, on the basis of three, four, or 
five cases from which certain patterns emerge, allowing one to formulate 
tentative generalizations to be checked at a further stage. Furthermore, 
there are certain issues where the deductive approach may be employed at 
this stage. 
In this incremental way, results may be achieved that will undoubtedly 
lower the coefficient of ignorance of policymakers and participants, 
particularly if comparisons can be made from the experiences analyzed in 
different countries, so that better measures may be envisaged to develop 






CREATION OF ENGINEERING SERVICE COMPANIES IN KOREA, 
15MAY1969 
The majority of major industrial plants, into which a vast amount of foreign and 
domestic capital investments has been channeled, have been built with foreign 
capital, foreign technology, and foreign services in all phases of their construction: 
from basic design to test operation. Therefore, the participation of the Korean 
engineers in, and the use of domestically available materials for, the construction 
of these plants has been impossible, while the lack of our technical know-how and 
the shortage of adequately trained Korean engineers have made it difficult for us to 
ask foreign countries for our greater participation in these projects. As a result, the 
drain on our foreign exchange reserves has been considerable. Should this 
situation be allowed to continue, the loss of foreign exchange will certainly 
increase as the amount of investments goes up. 
To deal with the situation, the government will henceforth do away with the 
turnkey job principle to make newly emerging Korean engineering service 
companies and homemade products take a greater share in these projects. For this 
purpose, the establishment of joint-venture service companies will be encouraged 
between foreign engineering service firms of high standing and able engineers at 
home who have been pooled by industries, and thus to form a combination of 
foreign capital and domestic skills. 
By so doing, the government encourages the use of homemade equipment 
and materials fully in the construction of plants and promotes a learning process 
through the participation of local engineers in all phases of plant construction, 
from basic design to final operation. 
At the present stage, the most important problem is how to increase the 
degree of participation of Korean engineers in, and the quantity of homemade 
materials to be used for, such plant construction. In particular, the government is 
striving for the construction of petrochemical plants, for which an investment of 
about $200 million will be required. In the implementation of these projects, 
conventional methods will be boldly discarded in favour of the utilization of the 
aforementioned joint-venture engineering service companies so that any further 
drain on the country's foreign exchange may be curbed. In addition, the 
government will encourage the integration of Korean manufacturing industries 
with an eye to raising the standards of domestic products, and all efforts will be 
made to search for able brains and excellent engineers hitherto untapped. 
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